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ABSTRACT
TURKEY- EU RELATIONS AND IT’S FUTURE 
Yaycioglu, Zeynep
Master of Arts in International Relations 
Supervisor; Prof. Dr. Yüksel inan
December 2004
This thesis analyzes the process of both the European integration 
process from the beginning till now and the Turkey- EU relations. It also analyzes 
the existing situation in die lights of the past and gives knowledge to the readers the 
developments that had happened throughout this long process. In addition, it tries to 
make anticipations about the future of European Union and Turkey- EU relations.
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ÖZET
TÜRKİYE-AB İLİŞKİLERİ VE GELECEĞİ 
Yaycıoğlu, Zeynep
Yüksek Lisans, Lfluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Yüksel İnan
Aralık 2004
Bu çalışma başlangıcından bugüne kadar olan Avrupa bütünleşme 
sürecini ve Türkiye- AB ilişkilerini analiz ediyor. Bunun yanı sıra, geçmişin ışığında 
a su an içinde bulunan durumu anlatarak okuyucuya bu geniş dönemdeki gelişmeleri 
anlatıyor. Ayrıca, bütün bunlardan yola çıkarak hem AB ‘nin geleceği hem de 
Türkiye- AB ilişkileri hakkında geleceğe yönelik tahminler yapmaya çalışıyor.
Anahtar Kelimeler: AB, AB- Türkiye İlişkileri, AB’nin Geleceği
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Turkey isolated herself from the West till the end of the 1920’s due to the War of 
Independence and certain events that had lead Turkey to stand against the West. For 
example: Mosul Case, Etablis Dispute, etc.
At the end of the 1920’s, as the revisionist states started to display their policies, 
Turkey turned its face to the West by the end of the 1920’s and became a member of 
The League of Nations. This line of being a member of the Western block foreign 
policy has continued in pre and post war periods and has become one of the foreign 
policy objectives of the Turkish Republic. Consistent with this aim, Turkey became 
an almost original member of the Council of Europe. This political link paved the 
way for military alliances with the West: Such as full membership to NATO, and 
later at the end of the 1990’s to Western European Union as an associate member.
The political integration of Turkey, which started by the Council of Europe, later 
turned out to an economic integration by the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement in 
1963 by the EEC. As the EEC developed and started to turn out to be a political 
union, Turkey’s relations with this organization also continued. Despite certain 
interruptions resulted from Turkish domestic and foreign policy objectives and 
economic problems, Turkey raised its clear desire to be a part of the this new 
identity. Turkey, in 1987, when this new identity was not ready for enlargement.
applied to be a member to the ECSC, EEC, and to the EURATOM. However, its 
application was refused on the grounds that the organization was not ready for a new 
enlargement till the establishment of a single market among its members. This 
decision did not discourage Turkey and it renewed its application to the EU for full 
membership in 1997. This desire of Turkey was positively responded in 11-12, 
December 1999 by declaring it as a candidate state, on the basis of the same criteria 
as applied to the other candidate states.
Although the process of Turkish membership is slow when compare with the others 
and involves much more complexity due to its sui-generous character of this 
relationship, it has been evolving. However, not only the nature of this relationship 
has been evolving but also the actors and their preferences have been changing 
depending on internal and external circumstances. It is clear that EU membership is a 
desired outcome of Turkey’s long lasting foreign policy objectives and also a 
consistent one. Therefore, from Turkey’s point of view there is no problem and all 
the domestic arrangements have already being made for the realization of this 
process under the light of “ Annual Progress Reports”. However, from the EU point 
of view, the story is different and much more problematic. As it is clearly known, EU 
has been facing dilemmas and uncertainties regarding its role in the international 
conjecture and despite the clues, and some attempts; no formal and binding action, 
which indicates the EU’s sincerity, has been taken place yet to prove the EU’s 
sincerity to answer clearly. The members still did not reach to a consensus about the 
future of EU. Some remarking developments were done and further developments 
are still planned to be done but nothing seems clear and fully agreed yet, till the
approval of the European Constitution, by its members according to their domestic 
law procedures.
By taking these realities into consideration, in order to be objective, this study while 
examining these relations, also tries to analyze the dynamics of the Union. It should 
be noteworthy that as it is mentioned in the constitutional, and also in some formal 
documents of the Union, an admission of a new member does not only depend on the 
fiilfillment of the required political and economic criteria but also depends on the 
conditions of EU itself, as an international identity and most probably to the 
domestic factors of this identity. As Romano Prodi mentions, the EU has to decide 
on what kind of a Union the EU desires. EU has to develop it's own identity and 
clarify the fixture role of the EU, which everybody agrees on.^  Therefore, the 
preferences and choices of EU in accordance with the conditions of international 
system will be one of the determining factors in this relationship.
This research aims to give knowledge to the reader and to the researchers, the 
developments that had happened throughout this long process. In addition, the timing 
of this research also seems appropriate, as the time is getting closer for the EU to 
decide upon for the accession negotiation with Turkey leading to membership. In 
addition, the systematic changes within the international environment have indeed 
gained a momentum after September 11. Turkey, after these events, now regained the 
opportunity to preserve its pre-strategic importance that it used to have during the 
Cold War. This reality has not only affected the relationship between EU and Turkey 
but also the preferences of these actors. Therefore, their preferences specifically the
' Robert J. Guttman, Europe In the New Century: Visions o f an Emerging Superpower, London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, foreword
preference of the EU regarding it’s future will establish the destiny of Turkey and 
EU relations.
This dissertation aims to reflect, the developments that had happened since 1960’s 
between the parties. In addition, by analyzing the past, by emphasizing the recent 
developments, it will also try to anticipate the future. This research, no matter it has a 
general and a descriptive nature, also reflects when a necessity arises my own 
personal views related to the issues in order to make this study an analytical one.
In the first part of this study, European Integration Theories will be explained and if 
necessary will be criticized to give the reader the opportunity to choose their choices 
or even to create their own by using the hypothesis of the existing ones. In the 
second part, the process of the EU integration will be explained in order to evaluate 
its current status and anticipate its future status in international conjecture. In the 
third part, a brief history of Turkey- EU relation will be summarized in order to give 
the reader a background information. After analyzing the history, in the fourth part, 
the current situation of the EU will be explained in order to display the reasons of the 
idea of “ New Europe”, which has a tendency to be an influential political identity in 
addition to its economic nature. All the internal and external causes and factors will 
be examined to foresee its future. In the fifth part of this study, EU’s attempts and 
efforts, which they try to overcome these internal and external problems, will be 
classified. In this part, more emphasis will be put on the Constitution for Europe 
signed on 29, October 2004, which aims to give the EU a political and a legal 
legitimacy. Furthermore, this document will increase the EU’s influence in political 
affairs and in a competitive power. In addition, this chapter will also try to examine
the barriers that the EU has to come across will also be summarized. Then, the future 
of the EU-Turkey relation will be anticipated by examining the difficulties, that 
Turkey will face and also the benefits it will receive through membership.
CHAPTER II
THEORIES ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The European Union since it's establishment has been one of the major concerns of 
theoreticians due to its sui generis character and structure. It has not been the only 
international institution in the international system but its aim of the establishment 
was different from the existing other ones; such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. In the existing international 
organizations, members are independent on each other on certain issues. The nature 
of co-operation within the organization has certain limits and clear boundaries. The 
existing ones are "interdependent organizations", in which national governments co­
operate on certain issues without any interference with the other states policy­
making. However, the European Union is an "integrated institution", in which a 
supra national body is created and the member states voluntarily transfer some policy 
decisions to this body. It is important to differentiate the meaning of integration and 
interdependence. In integration, unlike in interdependence, the members of the 
organization transfer their degree of sovereignty and authority to a supra-national 
body, like it was in the European Coal and Steel Commimity. The main aim behind 
the efforts of establishment of the European Union was the federalization of Europe 
without setting up a federal European state. Owing to this peculiar structure, the 
European Union has become the case study of some of the theoreticians.
 ^Martin J.Dedman, The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95, London and New  
York: Routledge, 1996,p. 7
There is no doubt that European Coal and Steel Community had been unique 
experience likewise the European Economic Community (EEC) was. European 
Union is the most unique international organization, which is the continuation of 
European Coal and Steel Community. It might be a sign of things to come. As Ernst 
Haas in the Uniting of Europe described, Western Europe as a "living laboratory" for 
the study of the collection action between members states. ^
There have been many theories to explain the integration of EU, and also the policy 
making of EU. In this paper, these theories will be briefly explained, analyzed and 
also criticized. The aim is: to present the reader the different ways of studying 
European Union and European integration. Among those, ways of theoretical 
explanations are one of the most important ways. Theories are the small and minor 
part of the big picture in which too many figures might be seen. Theories of 
International Relations, in particular theories of EU, by taking some of these figures 
and variables in account have been trying to explain just the small part of the 
international system. It will be wrong to expect from one paradigm to explain every 
thing. Theories only provide us the clues about the politics by using their own 
peculiar concepts and variables. It is our job to select or analyze and even to combine 
the most appropriate and useful one for our small part of the picture.
Regarding the European Union, there exists mainly two different types of theories. 
However, theories divide into the waves according to the EU's integration process. 
Each wave has it's own theories depending on the periods they are raised. The first
 ^Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, Standford: Standford 
University Press, 1968, p.4
waves of theories are: neo- functionalism and intergovemmentalism. The theories of 
the second wave are mainly liberal intergovemmentalism and new institutionalism.'* 
2.1 FIRST WAVE THEORIES
2.1.1 NEO-FUNCTIONALISM
It is the continuation and the revised or better to say re-evaluated version of the 
Mitrany's functionalism. Although on one hand the means, variables, and the end 
(the dissolution of territorially based authorities) are the same, on the other hand the 
main actors of integration generally change in neo- functionalism. Their perspectives 
of integration are still alike. The biggest difference is neo-functionalism by focusing 
on technical co-operation and by avoiding political debates tried to create a regional 
organization. The most influential functionalist work was the David Mitrany's work 
of " A Working Peace System". Jean Moonet and Robert Schuman, who were the 
fathers of the European integration project, were inspired by this theory. ^
What Mitrany desired in his book was a universal solution to the problems of world 
politics. He opposed the idea of creating just a regional organization. According to 
him, nationalism and the territorial organization of power were threats to peace.^ 
What the member states do by uniting among themselves is the transfer of the 
territorial problems to the European level, nothing more than this. He thought tha t" 
peace not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it.  ^ To sum up, it is 
difficult to enhance the political will to create a new constitution.
'* Ian Bache and Steohen George, Politics in the European Union, Oxford; Oxford University Press,
2001, p.6
’ Laura Cram, "Integration Theory and the Study o f the European Policy Process" in Jeremy 
Richardson (ed.), European Union: Power and Policy- Making, London and New York: Routledge, 
1996, p.40
* David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966, p. 82 
’ D.Mitrany.,op.cit, p.96
Secondly, he differentiated the political- constitutional co-operation and technical- 
functional co-operation. He mentioned that we should work for co-operation but by 
touching as little as possible to the points of divergence, which was nearly
o
impossible in political- constitutional tasks. He proposed technical international 
organizations for the welfare of societies. According to him, it was the rules, experts 
and the principle of technical self- determination can lead to the decline of 
ideological conflict and the fall of nationalism, which at the end leads to peaceful co­
operation at the world level.^
To sum up, he tried to create a functional international organization, which might 
create a peaceful environment at the world level. This ftmctional organization might 
dilute differences through learned habits. He was not against the formation of 
political union but he thought that this end is too ambitious.
Neo- functionalism has developed mainly to fill the gaps and to answer the non-
answered questions of functionalism. As Laura Cram mentions, it is a mixture of
intellectual parentage. * * The father of neo- functionalism advocated his study to the
process of integration rather than the background conditions of integration. As Haas
mentioned in his book" The Uniting of Europe" the aim of neo- functionalism.
"Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre- existing national states."*^
* Ibid, p.58
 ^D.Mitrany, op.cit., p.7210Ibid, p.97
" Laura Cram, Policy - Making in the EU, London and New York; Routledge, 1997,p.l2 
E. Haas, op.cit, p .l6
Unlike functionalism, neo- functionalism takes the states, as territorially based units, 
and as the main actors taking part in this process. States have been trying to integrate 
by forming new territorially based international organizations. Western European 
states tried to integrate by forming European Coal and Steel Community. As Haas 
emphasized the organization, which is capable of maximizing the powers of 
members, are the key components in this theory.
Ultimate goal of this integration theory is the creation of a political community with 
the help of the " agent" of integration.'^ International organizations can serve as a 
channel to facilitate the transfer of loyalties to the European level.
Neo- functionalism accepts the social actors and technical experts as major actors 
who behave according to their national interests at the first stage. The actors' 
behavior appears to be driven by instrumental self- interest, largely conceived of in 
economic terms. '^However, unlike Mitrany, he attaches importance to the national 
political elite who can lead to further political integration. As it was mentioned 
earlier, the ultimate goal of this school of thought is to establish political community, 
which is the continuation of economic integration. Neo-fiinctionalism proposes two- 
step integration model initially economic and then political integration follows either 
federal or confederate state.However, it is different from federalism because neo- 
functionalism aims at creating a supranational political community through economic 
integration.
E. Haas, op.cit, p.29
Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation- State: Functionalism and International Organization, Standford: 
Standford University Press, 1964,p.524
James Casporaso, "Regional Integration: Understanding Our Past and Anticipating Our Future." 
Journal o f European Public Policy,5{\), p.9
Cmar O zen," Neo-Functionalism and TTie Change in the Dynamics o f  Turkey-EU Relations", 
Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol III- NumberS, and September- November 1998.
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Haas has divided the political field in two parts: "high politics", which involves 
security issues, defense and diplomacy; the second is the "low politics" which 
involves economic and technical issues. He proposed a model in which integration 
in low politics can spread to high politics. This is called " spill over effect". The 
related political bodies from different national governments co-operate in economic 
or technical issues. They transfer some degree of loyalty to this supra-national 
organization. Then, through the learning process, which they can attain in that 
organization, facilitate the co-operation in other issue areas. This is fixnctional spill 
over: how integration in one policy- area leads to spill over to the other issue area. 
Haas focused on the linkages between sectors, which can increase the possibility of 
political community. It makes "snowball effect".’’ Through this integration process, 
interests of these different groups and elite will be re-defined at regional rather than 
national level. Supra- national organization leads the actors to upgrade of common 
interests. This was political spill- over: how the existence of supra- national
organization might generate a self- reinforcing process of institution building. In 
addition he mentions the geographical spill over as well. Co- operation among group 
of states might affect others group of states. ’^ This has been what really happened the 
EU in enlargement process.
Neo- fimctionalism is really good at explaining the earlier stages of integration: It is 
a self- sustaining process. Establishment of European Coal and Steel Community, 
then ECSC spilled over European Economic Community and the European Atomic
L.Cram., op.cit, pp. 15-17
Cmar Ozen, " Neo- Functionalism and the Change In the Dynamics o f Turkey-EU Relations",
Perceptions Journal o f International Affairs, Vol 3, NumberS, 1998 19 1E.Haas., op.cit.., p .317
11
Energy Community. However, EU experienced what I call a stagnation period, 
which cannot be explained by the assumptions of neo- functionalism. The reason of 
this was as Cinar Ozen mentions in his article was it's ignorance of "peripheral"
factors based on international conditions and it's ignorance of "cultural" factors.20
2.1.2 INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
Intergovemmentalism is the second integration theory, which tries to explain the 
European integration. We can test the validity of the realist assumptions by this 
theory. The spirit of realism really dominates this integration theory. States are the 
main actors in international politics. Issue areas are hierarchical and military security 
is the number one priority for all sates. Politics is based on power and the goal of 
every nation is to maximize their national interests. As Morgenthau mentioned "
91Politics is struggle for power".
Stanley Hoffman, who was the main figure of intergovemmentalism, developed his 
theory on the grounds of realists’ assumptions; however, he rejected the realist 
assumption that states are the unitary actors. At the same time, it is the critique of 
neo- functionalism. As it was mentioned in neo- functionalism one of the fallbacks of 
neo- functionalism is it's ignorance of international environment; unlike this theory, 
Hoffman stressed the importance of international environment and the global system. 
Moreover, he focused on the impacts of national states in the global system. He took 
states as the actors who pursue their self- interests and in the global and conflictual 
environment. States put more emphasis on the importance of " purely local or purely
Ibid,pp.l-13
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4*'* edition. New  
York: Knopf, 1967
12
global" concerns than the regional ones. He mentioned," Regional subsystems have
99only a reduced autonomy".
Furthermore, he found that co-operation has a "contingent nature". When the 
reasons for co-operation disappear, there was a risk of reversal of transnational co­
operation. The interests of national governments are more influential in European 
integration and national governments are resistant to this process. This can prevent 
the snow- ball effect from taking part in the integration process. It can be concluded 
that integration occurs as long as states parallel to their national interests desire it to 
occur.
He implicitly accepted the two kinds of politics; high and low politics. Then he
argued that "Monnet Method" was underestimating the " logic of diversity".
According to him, in the areas of high politics, states are less likely to co- operate
where national interests are at stake because states cannot compensate the losses in
these issue areas by the gains in other issue areas. Decision- making in the European
integration was a zero sum game. It was the interests and actions of European states,
which lead to European integration. Hoffman defined integration as:
"Russian roulette is fine only as long as the gun is filled with 
blanks...Functional integration's gamble could be won only if the method 
had sufficient potency to promise an excess of gains over losses, and of 
hopes over frustrations. Theoretically, this may be true of economic 
integration. It is not true of political integration (in the sense of " high 
politics)
Stanley Hoffman, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f The Nation State and The Case o f Western 
Europe, Daedulus95, p.865 
Ibid, p.895 
Ibid, p.882 
Ibid, p.882
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To sum up, intergovemmentalism put the national interests of the states at the center 
of the European integration and according to this approach co- operation can only 
exist and continue as long as the states want it and this is difficult to achieve in high 
politics. This theory is good at explaining the De Gaulle period and the stagnation 
period of the European Economic Community.
2.2 SECOND WAVE THEORIES
These theories have begun to emerge after the Single European Act (1989). This Act 
leads to the formation of European Economic Community, and a single market and 
the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Although there have been new developments in the 
European integration process, the essence of this debate has remained the same. The 
research questions are: Who is the main actor in integration process and what is the 
expected end? Theoretical debates lack behind the process itself. For example, only 
Wallace touched upon the enlargement process. Mainly, two theories have achieved 
to develop new assumptions about the European policy making and the integration
process. These are "revived neo- functionalism" and " revised intergovemmentalism"
26
2.2.1 LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
Andrew Moravcsik is the architect of liberal intergovemmentalism. As Hix 
mentions, he divided the European integration process into two stages. In the first 
stage; like in neo- functionalism, national elite, domestic economic and social actors 
owing to their self-interest requires integration. These actors compete for their own 
interests represented, defended by national governments in European Union level. In
26 Lykke Friss and Anna Murphy, ''An Ever Larger Union? Conceptualizing Enlargement"  ^Danish 
Institute of International Affairs, workshop, 23-25 June 2000
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the second stage, national governments, like in intergovemmentalism, have begun 
bargaining for their own national interests. This had lead to European integration. 
For example, it was the bargaining between France and Germany and France in this 
issue was the key factor in the formation of Single European Act.
States are unitary and supra-national institutions have limited effects on eventual 
decisions. States do their best to protect their national interests and less likely to 
transfer their high degree of sovereignty to the supra national institutions.^’ However, 
by bargaining among themselves, they can produce positive- sum outcomes. Because 
as it has been in the regime theory, institutions can reduce transaction costs and 
minimize the uncertainty.
In addition, unlike the realist school of thought, state preferences are not fixed and 
exogenously given. He believes that domestic factors are the most important factor in 
the formation of state preferences. He gives more importance to economic interests 
rather than the geopolitical ones. He mentions," State behavior reflects the rational 
actions of governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and 
abroad by their strategic enviroiunent". On the other side of the coin, he produces a 
concept" agency slack".^* This generally occurs when the domestic factors delegate 
their level of discretion to the governmental agents. If the interests of the domestic 
societal factors do not converge, the agent gains a room for maneuver. International 
institutions gain importance here, because states agents in order to maximize their 
room for maneuver, use the EU institutions. National governments can use EU
Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, London: Macmillan Press, 1999,p.l5 
■^Andrew Moravcsik, " Negotiating The Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional 
Statecraft In The European Community", International Organization 19-56, 1991, p.45 
Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, London: Macmillan Press, 1999,p.l5 
Andrew Moravcsik, " Preferences and Power In The European Community: A 
Liberalgovemmentalist Approach", Journal o f Common Market Studies 31:4,( 473-524), 1993, p.483 
Ibid, p.488
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institutions " to manipulate their own domestic constituents into accepting common 
policies".
To sum up, by combining some elements of realism and neo- fimctionalism, he 
produced two steps of European integration and by doing this; he tries to increase the 
importance of international institutions unlike intergovemmentalism.
2.2.2 REVIVED NEO- FUNCTIONALISM
One of the most important revived neo- ftinctionalists is Paul Pierson, who is 
inspired by one of the theories of political science; historical institutionalism. ^^He 
proposed a three-step model. At the initial stage, by considering the existing 
preferences, a policy decision is made and institutional rules are chosen. States 
cannot predict their preferences at the second stage. At the latter stage, new strategic 
environment leads the formation of new and common preferences of states and 
supra- national institutions. This finally leads the emergence of new rules and 
political competence at the European level. At the final stage, a new policy decision 
is made and this “locks" the process of integration into a particular path. At these 
stages, states have imperfect information. "^^ To sum up, he mentions that state 
preferences are not fixed and they are not being formed due to the high uncertainty. 
They are formed, unlike in neo- functionalism, in accordance with institutional 
context and " the logic of appropriateness"
Andrew Moravcsik, Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and 
International Cooperation, Chicago: Paper presented to the Conference o f Europeanists, 31 March-2 
April, 1994, p.45 
S.Hix., op.cit, p .l5  
Ibid, p. 16
Thomas Risse, " Let's Argue!; Communicative Action in World Politics", International 
Organization, Vol 54, No. 1,2000, p.4
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Other revived neo -functionalists are: Sandholtz and Zysman. They, unlike neo-
'2^
ftinctionalists and like Pierson, take the international environment into account. 
They accept that the dynamics of international context might change. For example, 
the rise of Japan and the relative decline of United States of America had caused the 
adoption of the Single European Act. ’^Secondly, he plays attention to the domestic 
factors as well. The formation of preferences can be formed by domestic elements as 
well. The domestic and international conditions are interdependent. To quote 
Sandholtz:
"The national interests of European Community states do not have 
independent existence; they are not formed in a vacuum and then brought to 
Brussels. Those interests are defined and redefined in an international and 
institutional context that includes the European Community. States define 
their interests in a different way as members of the European Community 
than they would without it."
Revived neo- functionalism by accepting the main tenets of neo- functionalism try to 
explain the dynamic developments in European integration and European policy 
making. They take the domestic and international factors, and environment as 
independent variables, which continuously affect each other, forms preferences of 
national governments.
2.2.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM
The other important paradigm, which is quite new compare to the others, is the 
Wendt’s Constructivism. The constructivist approach sees states as social actors 
whose actions follow international or domestic rules. From this perspective, state 
behavior is driven by rules, norms, institutions, and identities. Constructivism is a
L.Cram., op.cit., p.23
W. Sandholtz and J. Zysman, " 1992: Recasting the European Bargain", IForWPolitics 42; 1,1989, 
p.lOO
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structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims:
(1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory;
(2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, rather than material; (3) 
state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social 
structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic 
politics?^
Two main constructivists propositions have an important role in explaining European 
integration. The first is that the elites chose specific policies, policy ideas and 
interests because they are consistent with more general collectively held ideas, 
discourses. This proposition emphasizes the reciprocal interaction between the agents 
and the structure. Actors’ policies emerge out of interaction with the external 
environment, which can vary in response to social interaction. Therefore, this school 
opens the black box in order to test the changes of national preferences owing to 
interaction. The latter one is that through socialization and learning process common 
norms can be formulated because state preferences are not accepted as exogenously 
given and formulated through social processes. States through interaction can 
formulate different norms, policies because their practices might affect their 
priorities. This proposition makes this school long lived because through 
socialization the preferences of new generations can vary as well.
W. Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht", International Organization 
47:1,1993. p.3,1993
Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," American Political 
Science Review, 88 (June 1994), p. 385
Andrew Moravcsik, “ Is Somediing Rotten in the State o f Denmark? Constructivism and European 
Integration”, Journal o f European Public Policy,6:4 Special Issue ( 1999), pp.669-671
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There are many situations and aspects of European integration where the 
constructivists’ assumptions can be useful. For example, meetings of the European 
Council or the interstate bargaining that can explain the interaction between agent 
and structure and the level of importance of structure (environment) in the 
interactions of states in decision-making. Moreover, informal communication in 
working groups of the Council of Ministers, European-level policy networks 
centered on the Commission indicates the significance of social interaction through 
learning process and through socialization. Furthermore, the emergence of one 
common Constitution explains the probability that through socialization state 
preferences can change and through common practices, common accepted norms can
emerge.41
The biggest contribution of Constructivism to European studies is its ideas about the 
possible role of collective ideas and socialization in European integration. Of course 
the other paradigms have made implicit references to these variables but not that 
much in explicit manner. European integration theories gain important variables, 
which in my opinion will become more important in the future, with the help of 
constructivism.
It should be remembered that theories cannot explain everything with their own 
concepts. They try to explain the minor part of the complex environment. None of 
them are completely wrong or completely right. They only make assumptions and 
generalizations but their assumptions can be wrong or insufficient but this does not 
mean that they are invalid theories. Good theories are falsifiable as well. All the
“"jeiiTey Checkel,” Social Construction and Integration’’, Journal o f European Public Policy, 6:4 ( 
1998),pp. 545-60
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theories above are good at explaining their part of the picture but in order to 
understand the whole system, we should learn all of them in order to have different 
perspectives and to have an idea of the whole picture/^ By using 
intergovemmentalism, we can understand the De Gaulle period; by applying neo­
functionalism, the formation of European Community from European Coal and Steel 
Community can be explained; by Moravcsik Liberal Intergovemmentalism, the 
negotiation period of Single European Act can be understood; and finally by 
applying Sandholtz, Pierson and Zysman, the formation of national states and the 
new and latest attempt of forming the political union might be understood. Important 
thing is to know the places where these alternative theories can be used, and applied.
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 
Boston: Little and Brown, 1977, p.307
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CHAPTER III
HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION
European Union is a sui generis international organization. It was the sign of 
integration to come when it was first established and its uniqueness has continued 
though it has continued to be the sign of things to come. Therefore, as usual to better 
evaluate the current developments it is necessary to understand the stages, which 
have created today’s EU. In order to anticipate the future of the European Union, its 
history should be taken into account.
3.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF ECSC
Before the Second World War, the idea of integration with which we are so familiar 
today was nearly an impossible goal to achieve, it was only a dream, may be an 
utopia. Nations protected their national sovereignty and tended to co-operate only 
through intergovernmental agreements. However, the Second World War and its 
consequences changed the ideas of most of the Europeans. After long and 
devastating wars, the leaders realized that the only way to have a long lasting peace 
in Europe was the economic and political xmification.
As a reflection of this idea, Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 made his 
announcement, which he proposed the formation of ECSC, a supranational 
organization. The idea of creation of ECSC belonged to two brilliant statesmen: Jean 
Monnet (Director of French Planning Organization) and Robert Schuman (Foreign 
Minister of France). Their main aims were to renovate French economy and control
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Germany to reduce the risk of war/^ By taking the steel and coal under the control of 
a high-authority, they aimed at preserving peace in Europe because these two 
materials were the bulks of the military equipments. These two combined the 
geology, economics and foreign policy and created circumstances for economic 
integration. Through this co-operation, the historical rivalry between France and 
Germany was somehow solved. The ECSC required the establishment of a " High 
Authority" who controlled the production of coal and steel and enhance the supply of 
coal on equal terms inside a common market. This international organization would 
be open to all European states that were willing to participate. The Treaty of Paris 
(1951) established this organization and Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and Netherlands became the initial members.' '^* Besides this, the main 
importance of ECSC was politic rather than economic because it was the proof that if 
the leaders wanted to co-operate, they could.
3.2 EURATOM AND EEC
The ECSC was successful and it really improved the relations between Germany and 
France, and the French policy of integration and co- operation rather than isolation 
worked. Even before the acquisition of sovereignty of Germany in 1954, they had 
begun to make plans to improve economic relations. Despite the unsuccessful 
attempts of European Defense Community (EDC)"^  ^ as a political and security 
integration, the attempts of economic integration continued. One of the parts of EDC 
became influential. This was the one which called for the members of ECSC to 
abolish quotas and tariffs among themselves, establish a joint external tariff, unify
Martin J.Dedman, The Origins and Development o f the European Union 1945-95, London and New  
York: Routledge, 1996, p.57 
** Ibid, pp.58-62
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trade policy toward the rest of the world, devise common policies for other sectors, 
and finally to organize a single internal market.'^® Moimet found this unrealistic, he 
preferred sectoral integration and he proposed the establishment of European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM), which was structured in the same way of ECSC, 
and promoted the aim of European federation. He knew that the importance of steel 
and coal began to erode and nuclear energy has begun to take the place of these two. 
Monnet had to resign due to his sense of dissatisfaction of the European integration 
and Paul - Henri Spaak, who was the Belgiiun's Foreign Minister, followed his ideas 
of sectoral integration and enhanced the formation of a committee in Messina 1955 
which worked on the possibilities of further integration. The report, which was 
presented, in Venice in 1956 proposed that the two objectives of sectoral integration 
(atomic energy) and wider economic integration (a common market) be realized in 
separate organizations with separate treaties. After this meeting in an 
intergovernmental conference, it was decided to establish EURATOM and the 
European Economic Conununity (EEC) in 1957. They decided to create a single 
market and to manage the use of nuclear energy in supranational style besides these, 
in accordance with the provisions of Rome Treaty, common policies were 
established in the fields of agriculture, transportation and antitrust policies. Custom 
duties were dismantled; and most importantly the four famous freedoms of European 
integration were guaranteed: free movement of persons, goods, capital, and
services.47
It was a project, which aimed to civil and military integration besides economic integration. It was a 
French proposal but French rejected this proposal upon the decision o f French National Assembly 
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, London; Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 29 
ibid, pp.29-33
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3.3 ENLARGEMENT WAVES
In 1967 the institutions of the three European communities merged. Since then on, 
Europeans have had one Commission, one Parliament and one Council of Ministers. 
Their aim was to create "an ever closer union among the people of Europe". This 
aim gained momentum within the Community with the first enlargement by the 
membership of Denmark, United Kingdom, and Ireland. Moreover, by the Werner 
Report Europeans decided to initiate to create an economic and monetary union."*^  In 
June 1979, European citizens through general suffrage elected their own 
representatives to the European Parliament. Then, after those developments, Portugal 
and Spain applied for membership. Greece later became a member of the European 
Community in 1981. EEC became very attractive that in 1986 the applications of 
Portugal and Spain were accepted and they became members in 1986. This was the 
third and the last wave of enlargement before the formation of European Union, in 
Maastricht, in 1992.^° A detailed analysis of enlargement will be made in part 4.2.2.
3.4 SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
The European integration has been a dynamic process that not only domestic factors 
but also international factors can take part it. One of these was the decrease in the 
price of oil in the mid 1980s. This crisis led Jacques Delors (the President of the 
European Commission) to propose a " new solidarity deal" to the European 
Commimity members. This deal required the creation of a single market without 
internal borders by January 1, 1993. Moreover, he proposed to fill the economic gap
® David Alter, The Politics of European Integration In the Twentieth Centwy, Cambridge: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company, 1993, p.l45
Martin J.Dedman, The Origins and Development of the European Union J945-95, London and New  
York: Routledge, 1996, p.l23
European Commission, The European Union: A Guide for Students and Teachers, Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 1999, pp. 4-5
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between the rich and the poor community members through a financial support 
program. Thereafter, they signed the Single European Act on February 17, 1986 to 
create a single market in goods, capital and services and the guarantee of free 
movement of people. It was the first major review of the Community Treaties. It 
involved the goal of improvement of European integration after the enlargement 
waves. It also called for closer co-operation on the environment, on research and 
development and put European political co-operation on a legal footing. Moreover, 
they extended the use of majority voting among members. This implied that all 
efforts for the "harmonization" of agreements were made by a qualified majority 
voting rather than unanimity. ’^Furthermore, in order to be more democratic and to 
create an ever-closer union, they increased the power of the European Parliament.
This new treaty, as Jacques Delors thought, might have had a spill over effect. A 
single market could be a motivating force to achieve political co-operation. To 
enliven this, Delors tried to persuade the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the 
French President François Mitterrand to the need for a single currency. He was 
successful, Helmut Kohl supported this idea but he emphasized the need for 
politically integrated Emope at the expense of powerful Deutsche Mark. Therefore, 
Europeans agreed on revising the treaty in Maastricht.
3.5 THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION (1993) (MAASTRICHT)
Maastricht is the most important treaty in the history of European integration. Its 
negotiations were harsh because the member states had to face with the challenging
Martin J.Dedman, The Origins and Development o f the European Union 1945-95, London and New  
York: Routledge, 1996, p.l27
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external factors such as the collapse of Soviet Union, the ethnic wars in Eastern 
Europe. To cope with these difficulties, which were happening at their backyard, 
they had to strengthen their position. Despite Margaret Thatcher's objection that 
personally did not believe in the spirit of integration, the Maastricht Treaty was 
signed in 1992 and officially entered the force in 1993. In Maastricht, countries 
decided to adopt the new title, "European Union". It took the process of European 
integration one step further. This was the official birth of European Union, which is 
knowm today. What Maastricht introduced was; laying down a schedule for the 
introduction of the single currency (Euro), completion of single market, lifting of 
trade restrictions, giving new legal rights in terms of the notion of citizenship (right 
to vote, right of petition and right of appeal to the European Ombudsman), 
broadening the power of European Parliament: co-decision with the Council. In 
addition, Maastricht created the three-pillar structure of the European Union in order 
to increase the co-operation among members within the union on foreign policy, 
security and defense, and injustice and home affairs. It paved the way for a Common 
Foreign and Security policy. However, the main emphasis was put on the issue of 
economic and monetary union since this has been their prior goal.
On the other hand, Maastricht had a divisive impact among members as well. The 
idea of multi-speed Europe was bom. From the initial days and during the 
enlargement, it was known that there was no economic equality among the members. 
Due to this, some of the members like the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and 
Greece opted out. They, mainly due to the economic conditions or domestic 
unwillingness to Euro or better to say sensitiveness towards their national currencies.
52 Elizabeth Pond, T/ie Rebirth o f Europe, Washington; Brookings Institution Press, 2000, pp.39-44
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decided to join lately. The issues of common foreign and security policies, defense 
policies were delicate issues at that time to the countries to transfer their sovereignty.
54
The European Union has been a good project that non- member states wanted to join 
to the Union. In 1995, three neutral countries, which are; Austria, Finland and 
Sweden became members to the EU and EU had 15 members. Besides these new 
members, most of the Central and Eastern European countries have been waiting for 
membership.^^
3.6 THE AMSTERDAM TREATY (1997)
Owing to this external pressures and insufficient structure of the Union, Europeans 
realized the need to review some of the provisions of the existing treaties not only to 
be powerful and increase efficiency but also to fulfill the expectations of civil 
Europeans. The Amsterdam Treaty was signed in October 1997. The new treaty tried 
to achieve the following goals.
• To be closer to citizens, their expectations and their concerns and to 
assert their rights.
• To remove obstacles to free movement while making Europe an area or 
security.
• To enable Europe to make its voice better heard in the world.
European Commission, How Does the European Union Work?, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications o f  the European Communities, 2000, pp.l 1-12 
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, London. Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 175-180
Gerda Falkner, " Enlarging The European Union" in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), European Union: 
Power and Policy- Making, London and New York: Routledge, 1996, pp.233-237
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• To make Union's institutions more efficient for its next enlargement.
The Amsterdam Treaty tried to strengthen the Community in the areas of social 
affairs, the environment and public health. In terms of internal politics, they 
decided to increase their collaboration on terrorism, drugs and crime. Moreover, 
in terms of external relations, they decided to formulate common strategies to 
guide the Union's action. Furthermore, in terms of institutional framework, the 
extension of co-decision procedure, which means the inclusion of European 
Parliament in more decision-making procedure. Shortly, the Amsterdam Treaty 
extends Community competence over Justice and Home Affairs and pronounces 
a date for completion o f " an area of freedom, security and justice.” This means 
that European policy makers have begun to realize the new necessities of the
international system. 57
European Commission, How Does the European Union Work?, Luxembourg: OfEce for Official 
Publications o f the European Communities, 2000, p.l3
57 Ibid,pp.l3-15
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CHAPTER IV
RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION
Since it's establishment Turkey has followed Western-oriented policies. Especially 
after 1923, Western types of democratic, and economically market- oriented states 
were accepted as model. The desire of Turkey to be a member to the Union is the 
natural outcome of Western-oriented policies. It became the member of the United 
Nations, NATO, OECD and associate member of Western European Union.^* 
Thanks to the international circumstances and its geographical location, it gained so 
much importance that it managed to establish close relations with the Community in 
those days. As a natural outcome of these policies, Turkey as a powerful player in the 
European defense and as the only Muslim secular state, Turkey has wanted to be a 
full member to the European Union.
It has been forty-five years; Turkey made its first application for membership to the 
system. Turkey made its first application in 1959 to the European Economic 
Community. Since that day, Turkey has had an intense but peculiar relationship, 
which has covered ups and downs, and has not reached the desired point yet. This 
relationship can be analyzed in two time periods, which has its own characteristics. 
First phase had began with the first application of Turkey to the EEC and continued 
till the beginning of 1980's. The second phase began in the beginning of 1980's and 
has continued till 1987. In the first phase, owing to the international conjuncture.
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political factors overrode the economic dynamics of Turkey. Whereas, during the 
second phase this equation has changed, the economic parameters have taken the 
leadership due to the variations in the international system. The end of the Cold War 
and the collapse of Soviet system gave an end to the Turkey's political importance.^^ 
Since the main topic of this paper is the future of the European Union and it's 
probable effects to the European Union and Turkey relations, the historical 
background of these relations will be briefly explained.
4.1 FIRST PHASE (1959-1980)
After the Second World War, parallel to the policy of westernization and 
secularization, Turkey has followed a strategy of rapprochement to the West. In the 
bipolar world, in which the risk of war was imminent, at those days EEC served as a 
magnitude to most of the countries, which wanted to be a member of a powerful 
club. Therefore, just after the establishment of EEC in 1957 and after the Greece's 
application for an association agreement^*’ Turkey applied for full membership to the 
Community in July 1959.^  ^ At those days, Turkey in order to defend itself against 
Greece’s claims related with the Aegean and Cyprus problems, and in order to 
minimize the risk of suppression from an international organization, Turkey 
formulated this foreign policy: participation to the same organizations. In addition, as 
another foreign policy formulation, Turkey in order to protect itself from Soviet 
threat followed a policy of rapprochement to the West. Under those days, this 
relation was involved reciprocity in the sense that Turkey was an important strategic
http://www.mfa.gov.tr
’^Cmar Özen, " Neo-Functionalism and the Change in the Dynamics o f Turkey-EU Relations", 
Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, Vol 111- NumberS, and September- November 1998.
It was a traditional Turkish policy o f being member to all o f the organization, in which Greece was 
a member
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partner due to its geographical location to the West despite the insufficient economic 
conditions. Turkey served as a buffer zone for Europe against Soviet threat. In return, 
Europe with the support of USA had been protecting Turkey against Soviet threat of 
conventional and unconventional attack. Europe or better to say Western alliances 
had been Turkey's guarantee to survive under these risks of war conditions.®  ^None 
of the actors had a chance of taking any risk. This reality had brought up close 
relations between these actors and Europe in order to protect the delicate balances 
preferred to continue the ongoing relations. So did the EEC but mainly on economic 
bases.
However, these conditions were not enough to set up a relationship based on full 
membership. So the EC rejected Turkey's obligation on the existing ground. They 
proposed to establish an association; Turkey accepted this offer. Till the beginning, 
Turkey insisted on neo- functionalist model of integration as the same applied to 
Greece in 1961 by the Agreement of Athens. ®^ In addition, Turkey's insistence on 
this model was due to the fact that this was nearly the same model that the EU had 
applied to itself. Therefore, on 12 September 1963 Ankara Agreement was signed 
between the parties. The Agreement envisaged a stage-by- stage integration 
culminating in full membership of Turkey.®'^These stages were: preparatory® .^
** Ziya Onis, “ An Awkward Partnership: Turkey’s Relation With the European Union in 
Comparative- Historical Perspective”, Journal o f European Integration History, Vol 7, Numberl, 
2001, p. 105
“  Cmar Ozen, " Neo-Functionalism and the Change In the Dynamics o f Turkey-EU Relations", 
Perceptions: Journal o f International Affairs, Vol III- Number3, September- November 1998.
® European Economic Consultancy Center, Profile 2001.Turkey- EU Relations, Ankara: European 
Economic Consultancy Center for Publication, 2001, p.27
^ Meltem Müftüler Вас, “ The Never Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union”, Middle East 
Studies, Vol.34, No.4, October 1998, p.241
This stage was supposed to be 5 years but upon the request o f Turkish government it took more 
years. As stated in the Article 3 o f  the Agreement, the purpose o f this stage was to strengthen Turkish 
economy in order to fulfill the obligations o f the following stages.
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transitional^®, and final.®’ With the provision of this association agreement, Turkey 
had become partner to the EEC. In addition, as it had been mentioned in the 28*^  
article the aim has been full membership.®*
Later, in accordance with the Ankara Agreement, an Additional Protocol was signed 
in 1970, which foresaw the establishment of Customs Union within the twenty- two 
years.®  ^Moreover, with this Protocol, EEC has begun to give financial assistance to 
Turkey.
Turkey made an important mistake by not applying to full membership to the EEC at 
the same time with Greece. As Mr. Güvenen mentions in his article there would be 
three probabilities if Turkey applied and in none of these probabilities Turkey would 
not have to pay these high alternative costs and would not have t o face with most of 
the difficulties it has now. These three possibilities were: Either Turkey would be 
member in 1981 with Greece, or would become member at a later date at the same 
time with Greece or most pessimistically only Greece would become member at a 
later date. If Turkey did not make this political mistake at those days, now Turkey 
would not have Cyprus problem. Southeast problem and could be easily reach the
EU economic standards.70
“  This stage was the comer store o f the Association regime. This stage was required the establishment 
o f  a customs union between the parties. During this stage, all the parties were under the obligation o f  
undertaking reciprocal obligations towards each other.
This stage was based upon the customs union. This stage aimed Turkish accession to the 
Community as a full member.
^  Association Agreement, Article 28, see Appendix A  
Onur Oymen, Türkiye’nin Gucu, Ankara: Dogan Kitapçılık, 1999, p.207 
™ Orhan Güvenen, “ Türkiye 1 Ocak 1981’de “ Avmpa Ekonomik Topluluğu” Üyesi Olabilir 
miydi.^", Doğu Bati Dusunce Dergisi, Ağustos- Eylül- Ekim 2003, pp.290-291.
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Until 1980's relations had continued despite of some problems, delays and 
difficulties. The Commimity did not met some of Turkey's demands like an increase 
in the amount of financial protocol, lifting the barriers in textile. However, the EEC 
accepted the Turkey's request for the delay of Turkish obligations. However, 1980 
was one of the freezing points in this relationship. This is due to the two main 
reasons. First one was the Greece application for full membership and the acceptance 
of Greek application by the EC. Turkish policy of being member to all of the 
organization with Greece had become unsuccessful. Although as the Foreign 
Minister Hayrettin Erkmen said at those days, the declarations were supposed to be 
made in Spring, 12 September military coup prevented Turkey from applying to the 
Community.^' With this coup, the relation between the Community and Turkey was 
frozen. These were the signals of initiation of second phase in this relationship. 
Slowly, the parameters have begun to change.
In that period, this relationship had been tried to carry out on the basis of neo­
functionalist model of integration. The parameters of Cold War put Turkey in such a 
position that made Turkey unavoidable for the West that in spite of the insufficient 
economic conditions of Turkey, formal relations had begun and continued on 
political bases. However, the end of Cold War changed the parameters and the 
second phase began.
4.2 SECOND PHASE
4.2.1 TURKEY’S APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP: FIRST
APPLICATION OF TURKEY (1987)- LUXEMBOURG (1997)
71 Ibid., p.208
Due to the inefficiencies of Turkey to fulfill its obligations and the military coup in 
Turkey in 1980, the relations since then deteriorated but in 1987 with the Turkish 
application, it aimed to revive the relations and with this unilateral effort the second 
phase of relationship began, in which unlike the initial phase the economical factors 
have had priorities and in which the political factors have lost its importance. 
However, the eventual goal of Turkey has remained the same.
Turkey in 14 April 1987 applied for full membership to the EC after the amelioration 
of the relationship. As a response to this application, European Commission 
published its Avis (Opinion) in 1989 and the Commission mentioned that Turkey 
was eligible for membership but on the other hand, they declared that the 
Community was neither politically nor economically ready to accept new members 
till the establishment of single market in 1992. Later, in 1990 the European Council
approved this opinion.72
The issue of enlargement gained importance and took its place in EU agenda after 
the completion of Single market and with the probable applications of Central and 
Eastern European States (CEES). However, the emphasis was put on the completion 
of Customs Union by the Union. Therefore, the Customs Union was signed in 6 
March 1995 after the required conditions were fulfilled. This Agreement was put into
force in 1 January 1996.73
After this establishment, EU in every occasion stressed the eligibility of Turkey as a 
member. EU made this relationship dependent on a number of issues: Cyprus,
AB Komisyonu Türkiye Tem silciliği, Avrupa Birliği Genişleme Surecinde Türkiye, Ankara: AB 
Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, Eylül 2003,p.7
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Greece and human rights and they mentioned this in the last Association Council of 
29-April-1997. However, in 1997 EU Commission published it's famous report of 
"Agenda 2000". In this document, roadmaps of EU's future policies were explained 
and enlargement was one of the most important ones among these.^"*Agenda 2000, 
xmlike the expectations of Turkey, implicitly eliminated Turkey from enlargement 
process by not making any reference to Turkey. EU distinct Turkey from other 
candidates and made the evaluation regarding Turkey just in one paragraph. They 
once more found Turkey eligible for membership but cited a number of political 
issues as preconditions for improving the relations.
EU by Agenda 2000 had given the initial signals of their response that they had made 
in Luxembourg Summit. This document made clear that the 1990's would be a period 
of isolation and exclusion of Turkey from membership. ^^EU by " Copenhagen 
Criteria" had not closed the doors to Turkey, but Agenda 2000 did this. Therefore, in 
12-13 December 1997 in Luxembourg, EU declared their exact position with regard 
to Turkey. They mentioned that Turkey was eligible for membership and Turkey will 
be judged on the basis of same criteria as other applicants. They made references to 
the human rights violations, minority rights while they were rejecting Turkey's 
application. In addition, they mentioned the Cyprus problem and the Greece relations 
as the international disputes, which had to be solved before membership.’’ Moreover, 
they rejected our application, but decided to initiate negotiations with CEES in 1998
Ibid, p.7
European Economic Consultancy Center, Profile 2001-.Turkey- EU Relations, Ankara: European 
Economic Consultancy Center for Publication, 2001, p.58 
European Economic Consultancy Center, Profile 2001. Turkey- EU Relations, Ankara: European 
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despite of the fact that they were under the Turkey's level or nearly the same level in 
terms of the EU criteria. This attitude proved that Turkey- EU relationship could be 
categorized by disequilibrium between its economic and political components.’  ^
Although due to the Custom Union Agreement, Turkey has had the most advanced 
economic relationship, it has the lowest level of political relation relative to the other 
applicants. EU states offered Turkey only a special status "European Strategy", 
which was rejected by Turkey. EU's affirmative decision disappointed and frustrated 
Turkey and Turkey decided to freeze its relation with the Union.’^
4.2.2 LUXEMBOURG (DECEMBER 1997)- HELSINKI (DECEMBER 1999)
During the 6 months following the Luxembourg Summit (December 1997) till the 
following EU Summit, Turkish politicians began to expect the correction of this 
mistake in Cardiff under the head of the United Kingdom. Although Cardiff Summit 
(1998) created better circumstances and ameliorate the relationship, the mentality
ar\
behind the Luxembourg decision was still perceived. The wordings of the decisions 
were neither negative nor positive. Moreover, Cardiff did not change the Europeans 
application of double standard to Turkey. However, in Cardiff Presidency 
Conclusions Turkey, for the first time explicitly accepted as “ candidate for
membership’' 81
Following these developments, after the Cardiff Summit, the social democrats began 
to come to power in most of the European countries but this did not affect the EU's 
negative decision to a great extend at a time when Turkey had tensions with Greece
All Karaosmanoglu, The Current Situation: Policies, Motives and Limitations, p.232 
Rıdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 
2002,pp. 15-17
80t i"Ibid., p .l7
and Italy. The report that was prepared before the Vienna Council involved the 
reflections of these tensions. In Vienna Summit (December 1998), Turkey could not 
be the 12* candidate. They only decided to prepare a European Strategy for 
Turkey.*^
The real change in this relation would occur in Helsinki (December 1999). Helsinki 
European Council produced a breakthrough in Turkey- EU relations. On 10-11 
December 1999 Helsinki Summit after hard and tough diplomatic maneuvers, Turkey 
was accepted as a " candidate member". Although it was a positive development, it 
could not be that much important because EU had not decided to open negotiations 
yet. However, it should be accepted that the preparation of Accession for Partnership 
in accordance with the provisions of Helsinki Summit opened a new period between 
European Union and Turkey. After the full implementation of Copenhagen Criteria, 
Turkey will be member to the EU. What was different and interesting at that point 
was EU, unlike the other candidates and members required from Turkey the 
implementation of these criteria as a рте- condition for the initiation of membership 
process. Whereas, the other candidates began to implement them after the 
complementation of membership process.
4.2.3 HELSINKI (DECEMBER 1999)- COPENHAGEN (DECEMBER 2002)
According to Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, the Commission 
started to prepare an Accession for Partnership for Turkey. After years, the 
Association Council meeting took places and eight sub- committees were set up to
*' For Cardiff European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A 
*^Onur Oymen, Türkiye’nin Gmcm,Ankara; Dogan Kitapçılık, 1999, p.209
83 For Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A
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carry out the screening process. At the end, on March 8*, 2001, Accession 
Partnership (AP) was adopted. Like the others, this document clarified the short and 
the medium term priorities and the requirements of the Union from Turkey, which 
were expected to be done. As a next step of membership, Turkey after the approval 
of Accession Partnership by the EU, prepared its National Program (NP). In this 
document, Turkey clarified how it adapted itself to the short term (2001) and 
medium term priorities of the AP and gave a calendar for the requirements. NP 
consisted of three criteria: political, economical, and the capacity to fulfill the 
membership requirements. It is worth to mention that in the AP the main emphasis 
was put on the political criteria since it has been the most difficult one. In addition to 
these, every year as part of the Union Enlargement Strategy, Union publishes "The 
Progress Report" to evaluate the developments in the countries parallel to AP. It 
should be remembered that after Turkey had gained a candidate status, Progress 
Reports were published in every year beginning with 1998 December. The Progress 
Reports, which were published before Helsinki, always involved the same logic that 
Turkey had made progress but these progress were not enough to meet the
Copenhagen Criteria; mainly the political ones 85
The Progress Report 2000 was different because it served as a roadmap of AP. This 
report stated that Turkey has not yet fulfilled the Copenhagen Political criteria 
especially the matters related with human rights and democracy. They appreciated 
the progresses that were made but on the other hand they found the implementation 
of institutional reforms in order to take the democratic and rule of law state under
Rıdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi,
2002,p.21
AB Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, Avrupa Birliği Genişleme Surecinde Türkiye, Ankara: AB 
Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, Eylül 2003,pp.8-l 1
guarantee slow. As usual, they criticized the role of military in politics as well. As a 
response in order to deepen the political reform process before at the adoption of NP, 
Turkey amended thirty four articles of it's Constitution, which were related with the
human rights, rule of law and institutions in 2001. 86
Consistent with Progress Report, despite the progress at the reforms in Turkey, the 
EU some how ignored the importance of Turkey in Nice Summit (December 2000).
In the Nice Summit, on one hand EU tried to make reforms and necessary
adjustments regarding itself and on the other hand EU with its decisions disregarded 
Turkey from the newly planned internal reforms and as a matter effect from the 
enlargement process till 2010. Briefly, Nice Treaty (February 2001) clarified the 
weighted votes of the members and the candidates in the Council of Ministers, and 
decided to increase the numbers of the parliamentarians of the existent members and 
plus newly participant candidate members. While deciding the weighted votes, 
Turkey was not mentioned. They only took care of Turkey just in one paragraph.
However, in spite of the expectations, the Progress Report, which was declared on 13 
November 2001, did not include positive opinions with regard to membership. They 
did not even pass to the screening process, which means the initiation of 
negotiations. They rather deepened the analytical examination process. Moreover, 
they again, like the report of 2000, appreciated the reforms, especially the ones, 
which allowed Kurdish language broad casts, and the one, which increased the 
number of civilian officers in National Security Council. However, they underlined
** Rjdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 
2002,pp.55-60
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the fact that these were not enough and at the desired level. Furthermore, the Union 
emphasized the need for an urgent result in the violations of human rights and 
Cyprus problem, which has been taken place in the short-term political criteria in
AP 88
In the following Summit, EU attitudes had become a little more moderate. In Laeken 
Summit (December 2001), EU stated the prospect of the opening of accession 
negotiations for Turkey for the first time. Besides this, Turkey gained a right to 
participate to the Convention for The Future of Europe on equal footing with the 
other members and candidates. However, Turkey still could not begin to the
accession negotiations 89
In 2002, on the way of political criteria, Turkey took very important steps through 
legislative packages. In February 2002, by the first package, by amendments in the 
related maters of Constitution extended the scope of freedom of thought. In addition 
by the second package of April 2002, Turkey extended the scope of freedom of 
thought and expression, the freedom of press, the freedom of association and 
peaceful assembly. It reinforced measures for the prevention of torture and ill 
treatment. ^ '^These reforms were welcomed in the Seville European Council (June 
2002) and the Council stated that they would be deciding the next stage of Turkey's 
candidature in the light of the developments between the Seville and Copenhagen
** Rjdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi,
2002,pp.60-61
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European Councils .^'Therefore, EU underlined the importance of this interval. 
Turkey had time to complete the reforms till Copenhagen Summit.
After Seville, Turkey passed its third package in August 2002, which was crucial 
owing to radical reforms. Turkey with this package abolished the death penalty, 
lifted the restrictions on individual cultural rights, reinforced legal guarantees on 
freedoms of expression and press, ensured the right to property of community 
foundations belonging to minorities in Turkey, provided the legal basis needed for 
the activities of foreign foundations in Turkey. In addition to this package, the new 
government adopted two more legislative packages before the Copenhagen Summit 
in order not to risk the membership. On 3 December 2002, the reform process was 
reinforced and ambiguities in implementation of reforms were eliminated. The 
government stated their intolerance to torture and ill- treatment. The latter package 
on 4. December. 2002, the scope of re-trial was extended and the disciplinary actions 
against university students were revocated.^^
However, the Union underestimated the reforms, which have been made. In the 
Progress Report (2002), Union characterized the reforms as fundamental steps. 
However, like the other former expressions, EU decided that Turkey has not fully 
met the political criteria and underlined the deficiencies in implementation. 
Moreover, in this report, EU declared its Strategy Paper for the future stages of 
relations. They recommended the deepening of Customs Union, revision of AP. 
However, Turkey expected the initiation of negotiations for membership.
’’For Seville European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A
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As it was understood from the Progress Report, EU fhistrated Turkey in Copenhagen 
Summit (December 2002). EU accepted Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Slovakia as new members. This 
conclusion did not meet Turkey's expectations. With regard to Turkey, they stated 
that; " If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a 
recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen 
political criteria, the European Union will open negotiations with Turkey without 
delay."^^
4.2.4 COPENHAGEN (DECEMBER 2002) - PRESENT
The Copenhagen Summit, like all the Progress Reports prepared by the Commission, 
did not open negotiations with Turkey for full membership but it decided to open 
negotiations with Turkey if Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria. It has 
been obvious that this was not the decision Turkey wanted to be taken but it opened a 
new stage in this relationship. This has made the job of Turkey more difficult 
because the EU organs, especially by the Commission, follow all the developments.
Since all the Accession for Partnership and National Programs are dynamic by 
nature, they can be revised in accordance with the developments and progress. 
Therefore, by taking into consideration the recent progress, the Commission prepared 
the revised Accession Partnership on 26 March 2003. Further, this report was 
accepted by the member states on 15 April 2003. As a normal procedure of
For Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A 
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membership, Turkey also prepared it's revised National Program, in which Turkey 
gave a time table for the short and medium term goals.^^
These documents are important in the sense that they involve some clues regarding 
the upcoming decisions of the Union. The revised AP appreciated the progresses that 
have been made by Turkey but it underlined the problem of applicability of 
legislative packages. Moreover, as usual, they put the problem of Cyprus and border 
disputes under the political dialogue and political criteria headings. So did the 
Progress Report of 2003.^’ It can be concluded that the main problems regarding 
Turkey are: the political criteria and the applicability problem of the reforms, which 
have been legally adopted. As it had been mentioned in Copenhagen Presidency 
Conclusions, Turkey has only one left year ahead to solve these problems.
In accordance with these documents, finally the EU in Brussels Summit (December 
2003) once more underlined these facts. EU welcomed the progress and the revised 
AP. However, they then found it insufficient. They clarified that progress should 
have been made in strengthening the independence and fimctioning of the judiciary, 
the overall framework of ftmdamental freedoms, the alignment of civil- militaiy 
relations with European practice, the situation in the Southeast of the country and 
cultural rights and the macro- economic imbalances. As they mentioned in the AP, in
QO
the presidency conclusions they called for urgent political settlement in the Cyprus.
Available on the Web, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/ Acces$ionPamership2003.pdf 
Progress Report 2003 is Available on the Web, http://www.ekutup.dpt.gov.tr/ab/uvelik/ilerle03.pdf
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After these developments, Turkey has given momentum to the EU Adaptation Laws 
and efforts. Turkey did it's best in the settlement of Cyprus problem and one of the 
political barriers eroded. Moreover, TRT has begun Kurdish casting, which is an 
important step in showing the Turkish capacity to apply the reforms that has been 
made. Furthermore, Democracy Party (DEP) parliamentarians were released after the 
adoption of necessary legal amendments within the Criminal Law. These are really 
important steps with regard to Copenhagen Political Criteria.
To sum up, in December 2004, the question of whether the EU will open 
negotiations with Turkey or not will be answered in this summit. The membership to 
the EU should be seen only as a step to be one of the most influential actors in the 
system. It is not an end in itself. Therefore, it is necessary but not an issue of live or 
death. It is an issue of time. Owing to some mistakes that had been made in the past, 
now it is more difficult for Turkey to be member and it's bargaining power has been 
decreasing. If Turkey wants to use the factor of time efficiently, it should exploit 
these times to make necessary reforms to achieve its goal of being a developed 
country in the long run. However, unconditional surrender to the EU should not be 
an option. 11 is important to maintain sustainable and long term out warded policies.
^  Amanda Akcakoca," Turkey's EU Ambitiou: Implementation o f Reforms and Cyprus are the 
Answer" Europe Policy Center, Brussels, December 2003
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CHAPTER V
CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PROBABLE
FUTURE OF THE EU
As it has been always said when the European Union was first established, it was 
clear that it would be an experiment due to two reasons. Firstly, it would demonstrate 
to the public and politicians that whether it would be possible to create a peaceful 
continent by forming a regional organization? Secondly, it would be an experiment 
to understand whether a regional organization can develop, and enlarge. Shortly, 
would it gain dynamism owing to internal and external factors?
In order to find an answer to these crucial questions, self- criticism would be 
inevitable for the Union. Unintentionally, as Caporaso argues " EU went beyond its 
original task it set for itself. The original task of creating peace among members 
would be successful on one hand. On the other hand, the accumulation of internal 
and external factors, and sudden expected and unexpected results has pushed EU 
further to be a political and more effective union. Therefore, EU politicians have 
rethought the role of EU in the existing system. By taking the assumption o f " The 
EU is a sub- system of international system" as exogenously given, the internal and 
external f a c to r sw h ich  obliges the EU to rethink its role will be explained.
James A. Caporaso, The European Union: Dilemmas o f Regional Integration, Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2000, p: 49
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5.1 EXTERNAL FACTORS
5.1.1 STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
5.1.1.1QUESTIONING UNIPOLARITY
5.1.1.1.1 UNIPOLARITY; AMERICAN HEGEMONY
When the rules and the environment of Cold War World Order disappeared, 
obviously the system of international system has also changed. One of the two super 
powers had disappeared; dissolved and lost its political and military power. This left 
only one super power, who through the agreements and pacts established ties with 
West Europe after the Second World War and strengthened its position and impact 
during the Cold War. The results imposed that the winner was United States of 
America and its values: liberal world order mainly democracy and free market 
economy. From then onwards, the international system was no more bi-polarity but 
unipolarity. This new system has presented the USA as a hegemon power, who has 
been the absolute protector, supporter and the leader of Western Europe.
The new system has introduced one actor to the system as an ally of the hegemon as 
well. This has been the European Union. Today's Europe is the combination of work 
of the Americans and the Europeans. European integration was mainly an American 
project, which designed to reinforce the American dominance by diminishing the 
role and weight of the Europeans in the world stage and to make Europe developed 
economically in order to stabilize the r e g i o n . A s  it has been generally pointed out 
without the American willingness and American security guarantee it was nearly 
impossible for European states to integrate. America has served to Europe like a 
Ministry of Defense, protected Europe both against external threats and internal
Barry Busan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study o f  
International Relations, Oxford; Oxford Press, 2000,p; 338
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threats. America played a key role in the solution of German Question. Fischer 
summarized these views. He emphasized the importance of two historic decisions, 
which were the tenets of the European integration. These were the USA decision to 
stay in Europe although there is no more Soviet threat and the latter one was the
1 A Q
France and Germany's acceptance and adherence to the principles of integration. I 
agree with him that it was the combination of these two created the current situation 
to Europe, They were both interrelated and interlinked.
As a reflection o f these realities, EU and USA have tried to set up strong 
relationships among themselves through Trans- Atlantic Agenda. At the first stages 
of this relation, everything had clear and they had effectively and efficiently 
collaborated with each other. Especially, they have had close economic ties. 
Explicitly, Washington supported the idea of Monetary Union and the acceptance of 
Euro as a single currency. As Clinton in 1991 realized: the world has no more 
dominated by the forces and parameters of geo- politics but governed by the rules of 
geo- economics.Moreover,  America has supported the idea of enlargement. 
However, the Union with twenty- one members in 2004 will catch up the USA in 
terms of trade parameters and economic power. Euro has already placed the Dollar in 
international trade and the union has become the second big trader in international 
trade. These are the signals that in the near future, the EU and America will become 
competitors and at the same time partners. Their economic competition has not 
created serious problems among themselves because both of them have had absolute 
gains and more important than this, owing to enlargements and economic disparities
Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", Policy Review, no: 113, June 2002 p.lO 
Ibid., p .l l
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New Century, London; Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.69
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among EU member states, EU has had budget problems. In conclusion, the 
implication of same means and the acceptance of same end in economic matters 
decreased the existence of tensions between two partners.
5.1.1.1.2 AMERICAN HEGEMONY: CRITICISED
However, things have begun to change. Especially after the recent USA decision to 
attack Iraq without the authorization of UN really shook the delicate balances and 
created tensions between these two allies. This unipolar structure has continued 
because the other actors have recognized the hegemony of USA. Through various 
open channels of contact the other actors can affect the decisions of the USA 
government before’®^, but this example underlined the fact that this has not been 
possible if USA is decisive and its national interest at stake. Till now, USA did not 
make any action, which hesitate the other countries and act as a liberal hegemon. It 
acts in accordance with the principles of liberal hegemon. Through diplomacy, has 
tried to persuade other states and through various channels of contact it gave 
importance to the other opinions and policy options. Therefore, especially the EU has 
begun to question the actions of USA and has not supported its actions. This has 
decreased the level of recognition of USA as "hegemon".*®  ^ In an anarchic world, 
great powers, hegemonies do only fear from the rules, which can constrain their 
capability to make maneuver.
Naturally, it is nearly impossible to change the structure of the system in the short- 
run, but as long as EU has tried to stand its own and the arbitrary actions of USA 
have continued, EU can gain the capability to counterbalance the USA in the near
R.Keohane, op.cit, p.43
Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", Policy Review, No: 113, June 2002, p.5
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future and might change the structure to bipolarity in the long run. The theory of 
hegemonic stability*®  ^has begun to work in the opposite direction. Will the Europe 
be that much powerful? That question has dominated the future in accordance with 
the developments. I agree with Huntington that the EU would be " the single most 
important move" in the world and that move might produce the system to 
multipolarity. USA hegemony is a reality but long- lasting hegemony requires the 
acceptance of this status by others both implicitly and explicitly. The recent arbitrary 
behaviors of United States of America have weakened its status in international 
relations because the reasons of other states to accept the hegemony of United States 
unconditionally have suddenly disappeared.
Before September 11 and Iraqi War, America was a tolerant ally which respected to 
the values of other states, principles of United Nations and its Charter, rights and 
freedoms of individual and regarding Trans-Atlantic Relationship respect to 
contradictory arguments and open to discussions to find the optimal best solution or 
answer. As Robert Keohane has pointed out in his article, the hegemony of USA is 
unique in the sense that there are many channels of contact to the relevant actors in 
the USA, which the other actors get into touch. Moreover, open channels have 
increased the chance and possibility of minimizing the opinion between these actors. 
When the other actors can find opportunities and in the past this was usually 
happen,^®  ^USA was willing to listen other ideas and more willing to act together in 
order to increase the legitimacy of the decision or behavior and to emphasize the 
sprit of co-operation. It is understandable for a country like USA to have a capability 
to act and decide unilaterally but all kind of unilateral action decrease the degree of
This theory claims that the existence o f hegemon in the international system bring stability. 
Samuel P. Huntington, " The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, March- April 1999
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reliability and the confidence in this long- lasting relationship. USA has been a 
hegemon or super power as long as the other sates accept it as a hegemon. 
Especially, in the long run this is very dangerous because the second power that 
operates in the opposite direction has a chance to be seen as an alternative. This has 
been what has happened in the international scene now. The unilateral actions and 
decisions of United States have hesitated the other actors and their reliability to the 
United States. Legitimate hegemony covers the recognition of others. This is the real 
reason behind the close relationship of USA and Brita in .Whenever Britain 
psychologically and practically had accepted the increased power of America, it 
preferred to be an ally of it rather than compete to it.
5.1.1.2 ANARCHIC STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
EU, with the help of the USA, could achieve its primary goal. The aim behind the 
establishment of such an organization was: by creating interdependencies among 
member countries, minimizing the risks of war and conflict. The ultimate goal is to 
create a peaceful world. Although the ultimate and final goal is sound political, the 
means are economic, apolitical, and pragmatic. This is an ideal way of solving 
problems. The neo-liberal version of international politics. EU has been really good 
at achieving this. Since its establishment, world has never confronted with the risk of 
war or conflict in Europe, among members. Europeans have accepted this way of life 
as general principles, which have a universal character
The acceptance of Europeans method in the whole world is clear because that's the 
way it should be in the twenty first century. However, outside the Europe, world is
109 R.Keohane, op.cit, p.46
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still anarchic. Only in Central and the Eastern Europe, the Europeans became 
successful. By giving these countries financial aid and through democratization 
packages through peaceful means, they could absorb these Communist states into the 
Western Europe. On the other hand, they could not prevent the bloody disintegration 
of former Yugoslavia. Even they failed to understand the essence of the reasons of 
disintegration of former Yugoslav states. Without the American persistence and 
without the help of NATO forces, Europe did not manage to prevent it. The essence 
of the problem is that the Europeans are overconfident to their ways of settling 
disputes and solving problems.^" Plus, they believe that these can work in 
everywhere. By applying their methods they think that they can create a method of 
peace. They make ambitions to convert the world into a peaceful place like 
themselves. However, their rules work only in Europe. Their rules do not have 
validity in an anarchic and conflictual world.
What they have achieved really deserves appreciation but the Europeans have really 
closed their eyes to the realities of outside world. Europeans live in Kant’s Perpetual 
Peace; whereas the others live in Hobbesian world, where there has been always risk 
of war and power dominates. At this stage, Americans view is more efficient 
especially towards rogue states. Although the Europeans insist on the validity of their 
means, the practices and current events prove just the opposite. It is obvious that 
Europeans do not prefer to interest with the issues, which are not purely European in 
nature.”  ^EU generally followed isolationist policies to the outside world and ignore
Barlett, The Special Relationship: A Political History o f Anglo- American Relations since 1945, 
London; Longman, 1992, pp. 174-175 
'"ibid., p.8 
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the realities of this world, which has not been possible for EU as an actor planning to 
be more influential.
EU has been living peace in the world, where the external environment it operates 
remains anarchical and will continue to remain like this. It is impossible to speak 
politely with the ones who have guns in their hands have waiting to fire. I think it is a 
utopia to establish this way of life in the Middle East, where there are lots of 
conflicts have been take place. In addition, in Yugoslavia, their way of life did not 
work. Even the UN had faced with problems in Kosovo after they have set up dispute 
and established the local government. It is a utopia to live in a peaceful world in 
every region. To reach this phase, Europe had experienced two world wars and only 
manages to enhance peace and stability with the help of USA.
However, the inclusion of Central and Eastern European countries to the Union will 
indicate the world that will it be possible to transform the anarchical and conflictual 
world to the peaceful ones. EU accepted Slovenia to the union in May 2004.**  ^ The 
developments in other CEEC show the probabilities to the world. The incapability of 
the Union to solve the problems at the backyard of the Union and the out of its area 
have proved the Union that it can no more behave in the same manner in every 
region.
To sum up, as a group of states living prosperously among themselves, they have 
decided to open up their eyes to the outside. They have come up with realities. These 
realities have forced the EU to take up measures. We will see how they will act in an 
anarchic world? Will they continue to live like this or will they look like USA?
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5.1.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USA AND EU
As it was mentioned above, the relationship between these two actors today is not as 
strong as it used to be in the past. I agree with Robert Kagan "it is time to stop 
pretending that Europeans and Americans share the common view of the world, or 
even they occupy the same all important question of power."'''* In this part, the 
reasons of this shift in this relationship will be analyzed. These are mainly: the 
existence of different strategic cultures and the existence of power gap between USA 
andEU.
5.1.2.1 DIFFERENT STRATEGIC CULTURES
From the begiiming of this relationship, we can talk about two different strategic 
cultures belonging to each actor. However, it was not that much talked about because 
no occasion existed, which makes this issue that much important. Under normal 
conditions, which mean there are no war or risk of war; or ethnic conflict, their 
relations protect the usual course. The problem occurs whenever there emerges a 
probability of the danger of war or ethnic conflict, briefly, whenever the issues of 
hard security issue are at stake, the tensions began to break out among these two 
actors."^ In hard security issues, the delicate balances have begun to shake and the 
breaking point has been approaching although complete separation and complete 
deterioration of relations will almost impossible. The parameters of USA- EU 
relations are very crucial to capture the idea that whenever the balances in this 
relation have the risk to shift downwards, this strong relations have deteriorates.
For Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix B
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As Kenneth Waltz claims, the alliances endure as long as the balance among them is 
clear and has clear bovmdary, as long as they share common perceptions towards 
themselves, as long as they are dependent on each other, as long as they have a 
common threat.*^  ^Under the light of these reasons, it is very logical to understand 
the reasons of long and strong alliance, but on the other hand, it is very logical to 
xmderstand the reasons behind the tensions in this relationship.
Both the USA and the EU agree on what kind of world they want to live, their 
strategic culture is really different in the sense that Americans live in the Hobbesian 
world, where the power politics dominates. In comparison, Europeans live in Kant's 
Perpetual Peace, where they are prosperous and international law has priority. The 
main difference between the United States of America and the European Union is 
their means, methods to solve the problems in the world. Europeans have produced a 
new strategic culture in order to eliminate the risks of turning to old devastating days. 
Robert Cooper in one of his article in Observer explained this evolution as " Emope 
today lives in a post modem system that does not rest on a balance of power but on 
the rejection of force and on self- enforced mies of behavior." Morality takes the 
priority in international system.^'’ For example, they solved the German Question by 
co-operating with Germany and by integrating with Germany economically rather 
than isolating it. European strategic culture gives more importance to the mies of 
international law, diplomacy, negotiation, and commercial ties and on 
multilateralism. Whereas, Americans prefer to use the means of realists power 
politics, more likely to use force, less patient to negotiate, less likely and more 
powerful to use the principles of diplomacy and more likely to govern in a unilateral
Stephen M. Walt," Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?”, Survival, Vol.39, Spring 1997, pp.l56- 
179
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world. This sharp distinction became obvious in the recent USA attack against Iraq. 
Americans tendency to use force versus Europeans resistance to use force divided the 
world into two blocks. This war proved that the Americans and the Europeans in the
1 1 Q
security issues do no more share the same means. Americans want to spread the 
democratic values and Western ideas by using more assaultive ways, whereas the 
Europeans try to spread their own ways of Westernization: these are more peaceful, 
democratic and attach more importance to economic means. Europeans have tried to 
spread their own experience, which came about with the help of Americans, who is 
now their counter part.
On the other hand, the historical perceptions of Americans: Munich, Pearl Harbor, 
Vietnam and newly added September 11 still nominates the formulation of foreign 
policy objectives, which are the comer stone of possible foreign policy actions.”  ^ I 
think, USA has been experiencing a big paradox at this stage. On one hand owing to 
the role it imposes on itself and the roles imposed on it by others, it is open to all 
kind of devastating attacks. On the other hand, these attacks and the responses of 
USA towards these make the USA more assertive and decrease the legitimacy of its 
status and recognized hegemony. All these experiences remembered the USA that 
either it has to or it wants to it has to be powerful and continue to live with 
Hobbesian mles of the world although they believe in the Kantian spirit of 
governance. If the Europeans helped Americans or the Europeans could help 
Americans to cope with these hard security issues, may be the Americans this time 
would insist on the magic of international law, diplomacy rather than force.
Robert Copper, Observer, April 7 ,2002
Steven Everts, " Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in Transatalntic 
Foreign Policy”, Center for European Reform Working Paper , February 2001 
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Americans have used to live the possible dangers of the enemies and have tried to 
formulate precautions. The only deterrent option for the Americans, since they have 
the opportimities, is to follow different strategic culture.
Current events indicated that none of these two actors have intentions to deviate from 
their means. Americans are one step further because they do not fear from 
Europeans. Plus, they know that in spite of the difficulties and divergences in this 
relationship, Europe is still dependent on Americans will and capacity to deal with 
political problems especially security ones. American foreign policy of squeezing 
Europe to Europe with small capabilities has worked well. However, this situation 
has to change owing to the will of the both sides and the dynamism of the 
international structure. Firstly, the wars in the Balkans emphasized the fact that at 
least for some issues Europe has to stand on its own including military capabilities as 
well. Americans are less sensitive to the issues, which are not that important to 
them than the Europeans. Balkan Wars (especially Bosnian War) were important 
turning stones. It proved that Europeans should no more follow inward looking 
policies only. They did not only stressed the military incapability of Europeans but 
also proved that there exists some issue which are critical, vital and essential for 
European security but not that much vital in the eyes of the Americans. At the same 
time, just the opposite may exist as well.
5.1.2.2 POWER GAP BETWEEN EU-USA
Some of the theoreticians claim that the reasons of these differences among these two 
actors is the differences in the levels of military capabilities of USA and EU. As
120 Nicole Gnesotto, ” Lessons o f Yugoslavia”, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 14
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Kagan in whole of his article points out, the main reason is this; the others are less
171important compare to this. He claims that it is a problem of power.
It is obvious that USA is militarily strong relative to the EU not only technologically 
but also quantity. USA has both the quantity (more number of materials) and the 
quality (technology) relative to EU. Europe has been militarily weak since the World 
War and after the World War II; it has not felt the need to gain military power due to 
the world, in which the Europeans have been living. Moreover, this gap has been 
increasing as well as a reflection of foreign policy means of these two actors. 
Furthermore, in most of the issues Europeans rather than developing of forming their 
own operational units choose to be dependent on the USA especially in hard security 
issues.*^  ^This is due to the experiences, most of the time USA did the job on behalf 
of the EU as well. However, this situation might change because problems have 
begun to emerge among them.
USA faces with dilemmas in here. On one hand, it gives more importance to power 
to preserve its status quo; but on the other hand, its existing power leads to 
Americans to increase them continuously. Not only due to the responsibilities which 
are imposed on the super power but also due to the self-imposed perceptions of the 
Americans, Americans have to be more powerful and decisive. It is a kind of self- 
fiilfilling prophecy. Americans behave as if they are the sheriffs of the whole world 
and they are responsible from protecting the good guys from the bad guys. Moreover, 
it should be remembered that one has to fulfill this role in order to leave the others 
available peaceful circumstances, which the Europeans set up with the help of
Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness", Policy Review, No; 113, June 2002,pp.4-5
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Americans after the devastating wars. As a current example, EU criticized the 
Americans violent attitudes towards Iraq, especially the decisions to attack Iraq 
unilaterally.
In addition to these, USA as a super power has to enhance the conditions of the 
theory of deterrence. To have strong military capabilities and advance technological 
military capabilities are necessary but not sufficient to use force. The sufficient 
condition, in terms of the physiological effects it has on state, is the political will to 
use force. This is the most important point missing in the EU. In order to deter the 
bad guys in the world where the threats change their nature, good guy should have 
the sufficient material capability, will and persistence to use this material capabilities 
and finally it should be aware of who is the bad guy? The difference between the 
Americans and the Europeans are firstly, the Americans have more military power 
and secondly, even if the Europeans have enough power, they lack enough political 
will to use it.
5.1.2.3 DIVISION OF LABOR
From these realities we can make the following assumptions: 1) although USA 
power and attitudes are that much criticized, this is a necessary element of the 
anarchical world in order to live in a peaceful world against rogue states. 2) 
Undeliberately and regarding some issues deliberately, the current main actors in the 
system clarify the points of collaboration. Americans and Europeans share the 
international problems among themselves. On one side, Americans mainly deal with 
hard security problems and rogue states and terrorism. On the other side, the
Martin Smith and Grahm Smiths, Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in 
Comparative Perspective, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000, pp.l 13-114
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Europeans try to solve the soft security problems, humanitarian problems like 
poverty and the economic problems. The European Union is the biggest aid provider 
to outside world, more than the USA. Through many programs, it tries to establish 
democratic systems to the undemocratic areas. Whereas, USA is manly dealing with 
the unidentified terrorist groups, built technological missile systems and if the means 
of democracies do not work, using force towards rogue states and bad guys.
The power gap requires a division of labor between these two actors. This division of 
roles was clear and is accepted by all the sides till the September 11 attack, after that 
some voices have begun to be heard. Since none of the European capitals or cities 
have not confronted with this kind of an attack and they do not aware of the risks of 
being a political super power, post September 11 behaviors of USA could not be 
understood by Europeans. However, due to the results of terrorist attack and deaths 
of many civilians, and the inefficiency of Europe to have one effective voice, 
European tried to tolerate these behaviors. The attitude of European Union towards 
bombing Afghanistan was felt but not clear. This division became relatively 
intolerable when the USA decided to attack Saddam without any express resolution 
of UN Security Council and without the consent of the European Union by ignoring 
the diplomatic means and the works of the UN officials in Iraq. Despite the 
existence of negative attitudes towards USA, EU could not prevent USA from 
attacking Iraq and could not rely much against an American insistence to resort 
force. USA by itself arbitrarily decided to do what it wanted to do. USA ignored the 
opinions of others owing to power it has.
European Commission, The European Union and the world, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications o f the European Communities, 2001, p.28
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To sum up, EU acts as a weak organization, which does not have enough power and 
will to act decisively and as an organization believe the applicability of peaceful 
methods. Whereas, the USA act as a super power, who does enough capability and 
will to use them. The main reason for this difference is the power gap among them. 
In what manner the EU will act when it will achieve that capability is another 
research question.
What the Europeans need is the political will, neither than the capability if the 
American support and the recent decision of Americans which allow the NATO 
assets to be used by Europeans within the European Security and Defense Identity 
without the authorization of Americans. NATO assets could be used for purely 
European operations that did not require U.S. troops, under the formula that NATO 
such European missions and forces would be " separable but not separate" from 
NATO. ^^ "^ To create this will, Europe has to have one voice. The splits within the EU 
should disappear and they should find common points regarding the vital EU 
interests. In addition, to achieve these they should remember as Kagan point out the 
memory of power, international influence, and national ambition. I agree with him 
that the American attitudes and inclination to act unilaterally might create some 
energy to Europeans to speak with one voice. EU is at a point, where its choice will 
determine the following ones. EU has to decide whether to tolerate the arbitrary 
actions of USA and remain only as an economic giant or to formulate of it's own 
policies consistent with it's own means and be an alternative and a balancing force 
against USA. History has been repeating itself America again is one of the factor 
that leads to the unification of Europe either consciously or unconsciously. In the
Martin Walker, "The Future o f  Europe's Foreign Policy" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), Europe In the 
New Century, London; Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.75
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past, it did for economic unification consciously, now for political unification but 
unconsciously.
5.1.3 GLOBALIZATION
Globalization is the most controversial phenomena of the twentieth and also the 
twenty first century. It can be defined as " A series of transnational economic 
processes making the world into large market place, and in doing so undermining the 
authority of, and need for, the nation state." As it can be depicted from this 
definition globalization is generally conceived as an economic phenomena rather 
than a political one. Due to this conviction, no consensus can be reached upon the 
definition of this concept and its outcomes. Although the debate about the scope and 
effects of globalization has continued, its non-negligible impacts on the international 
system are clear and feasible. As an extension of this debate, now its impacts on the 
European Union are discussed, as it will be done below.
European Union and the globalization can be taken as a two interrelated phenomena 
in international relations and world governance. What makes them that much 
important, non- negligible and powerful is their common point, that is: states are no 
more the sole actors in the international system. EU by decreasing the power of 
nation states, who transfers some level of their sovereignty to a high authority; and 
globalization, by putting more emphasis on the impacts of non state actors and by 
decreasing the power of nation states in the decision making structures, introduce 
alternative actors to the system. These are mainly international organizations and
Chris Rumfold, The European Union: A Political Sociology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing: 
Oxford, 2002, p .l6
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non- state actors like transnational organizations, elite and bureaucrats. States are not 
taken as granted and not treated as black boxes. Plus, I think what will make them 
correlated is their starting point. As it is known, EU entered that process initially 
with the ECSC: with economic aims; like the initial stage of globalization. EU can be 
a case study in order to understand the effects of globalization and measure the 
impacts of variables.
Now, there are two different existing types of understanding, if their effects are 
accepted. One of them supports the idea that: in order to be competitive in the 
global world, integration is necessary. This is mainly an economist model of 
explanation. The latter one accepts that the relationship between globalization and 
that European Union is interrelated. ‘ It is impossible to deny the truths in these two 
types of believe. However, if the improvements are taken into consideration, both the 
reciprocal and complementary nature of relationship between the globalization and 
European Union cannot be ignored.
5.1.3.1 THE ECONOMIST MODEL OF EXPLANATION
The economist model of explanation involves the realities and the initial stages of 
both the European Union and globalization. This model accepts EU and other 
organizations as agents of integration because in that environment states can no 
longer perform effectively in a highly competitive market which involves many 
players and which is created by globalization. Reduced transaction costs and
Hudson and Williams, " Re-shaping Europe; The Challenge o f New Divisions Within a 
Homogenized Political- Economic Space", in Hudson and Williams (eds.). Divided Europe: Society 
and Territory, London: Sage, 1999, p.5
Some o f the theoreticians do not believe in the effects o f globalization. However, in this study 
effects o f globalization are accepted.
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p.20
62
improved technology enhance the non-state actors to trade among each other in a 
competitive liberal economy. As a natural outcome of this, states loose their power 
and sub- national regions have begin to gain more importance. Global financial flows 
give momentum to states to increase their level of integration in order to tackle down 
the hazards of globalization like the European Union.'^^ Countries in order to 
increase their benefits from this increased transaction prefer to form blocs like the 
European countries in the EC and in later EU especially with their common trade and 
monetary policies. Moreover, by forming blocs they increase their level of security. 
These are mainly two reasons for regional integration against globalization. 
European Commission in 1993 legitimized the attempts of further integration by 
presenting the globalization as a challenge to be met. In brief, this model takes the 
globalization as an independent variable, which by forcing the states leads the 
creation of blocs like the European Union. Delanty accepts the process of European 
integration and the Maastricht Treaty as reflections of globalization and globalize 
world order. Even some of the theoreticians think that the variables in equation 
have changed, the need for peace and economic reconstruction as causes of 
integration have begun to leave its place to globalization as a motivating factor.
5.1.3.2 SECOND MODEL OF EXPLANATION
The second argument about the correlation between the EU and globalization is a 
more flexible one. This one accepts the globalization and the EU as variables but 
their status, place in the hypothesis can change depending on the circumstances and
Mehmet Ugur, " Globalization, Regional Integration and EU-Turkey Relations", Кос Lectures, 3- 
10 March 2003
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the interpretation.'^* In this argument, EU and globalization accepted as interrelated 
variables and the relation between them is too difficult to distinguish. There is a 
continuous interaction among them. Castells explains the European integration 
process not only as an answer and choice to globalization but also as its "most 
advanced expression." In addition to him, some like Ross argues that the EU is the 
motivating force of globalization rather than just the opposite. At that point it is 
worth to mention that nearly most of the regional integration arrangements were 
founded or reorganized while the debate about the globalization breaks out. This 
argument does not explicitly interpret this process as purely economic but not 
explicitly deny the impact of economics in this process as well. They cannot do this. 
What they try to do is to adjust this process and commends to the practices and 
realities of the world. They by not clearly ignoring the other sides of globalization 
and by not drawing the clear and definite boundaries of the EU and globalization 
remain more open to analyze the current situations. The idea of whether the chicken 
had come out of an egg or vice versa can not explain the attempts of the European 
Union to enlarge and deepen and the effects of globalization on this decisions only 
by itself by eliminating the other factors and by taking the globalization as an only 
factor. They had put this debate aside focus on the relationship between these two 
variables.
Chris Rumfold, Tke European Union: A Political Sociology, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, 
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5.1.3.3 WHICH ONE FOR EU?
In this paper, the debate about which one can be the exact independent or dependent 
variable will not be considered. From my point of view, the emergence and the 
remote causes of this process are to make this processes highly related and 
indispensable. Like in every debate, both of these two arguments are good at 
answering their own research question. First one, the economist model since its more 
emphasis on economics is right at accepting the globalization and its consequences 
of European Union and its developments. I agree with them, in all regional 
integration arrangements initial idea have been economic. EU has enhanced its 
members to compete more and gain more by its highly institutionalized institutions 
and economic power otherwise especially the less developed countries can manage. 
As Mehmet Ugur argues, EU decreases the transaction cost of trade and set the 
optimum tariff barrier.’^ '' However, this model is not sufficient in explaining the 
other sides of the globalization and its continuous relation with the European Union. 
Since the globalization and its consequences cannot be ignored like the existence and 
power of the European Union. As Beck argues it is logical to accept the dynamics of 
globalization and try to shape this by being active in this process. Being only a 
recipient decrease the power of the European Union and make it very passive which 
in the future will make the European Union meaningless.*^^ They do not neglect the 
idea of competition as a main reason of European integration but they try to explain 
the EU as a step in the process of globalization. I think through the formation of 
regional arrangements, the power of nation states will decrease and by creating less 
powerful actors in numbers, decision making procedure will become easy and less
Mehmet Ugur," Globalization, Regional Integration and EU-Turkey Relations", Кос Lectures, 3- 
10 March 2003
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complex and naturally they will go through the stages of globalization not only in 
economic terms.
As a real subject of this research paper, I believe that not only globalization leads to 
the formation of European Union but also EU can be seen as one of the " most 
advanced expression" of globalization. Due to this fact, globalization can be taken 
as one of the factor that forces the European Union to rethink its role and the place in 
the world. In a global world order for an international organization like the European 
Union adaptation of new conditions and dynamism are the inevitable and necessary 
conditions to be effective. The EU should prefer to be an active participant rather 
than a passive recipient. Under these existent conditions as a conclusion, not only EU 
can be seen as a participant of globalization but also it can be affected from the terms 
of globalization.
5.2 INTERNAL FACTORS
5.2.1 DYNAMISM OF EU AND ITS INSTITUTIONS
Like all the other international entities, international organizations have a reason for 
their existence. States generally are not close to the idea of setting up an international 
organization without a reason. These reasons can be found within the constitutional 
agreements of each organization. According to their reasons of existence, they define 
their purposes. For instance, the reason of the establishment of NATO was security 
and main purpose is to protect the Western European states against Soviet threat. 
However, depending on the changes in international circumstances, to protect its
M. Castells, End of Millenium: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture”, Volume 3, 
London: Blackwell, 2000, p.348
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status and weight, international institutions has to reevaluate its role and weight in 
international politics. Lacking of this vision was one of the main reasons of the 
steady decline of the NATO in recent past. The answer of the question of why does 
the alliance endure needs to be renewed depending on the conditions. Otherwise, 
after they achieved their goal, they are supposed to de facto disappearing. EU as a 
dynamic organization has managed to do these revisions. By nature, these revisions 
bring the deepening and enlargement on the top of the EU agenda. Deepening and 
the enlargement of the union not only makes the union dynamic but also make it 
more powerful and effective in international politics with more member states and 
with more democratic institutions, and responsibilities. In relation to this paper, the 
main issues which directly and indirectly lead to evolution of the union is: 
enlargement, the idea of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common security 
and Defense Policy.
5.2.2 ENLARGEMENT
When the ECSC was established in 1951 as an initial idea of European integration, it 
consisted of only 6 states and it was an economic institution. The coal and steel 
industry of France, Germany, Italy, Belgimn, the Netherlands and Luxembourg came 
together under the control o f " High Authori ty".As it was mentioned several times 
they tried to stabilize the region, achieve economic recovery and normalize the 
relations between states by transferring their authority to a high supra- national 
authority in one of the key economic issue. They have been successful. The 
establishment of European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic 
Community by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 further enhanced the adherence of these
Stephen M. Walt," Why Alliances Endure or Collapse?,"SMmva/, Vol.39, Spring 1997, pp. 156-179 
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six to the idea of European unity through economic integration.*"*® Later, the EEC, 
which is an organ functioning as a common market, became the European 
Community. These serious and efficient developments took the attraction of the non- 
member states not only due to the feeling of involvement to a powerful organization, 
club but also due to the benefits they can get from this organization.
As a response to the demands of the candidates and the Community and Union, till 
now EC\ EU has decided to enlarge four times. After Helsinki, this process has 
gained momentum and the Union is supposed to have approximately 27 members by 
the fifth enlargement in 2004. This process has been essential in the sense that 
changes in the number of member states require the adoption of existing EC\EU 
policies and institutions.
5.2.2.1 FIRST ENLARGEMENT
As a brief historical background, the first enlargement took place in 1973 when 
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland were accepted as new members. There is no 
need to mention that acceptance of Britain, as a new member was something that 
should have happened when the ECSC was first set up. As a country who applied for 
membership and whose application delayed till the 1973 due to French opposition, 
Britain really gave concessions. I think this wave had not created too many 
difficulties to the Community in terms of the effects on Community because these 
are the states traditionally equivalent of member states: they had working 
democracies, market economies. In addition, under those days existing mechanisms 
and institutions of the community were efficient enough to handle the intended and
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999, p.38
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unintended results of enlargement. In this wave, the economic interests of both sides 
had the priority over political considerations. It was normal in the sense that EC was 
mainly an economic community, which only has an implicit desire to be a political 
union. There had considerable changes in the economic considerations of the Union. 
Thanks to these changes and as a result Britain was accepted as a member. Britain 
was capable of solving this slump in the union with the help of its agriculture sector, 
which could give boost to the EU economies. The application of Ireland and 
Denmark were closely related to the Britain's desire to be a member because these 
two states had strong trade relationship with Britain.*'**
With this enlargement, the Community increased the number of member states from 
6 to 9.Since the main institutional structures were formed by the Treaty on European 
Union, at this time first enlargement made no important institutional changes within 
the Community. The effects of this enlargement on the Community are demonstrated 
on the Table 2.*^ *^
S.2.2.2 SECOND ENLARGEMENT
The second enlargement, which is kno-wn as Mediterranean Enlargement, took place 
in 1981 and in 1986.*'*^  Unlike the first wave and the third wave, the main reason of 
admittance of these states was political. I think this decision of the community began 
to give the indications of the idea of politicization of the Union because when the 
tenets of the enlargement waves are considered except the first wave, we confront 
with the reality that the economies of all the second wave candidates have been
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 64-67 
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below the EC\ EU level and the main aim of this decision was so as to democratize 
these candidates and spread of Western values. The main reason behind the second 
wave enlargement was to ensure the stability on the southern periphery of Western 
Europe. This political and security reason lead the Council to accept these members 
in spite of the negative report of the Commission covering these states.’"^"* Needless 
to say, the members of the Community could not tolerate any undemocratic, 
authoritarian regime in the areas in its periphery and they decided to accept these 
states. Political factors overrode economic factors regarding the all three of them: 
Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986. The membership of these countries with 
their poor economic standards might set a precedent for the membership of CEES.
With this enlargement, the number of member states was increased to 13. With 
respect to institutional structures at those days, like the first wave, these new 
inclusions did not create important institutional problems. The changes of this 
enlargement are demonstrated in the Table 2.'"'  ^ However, it should be noted that 
these enlargements have put great economic burdens on the EC/EU.
5.2.2.3 THIRD ENLARGEMENT
The third wave enlargement included the countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA): Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. EFTA countries felt this 
need due to the decrease in the investment in their countries. The determination of 
EU member states regarding the creation of a single market threatened the economies 
of EFTA countries. Despite the efforts of both sides to solve this problem and
Ian Bache and Stephen George, Politics in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001,p.409
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establish more close links among them without participating the community 
officially, they did not succeed on this. Mainly, the businessmen did not satisfy with 
the idea of European Economic Area because their main concern was foreign direct 
investment and they believed that this idea could not met their needs and not take 
enough precautions. They insisted on membership. As a response to this request, EU 
by taking the wealth of the EFTA states into consideration accepted their 
membership. EFTA enlargement had occurred mainly due to the need of EU to 
decrease the pressure on the budget, which might have created troubles with the
Central and Eastern European enlargement. 146
The changes that this enlargement was made on the Community are shown on the 
t a b l e ? T h e  main importance of this third wave enlargement was it was the first 
time that the discussions about the institutional structure of the union came to 
question. These discussions mainly cover the weighting of votes in the Council of 
Ministers, extension of the practice of Qualified Majority Voting, and the size of the 
commission. This enlargement pointed out the hazards of enlargement. When the 
new and increasing number of states becomes member to the EU, it becomes more 
difficult for EU to formulate policies and rearrange decision-making procedures.
S.2.2.4 CURRENT ENLARGEMENTS
Till now, enlargement processes took place without many problems. Even the 
participation of economically less developed countries did not put many burdens on
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999, pp. 104-109
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the architecture and the decision making of the Union. Only some complaints have 
been made regarding the too much money going to Spain and Portugal. The main 
problems have begun with the idea of the Central and Eastern European enlargement. 
After the sudden collapse of communism and the decision of the European 
Commission to co-ordinate aid regarding the post Communist countries and the 
construction of Phare Program, firstly to the Poland and Hungary and after the total 
collapse to all Central and Eastern European states in 1989.^ '^  ^This program aimed at 
to assist these states economically and politically. Two years later, in accordance 
with the aim of the post communist states of being "European", EC signed 
Association Agreements with them, which after the completion of adoption process 
give them the opportunity to be member of the club. The commitment to open 
negotiations also covered Malta and Cyprus. In 1993, European Council evaluated 
their request for membership and put their conditions, which are known as
Copenhagen Criteria, 150
"Copenhagen Criteria approved the principle of the enlargement but not 
unconditionally. EC\ EU laid down three main criteria for membership. The first one 
is political criterion: An applicant must have:
• Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy
• The rule of law
• Human rights and the protection of minorities.
The second one is the economic criterion: An applicant must have:
Ian Bache and Stephen George, Politics in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001,p.409
Martin Smith and Graham Timmins, Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NA TO Enlargement in 
Comparative Perspective, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp. 22-23
European Commission, Glossary: Institutions, Policies, and Enlargement o f The European Union, 
Luxembourg, Office for the Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2000, p.5
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• A functioning market
• Economy
• The capacity to cope with competitive pressures within the single market of the 
EU.
The last one is a criterion relating to the acquis commnautaire’^ ': An applicant must 
be able to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic, and monetary union."
Just after the declaration of Copenhagen Criteria, the applications began with Poland, 
and Hungary. Later, during the German presidency specifically with the 
encouragement of Germany, lots of supports were given to Czech and Slovak 
Republics. In 2003, 12 candidates were waiting for membership at the EU gates. EU 
initially preferred to put them in equal footing, but later depending on the candidates’ 
peculiar circumstances this decision was ignored. In 1997, the Commission 
prepared and announced the famous document of Agenda 2000.*^  ^ Plus, they 
attached their opinions on the applicant states' preparedness for membership. After 
the evaluations, they proposed to begin negotiations with the best-prepared 
candidates. Their proposal was accepted in the Luxembourg Council (1997) and the 
applications of Cyprus, and Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia 
were prioritized. The other five (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia) 
and the Malta, who withdrew membership and re applied in 1998, were the second 
group. EU in 1999 decided to open negotiations with them as well.*^^
It is the body o f  common rights and obligations, which bind all member states together within the 
European Union.
European Commission, How Does The European Union Work?, Luxembourg; Office for Official 
Publications o f the European Communities, p. 15
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For EU, acceptance of these states as members has not been an easy decision as 
accept them as candidates for membership. This is not only because of the scope of 
the enlargement comparing to pervious waves or the economic burden of this 
decision on the budget but also because of the unprepared institutions of the EU. 
Dating from the Maastricht, EU institutions have tried to adopt their own structures 
to the future enlargement before admitting new members to prevent any 
inefficiencies of the decision-making dynamism. ^ '^^However, EU was not decisive 
enough to apply this decision. Therefore, in order to speed the application of this 
decision up and fill in the gaps of the Maastricht decisions, member states convened 
in Amsterdam Intergovernmental Council. These were all the essential documents 
but as it can be easily understood from the former information, the main document, 
which put great emphasis on enlargement, was the Agenda 2000. This document 
aimed to prepare the EU and its institutions for enlargement but the main decisions, 
which requires the urgent implication of previous decisions, was given in the Nice 
Treaty. The Nice Summit of EU (December 2000) aimed to reform the structure of 
the Union in preparation for the admission of up to 12 new states. This meant 
limiting the number of policy areas where imanimity is required (the question of 
national veto), the size of the blocking minority, the weighting of votes under 
Qualified Majority Voting, and the size of the Commission. They achieved some 
degree of success but not as much as expected, only at a degree, which was enough 
to keep open the prospect of enlargement.'^^ Now, after the completion of all the 
procedures with the decisions of EU Council of Ministers in the Brussels Summit 
(December 2003), EU will have 10 more members (Czech Republic, Estonia,
*^ F^or Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A 
Croft et al, op.cit, p.8
Rjdvan Karluk ve Ozgur Tonus, Avrupa Birliği Kapısında Türkiye, Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 
2002,pp.29-30
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Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) on 1 
May 2004. Plus, EU clarified that they are ready to accept Bulgaria and Romania as
full members in 2007, if they are ready, 156
Likewise in the issue of globalization, the question of whether the decision of 
enlargement forces the Union to rethinks it's role or the EU enlargement because it 
has been rethinking its role has included controversial aspects. The dynamism of EU 
and the unintended and unpredicted events in the international system have led the 
EU to enlarge so as to spread its democratic values; however, any increeise in the 
number of members has put new responsibilities on EU shoulders not only in 
economic terms but also in political terms. Every enlargement varies the geography 
and the geographical boundaries of the union, political balances among the members, 
balance of budget and the decision- making mechanism of the Union.
Enlargement imposes not only internal, institutional changes but also external, 
geographical burdens on the Union. Firstly, it leads changes in security and defense 
objectives of EU. Needless to say, EU clearly has a commitment to promote stability 
in Central and Eastern Europe and incorporate its peoples into the West. If we take 
this commitment as the maim reason of EU in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
decision of enlargement is consistent \vith this aim. In order to enhance the stability 
in this region, the best way is the inclusion of these states in the union. By this 
method, EU can better control these states and spread democratic values because the 
aims of the Union not only includes the government agencies but also the public and 
public agencies. Secondly, changes in the threat perceptions in the new conjuncture 
of the system have decreased the role of NATO. The end of the Cold War and the
For Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions, see Appendix A 
For detail information, see Appendix B List o f Tables
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current threats has proved the assumption that the main threats are mostly under the 
scope of soft security issues. It is necessary to have military capabilities and will to 
create pan- European security order but not sufficient in itself. In addition to military 
needs, economic and social contexts are also required in current pan- European 
order, which is the aim of the EU. Therefore, by enlargement EU has tried to solve 
the problem of economic insufficiency, undemocracy by its own methods. Thirdly, 
parallel with all of the reasons above, EU has to formulate sufficient policies and 
adopt credible policy actions by considering the number of its members and extended 
geographical boundaries. Enlargement, having more members requires additional 
policies, actions and more responsibilities.
The impacts of the most important enlargement are demonstrated in the Table 2.
5.2.3 IDEA OF COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
The idea that the European Union should speak with one voice in world affairs is old 
as the European integration process itself But the union has made less progress in 
forging a common foreign and security policy over the years than in creating a single
market and a single currency. 159
As it can be understood from this phrase: Although it has not been achieved yet, 
the attempt to make this union politically integrated has begun nearly at the 
same time of creating an economic union. Efforts of creating a political union in 
spite of the slow developments will be analyzed and criticized within the 
contents of Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Martin Smith and Graham Timmins, Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in 
Comparative Perspective, Aldershot; Ashgate, 2000, pp. 168-170
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5.2.3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF CFSP
The first step on the way towards forming a political union was an attempt in 
1954 to create a European Defense Community*^®. This attempt had not been 
realized due to the veto of French National Assembly. This desire was delayed 
till the 1969 Hague Summit. In this summit, EC states expressed their desire of 
adding a political dimension to the community and they set up European 
Political Co-operation (EPC). EPC was like a negotiation forum among 
members of the community but did not have a binding effect and operated 
through adopting common positions. It can be argued that the success of the 
EPC was depending on the will and the intention of the members. The intention 
of the members had priority over common position because legally EPC was not 
part of the community architecture.’^ ' Therefore, foreign policy co-operation 
was not institutionalized.
5.2.3.2 SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
What made the foreign policy co-operation institutionalized was the 1987 Single
European Act. By this act, EC members linked the EPC into the framework of
EC. This did not only enhance a legal framework to the actions of the EPC but
also legitimized the possible actions under the framework of common positions.
In order to increase the legitimacy of their common positions they changed the
1decision-making apparatus of foreign policy to ’'constructive abstention.”
http://www,europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/overview
Werner Weidenfeld, " Upheaval in Europe”, in Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), 
Europe From A to Z Guide to European Integration, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 1997, pp.8-9 
Ibid.., pp.8-9
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999, p. 114
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However, what was fastened this desire of the members was the events taken 
place in the international structure. The fall of Berlin Wall, collapse of 
communism and the Soviet Union, the regional conflicts at the backyard of the 
EC\ EU in former Yugoslavia, and lastly the danger of international terrorism in 
recent years were pushed the issue of forming a political union through 
Common and Foreign Policy to the top of the EC agenda.
What has made these events that much significant is: they showed that EC could 
not remain only as an economic vmion, if it wants to be an effective international 
institution. These events proved that by giving financial aids, not all the 
solutions could be solved in terms of international politics. The inadequacy of 
EPC within the framework of Single European Act had become an unavoidable 
reality with the Gulf Crisis and Yugoslav Civil War.
5.2.3.3 THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
After the realization of this, EU leaders decided to arrange an Intergovernmental 
Conference to fill the gaps in the application of foreign policy. The Maastricht 
Treaty (The Treaty on European Union) concluded this conference in December 
1991. By Maastricht, EPC was transferred into the CFSP (Common Foreign and 
Security Policy) as a second pillar of the EU. It can be said that the Treaty on 
European Union introduced CFSP in Article J.l of this treaty clarified the 
famous 5 objectives of the Union. These are;
Gabriela Thornton, " The Future o f European Union External Relations: From a " Pass-the- Buck" 
Strategy to a Common Voice?", Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol.l, No.7, September 
2002
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• To strengthen the common values, interests and independence of the
Union
• To strengthen the security of the Union it’s member states in all ways
• To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris 
Charter
• To promote international co-operation and
• To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.'^
In addition to these goals, Maastricht (TEU) reformed the decision-making 
procedures of the CFSP. Commission has been responsible from the issues on 
foreign policy. Directorate- General for External Policies was set up to perform 
this function on day-to-day basis. European Parliament only had a consultative 
role in CFSP. Further more, they introduced two policy instruments: “common 
positions” and “joint actions”. Common positions are decided through 
consensus among members, with the informal constructive rule applying. 
Member states are free to implement this position. The latter policy instrument 
is the joint actions. The actions, which require joint actions, are decided by the 
Council by unanimity and than its implication are done by qualified majority 
voting. This was the first time that qualified majority voting has been 
pronounced as a voting system in terms of foreign policy. However, it cannot be 
said that these are binding on members as well.
164 Treaty on European Union, Article J.l. Available on the Web: http://wwvy.europa.eu.mt/
79
Moreover, as another pillar of foreign policy, the issue of defense was 
mentioned in the Maastricht. The EU and Western European Union (WEU) 
would co-operate in the defense issues and WEU was integrated to the EU as a 
part of this existing architecture. Their aim was mainly to " strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".
5.2.3.4 THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (1997)
In order to achieve this goal, they decided to reform CFSP and this issue became 
the central tenet of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. However, the 
war in former Yugoslavia proved the inefficiency of CFSP. The aim of CFSP 
written into the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 has proved elusive. Its 
implementation has lagged behind the implication of forming a single market. 
To fill the gaps and to increase the implementation capacity of CFSP, they have 
developed the CFSP. Firstly, Amsterdam Treaty of 1996 decided to appoint 
"Mr. or Ms. CFSP", who is responsible from the implementation of EU actions. 
Javier Solana was appointed to this job in 1999. The main aim behind this 
decision was to attribute a personality to the EU on foreign policy matters. He or 
she on behalf of the Union has represented the EU on CFSP matters. Beside this, 
this was the symbolic indication that in spite of the criticism EU could speak 
with one voice. Secondly, Amsterdam introduced " common strategies" as an 
additional instrument of CFSP.’^^  On the basis of proposal of foreign ministers 
EU Council decides to adopt them through common positions or joint actions. 
Thirdly, in order not to create ambiguities in the voting system of decision-
165
346
Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, London: Macmillan Press, 1999,pp.343-
166 European Commission, The European Union and the World, op.cit. p.6
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making structure, Amsterdam clearly drew a line between the CFSP principles 
and general guidelines, and the adoption of joint actions, common positions and 
implementing decisions. It was clearly stated that the voting system of the first 
one is unanimity and the latter one is qualified majority voting. This division 
was made in order to enhance the proper function of the CFSP. Moreover, 
Article 15 of the Treaty has separated the content of the common positions and 
joint actions. Joint actions require where necessary upon the decision of the 
Council specific operational action. Whereas, common positions are planned to 
be used in less clearly definable situations, " of a geographic or thematic 
nature". Fourthly, Amsterdam formalized the system of the second pillar of the 
structure as a " constmctive abstention". Although all CFSP decisions are taken 
by unanimity, they decided to count the abstention votes as not negative in order 
to enhance the unity. Therefore, the member states, who do not share the same 
perception has an opportunity to abstain rather than opposing the decision 
legally. Therefore, they are not obliged to take an action parallel to the given 
decision. Finally, as a complementary element of CFSP, Amsterdam reaffirmed 
NATO as the central defense organization of Europe but mention the possibility 
of integration of WEU to the EU.
These are all the legal institutional developments with regard to CFSP. They 
look well on the paper but the same command cannot be made about the practice 
of these developments. Despite these improvements, the issue of CFSP is still an 
intergovernmental policy area and due to this fact, as the Commissioner
Amsterdam Treaty is available on the Web.httD://www.europa.eu.int/
John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, Decision Making In the European Union, London:
Routledge, 1999,pp.230-231
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Responsible for the External Relations mentions, it has been "a common policy, 
not a single one."^^^
5.2.4 EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
The developments in the former Yugoslavia and the humble architecture of the 
Union in responding these developments showed that reaction is nothing 
without the capacity and the intention to act.'^° The conditions of the theory of 
deterrence were missing in the union's CFSP. To fill this gap in their policy of 
external relations, EU since 1999 decided to create a European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP) within the CFSP. In addition, from the beginning of 
efforts of co-operation in the CFSP; foreign affairs, security and defense has 
constituted the two components of it as mentioned in Treaty on European Union 
(1992). Therefore, developments and concerns about the CFSP have been valid 
for CSDP to some extent.
5.2.4.1 THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
The main step at this direction was taken at Maastricht. They decided to 
formulate a common security policy and declared the WEU as the institution to
implement the security and defense policies. 171
Chris Patea A Voice for Europe? The future o f the CFSP, lEA, Dublin, Brian Lenihan Memorial 
Lecture, 7 March 2001, Speech /01/111.
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, London; Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1999, p.509 
171 Christopher Hill and William Wallace, '' Introduction- Actors and Actions", in Christopher 
Hill (ed), The actors in Europe's Foreign Policy^ London and New York: Routledge, 1996, p:13
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S.2.4.2 THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (1997)
The Treaty of Amsterdam reformulated the existing provisions and added 
Petersberg Tasks as new aspects. These tasks have been incorporated into 
Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and they involve: humanitarian and rescue 
tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peace making. The reason of enlarging the scope of the aspects of 
CSDP was to show the determination of the member states to safeguard security 
through operations especially at a time when there was a risk of local conflicts at 
the backyard of the Union in the former Yugoslavia, which might have spread to 
other regions. Besides these, Amsterdam established highly closed ties between 
the EU and WEU without incorporating them. However, these arrangements 
were not able to enhance the adaptation of a common defense policy and the 
unanimity rule in the decision making process
However, the success of the Petersberg Tasks depends on the collaboration with 
the NATO because approximately all the material capabilities and materials are 
supposed to be given by NATO to the EU; such as, military capabilities, 
operational planning capabilities, and so on. Therefore, EU has tried to 
strengthen the material capabilities. Consistent with this goal, in Helsinki in 
December 1999 member states introduced the military component of the CSDP. 
EU established a "headline goal" in Helsinki, which is, the Union's capacity to 
deploy within 60 days, and sustain for at least one year (by the year 2003), and 
up to 60000 persons (even some of the candidate countries participate with
Amsterdam Treaty, Article 17 is available on the Web, httD://www.europa.eu.mt/
John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg, Decision Making In The European Union, 1999,p.234
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military forces) to fulfill Petersberg Tasks: mainly to response to international 
crisis where NATO as a whole militarily not engaged.
5.2.4.3 NICE SUMMIT
To implement these tasks, EU reformed the military structure in Nice Summit 
(2000) and developed the military capacity of the union. The most important one 
was the creation of the ESDP
Replacing the Political Committee, the PSC keeps track of international 
developments; helps define policies and monitors implementation of agreed 
policies. Composed principally of national representatives, it is the lynchpin of 
crisis management activities. To ensure its smooth operation, the PSC is assisted 
by a politico-military working group, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis 
management, as well as the Military Committee (EUMC) and the Military Staff 
(EUMS). The EUMC gives military advice to the PSC and the High 
Representative while the EUMS, which is part of the Secretariat of the Council,
17Sis responsible for early warning, strategic planning and situation assessment. 
Moreover, at the same day, EU established the Rapid Reaction Mechanism to 
enhance the Union's civilian capacity to intervene effectively in the crisis 
situation in third countries.’’  ^ Furthermore, in Nice (2000), EU removed the 
Article 17 of the Amsterdam and clarified that enhanced co-operation cannot be 
used for defense matters, which does have military components in it.
Nice Presidency Conclusions is available on the Web.httD://www.europa.eu.int/
Cengiz Okman, "AGSK ve NATO Üzerine Radikal Donusum Iklilemi", Karizma, Nisan/ Mayıs/ 
haziran 2001, pp. 108-112
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As it can be depicted from these decisions, EU has tries to establish its own 
defensive capabilities but these are not enough to formulate a CSDP in a full 
scale. As the EU High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana said:" NATO will 
continue to be the cornerstone of the collective security of the European 
countries. The European security and defense capacity will reinforce and 
revitalize NATO."'^^
In the new future according to the EU actions, it's success and failures of CFSP 
and CSDP will be better evaluated. Whether these policies will be formally 
recognized and implemented or whether these policies if are accepted in a legal 
document, remain on the paper. Future will show the world and also to their 
own members of this unique club that the success of the attempts are for a 
political union. Will the EU pass this test as well or fail?
Commission o f the European Communities, " Sununary o f the Treaty of Nice", Memorandum to 
the Members o f the Commission, Brussels, January 18, 2001, SEC (2001) 99, p.l3
Javier Solana," Towards a Stronger Alliance", European Affairs, Brussels, 12-04-2000 
httD://ue.eu.int/solana/details.asp
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CHAPTER VI
EU AS A GLOBAL POWER
It was nearly fifty-three years since Robert Schuman had proposed the 
establishment of ECSC and now the EU is the final project of these efforts. 
Schuman's small community has been growing. Now, the EU is the largest 
single market in the world and the largest international trader.'^* EU's influence 
in the world has been increasing parallel to the developments of the policies. 
The process of integration, acceptance of Euro as a single currency, and the 
attempts of developing the idea of CFSP have contributed to this continuous 
increase of EU. After that, EU will be accepted not only as an economic giant 
but also as apolitical giant.
International expectations about the EU that by using it's economic power, EU 
might have been a political power were fmstrated by the internal arguments and 
as a reflection of these internal debates.*^^ The Union's economic objective of 
protecting its competitiveness by promoting global commerce through 
liberalization of world trade rules work very systematically and practically. 
Whereas, the Union's objective of establishing a stable Europe with a stronger 
voice remains open to discussions owing to the incapability and indecisiveness 
of the EU. EU's actions indicated the unwillingness of EU and EU was accepted 
mainly as a commentator rather than a player in the system. From political point
Christopher Patten, "The European Union and the World" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), Europe In 
the New Century, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.79
179 Ibid, p.80
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of view, after the bloody disintegration of former Yugoslavia, EU realized that it 
should have not continued to underestimate its potential power not only in 
Europe but outside Europe as well. Political dimension of the Union's external 
activities lagged behind the level of expectations. After the realization of these 
realities, EU decided to be stronger in foreign policy, reinforce political
capabilities 181
To sum up, in order to destroy its weaknesses, EU decided to develop and speak 
with one voice either internally or externally. One of the tangible indicators of 
these ideas is the Draft Constitution for the Future of Europe.
6.1 A CONSTUTION FOR THE EUROPE
In Laeken Summit (2001) parallel to the plans of the Union, EU decided to 
establish a convention to work on the future of the Union and to propose a 
constitutional d r a f t . I t  was really a turning point in the history of the Union 
because by having a constitution, it owes one of the necessary components of 
being a state. This reflects the seriousness of the Union on the way towards 
being a political institution besides its economic character. In order to be both 
decisive and powerful both within the imion and outside the union, the 
convention was expected to answer the following questions:
1) How to bring citizens closer to the European Design and European 
Institutions.
'^ “Lionel Barber, "The New Transatlantic Agenda" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), Europe In the New 
Century, London; Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.99
European Commission, The European Union and the World, op.cit, p.3 
The Laeken Declaration is available on the World Wide Web: 
http://www.euroDa.eu.int/faturum/documents/offlext/doc 151201 en. htm
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2) How to organize politics and the European political area in an enlarged 
Union
3) How to develop the Union into a stabilizing factor and a model in the new 
world order.
The common points of all these questions are all of them require a more 
powerful organization internally and externally. In order to re-think, readjust 
and reinvent the system, Valery Discards D'estaing as the President of the 
Convention mentioned, they established Convention worked and completed 
their proposal text to be declared in an IGC. . They prepared their draft and 
accepted by a broad consensus on 13 June 2003. They submitted and proposed 
to the Council in Thessaloniki on 20 Jvme 2003. This draft hoped to be a treaty, 
which in the future might transform to a constitution. In this paper, mainly this 
draft constitution will be examined in terms of its probable impacts on the 
Union's future and special focus will be made on the unions external relations 
since it will affect it's relation with Turkey.
6.1.1 CFSP and CSDP
Under the provisions of existing treaties and legal documents, EU had mainly 
three devices for the implication of external activities. These were: trade policy, 
development aid and the political dimension, which was under the average 
compare to the other policy instruments.^*'* With these attempts, EU has tried to 
strengthen the political policies as a policy instrument. In order to be more 
involved in security issues as it's role and geography impose on the union and to
European Policy Center," The IGC and Institutional Reform", 05 December 2003, p.l (running 
notes)
184 Emopean Commission, The European Union and the World, op.cit, p.3
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be more active in world scale, the Convention gave much importance to the 
CFSP and CSDP.
In addition to the institutional changes it requires, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and the Defense Policy take the biggest part in the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe and are central to the text. However, the member states had 
not agreed on the draft of the Constitution during the Italian presidency.'*^ Besides 
this, I think they would not be able to reach a consensus during the Irish presidency 
as well. I guess that the main aim of this attempt has not been by establishing a closer 
relationship solving the problem of democratic deficit because by solving another 
problem, which is the institutional balance within the Union by treaties, the Union 
can handle this problem. There are easier ways of solving this problem. However, the 
main reason is political. EU is at a time to define its future and act in this direction. 
Member states are well aware of the fact that the union has been evolving to meet the 
challenges of political integration besides economic integration.'*^ This is the main 
difficulty in the draft text.
By the Treaty of Rome (1957), Union decided to extend the scope of their 
activities. One of them was foreign policy and security. In order to achieve this 
goal, in this draft the members of the convention tried to give a momentum to 
this decision. They tried to do this by making institutional reforms, by reforming 
the decision-making and policy formation system. It should not be understood 
that this paper will simplify the Constitutional Treaty by only focusing these
"Constitution Talks Collapse", Euobserver: 
http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=l 3891. 13.12.2003186The IGC and Institutional Reform, 05 December 2003, European Policy Center, p .l
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changes, in the necessary places especially to the ones regarding the external 
activities of the Union, will made.
Firstly, there has been a widespread opinion that EU has been undergoing 
significant institutional reforms. It is true that attempts are really historical and 
radical’*^  but not that much important compare to others. There is a risk and 
tendency of over estimating the importance of institutional reform. The major 
success will be evaluated when this treaty will be ratified and implicated by all 
member states. The success of this draft and the acceptance of it depend on the 
will of the member states rather than the written institutions and they're written 
responsibilities.'^* This reality can be well understood when the 
intergovernmental institutions and the relative role of the Parliament are taken 
into consideration. The recent Iraq Crisis revealed the limits of loyalty and 
mutual solidarity of the Union. Draft Constitution will show whether the 
necessary lessons have been taken or not?
One of the activities of the Union, which indicates the sincerity of the Union to 
adopt and to use these measures, is external relation. The so-called CFSP and 
CDSP. The Constitution for Europe separated nearly 22 pages to the external 
affairs. Main principles are explained as: strengthening multilateral co­
operation, good global governance, sustainable development, free trade, and 
conflict prevention and eradicating poverty. Consistent with these general
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
For Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Part I, p.23
Martin Walker, "The Future o f Europe's Foreign Policy" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), Europe In The 
New Century, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, pp.77-78
^^^European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title I Part I, ppdO-l 1
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principles, the European Council will be responsible from defining the strategic 
interests and objectives of the EU and from providing regular threat 
assessm ents.B y this article, EU explicitly recognizes that the outside world is 
still anarchic and it has to have deterrent measures and will to live in this world. 
Moreover, the member states are expected to collaborate in harmony regarding 
CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and refrain from any action contrary to the interests 
of the Union or likely to diminish its effectiveness in international relations.
6.1.1.1 INSTUTIONAL REFORMS REGARDING CFSP
As Grevi mentions, strengthening the role of EU in foreign and security policy 
domain and support this by credible actions and policies towards to the outside 
of Europe will determine the level of the future integration of Europe.’^ ’ There 
has been a real development in the articles of the external affairs but not enough 
to cope with the challenges of the global and unidentified hard and soft security 
threats. Main development is the recognition of these new threats and 
presentation of instruments to handle them both in military and political terms. 
Especially, "mutual solidarity clause" deserves much attention. In addition, 
the attempts for further integration by having their own external representation. 
On the other hand, main short-backs in this draft and in the newly proposed and 
rejected draft are: the complicated mechanisms in decision- making and the 
creation of the post of a double-hatted EU Foreign Minister, which might be 
both an advantage and disadvantage.
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 20, p.25
Political will and institutions: A chicken Egg Dilemma in EU Foreign Policy, Giovanni Grevi, 02 
Dec 2003; p.l
For further information look at: European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for 
Europe, Luxembourg; Office for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title V 
Article 42, p.53
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In order to show the world that there will be "more Europe" in world affairs. 
Members of the Convention proposed the appointment of a EU Foreign 
Minister. He will be appointed by the European Council, by taking the opinions 
of the President of the Commission. He is responsible from developing 
common foreign policy, and common security and defense policy by preparing 
proposals. To fulfill these tasks under the provisions of Article 27-2, he will 
work with the Council of Ministers. Besides this, as a Vice President of the 
Commission, he will co-ordinate all the aspects of external action of the Union 
and handles external relations of the U n i o n . A t  this post, he has a power of 
initiating policies regarding Common Foreign and Security Policy.
6.1.1.1.1 EU FOEUEIGN MINISTER
The post of the Foreign Minister of the Union was created so as to enhance 
synergy in foreign policy making. Union tried to merge the functions of External 
Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. He has a double - hatted pos i t ion .The  Minister will have to 
work both with the Commission and the Council. This aims at enhancing co­
operation between the Council and Commission but I think that introducing one 
more player to this complex structure will make especially the policy formation 
difficult. The Minister illuminates with wide range of powers and in practice he 
or she has more power than the President of the Commission if his or her power 
of policy initiation in the field of CFSP and CSDP is taken into consideration. It
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg; Office 
for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 27-1, p.34
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 27-3, p.34
Political will and institutions; A chicken Egg Dilemma in EU Foreign Policy, Giovanni Grevi, 
European Policy Center, 02 Dec 2003; p.3
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should de noteworthy to remember that in the other external relations' fields, the 
Commission has a power of initiation, whereas in the foreign policy and security 
field this power is delegated to the Foreign Minister. This really threatens the 
power and authority of the President of the Commission in external relations. 
The ability to co-operate will depend on the will and personal abilities of these 
two. Moreover, since he is appointed by the Council, which is an inter­
governmental organ, might be dependent on the national governments might 
have his own priorities and might decide on national basis. By the elaboration of 
the right of initiation of the Commission, The Council can define the policy 
guidel ines.On the other hand, this post really strengthens the Union in terms 
of external representation. The Minister will represent the Union to the outside 
world, establish political dialogues with third countries and act for the Union in 
international organizations on behalf of the Union when the Union can produce 
a common position, and represent the EU at international conferences, which is 
related with CFSP.*^’ To sum up, CFSP will be mainly defined by the Council 
and implemented by the Minister.
6.1.1.1.2 PRESIDENT OF EU COUNCIL
Second important institutional reform in this Constitutional Treaty, again related 
with CFSP is the creation of the post of the President of the EU Council. The 
President will be elected by a qualified majority to chair the Council for the 
period of 2.5 years. He will represent the Union externally on the issues
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg; Office 
for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 20, p.25 
’’’ European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2003, Title IV Article 27, p.34
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concerning CFSP without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Minister. 
This means that EU Council remains as the most essential institution in this 
policy area. This involves great paradoxes because the divisions of task between 
the Minister and the President of the Council is not clear due to the unclear 
position of the Minister. Therefore, the personal characters of these two and 
their ambitions will determine their ability to work under this ambiguous 
structure. In addition to this. Article 1-23 indicates the impact of European 
Council over the Council.^^^ This in practicable terms prevents the Commission 
from proposing and coordinating policies. The relationship between the 
President of the Commission and the President of the Council creates 
ambiguities in terms of the conflict in their area of influence and power, 
authority distribution. The triangular relationship between the Minister, the 
President of the Council and the President of the Commission might block the 
foreign policy and implementation process and lead to ineffectiveness of the 
system. In addition to all, in this convention the executive and legislative 
function of the Council of Ministers is separated;^ ®® however, this is not a clear 
separation. Again, the Treaty creates a double-hatted situation, which will 
increase the need for coordination. However, this does not affect foreign policy 
so much because the Foreign Affairs Council will be chaired by the Foreign 
Minister.
Constitutional Declaration, Stanley Crossick, European Policy Center, 14 Dec 2003; p.5. Also 
available at: 
http://www.eDC.com/
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title I Article 23, pp. 27-28 
Ibid, pp.27-28
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The decision-making procedure was changed by the Draft Constitution as well. 
The instruments of Common Strategies and Joint Actions are replaced by 
Decisions that commit member states to pursue the agreed EU policy.^ ®* Every 
Member State and the Foreign Minister have a right to submit proposals to the 
Council, which is subject to the approval of more than a third of weighted votes 
in order not to be failed. However, the rule of Qualified Majority System only 
valid for implementing decisions, unanimity is general rule but abstention is 
possible. The extend of QMV can be enlarged by the unanimous votes of the 
Council with the exception of defense matters. Although the QMV is the main 
rule, CFSP according to the provisions of Article24 subjects to unanimity. 
Therefore, the Convention is not present fimdamental quantitative changes 
regarding the decision-making mechanism in this field. This is one of the main 
obstacles in terms of CFSP field because especially after the enlargement will 
take place, how the Union will be able to decide by unanimity with 25 
members?
6.1.1.2 INSTUTIONAL REFORMS REGARDING CSDP
6.1.1.2.1 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
Regarding CSDP, the rules are stricter and decisions are more difficult to be 
made although this text proposes to increase in the Union's capacities. The 
Constitution for Europe states," The Union shall have competence to implement
6.1.1.1.3 DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title V Article 39, pp. 47-48 
^^'European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Comtitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title I Article 24, p.28
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progressive common defense policy.” ®^^ Paragraph 2 of the same article clarifies 
the steps need to be taken. This article emphasizes the importance of the Council 
in defense matters, which will decide by unanimity to adopt Common Defense 
Policy. Article 15 underlines its abilities and decisiveness of preserving security 
by military means and calls the members to act in a spirit of loyalty and mutual 
solidarity. Moreover, member states under the “ structured cooperation” within 
Union framework make more binding commitments to each other. 
Furthermore, more powerful states implicitly become more effective in this 
domain. Because the Council may ask a group of members "with necessary 
capability and desire" to undertake certain tasks on behalf of the Union. They 
can enter into structured cooperation and accept more binding commitments. 
Furthermore, it is decided to establish a European Armaments Agency to 
monitor the capability commitments of Member states and promote the 
harmonization of the projects.
6.1.1.2.2 THE SCOPE OF EU TASKS
Plus, by ArticleIII-210, the scope of Petersberg Tasks is expanded to include 
joint disannament operations, military advice and post-conflict stabilization. 
The EU increases its level of intervention by this article. This article even gives 
the right to EU to intervene to a civil war when it thinks it is necessary. EU does 
not clarify the limits of extra- territorial military operations undefined, which 
gives the opportunity to the Union act more flexible. In this Constitutional 
Treaty, EU defines its attitude towards terrorism clearly especially by "the
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title I Article 11, p .l7
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications o f  the European Communities, 2003, Title V Article 43, p.54
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90S ♦Mutual Solidarity Clause". This means that EU realized the existence and the 
dangers of soft threats and decides to fight against them militarily as well. 
Article 42-1 declares the world that in the case of confi’onting a soft threat, 
which is defined in this article of its members, all members will co-operate by 
military means as well. By all these articles, EU shows its capability to have its 
own military structure. Plus, they mention that in necessary environment they 
can use the military capabilities. Article 39 and 40 summarize these as " Where 
the international situation requires operational action by the Union, The Council 
of Ministers shall adopt the necessary European decisions."
These are all radical steps in the field of CSDP within the context of CFSP. 
However, during the Italian presidency this Draft Constitution was not accepted 
and the external affairs is one of the reasons of this rejection. I argue that these 
articles do not provide a powerful base for the Union to handle the challenges on 
the global world. The member states independent variable in this hypothesis 
does not match. Different perceptions create the same results but this is mainly 
due to the coincidences and the pressures both within and outside on members to 
be more active in the world affairs. To fight against terrorism is not the same 
thing with the liberalization of economies or setting up democratic institutions. 
It requires both the power and capabilities but much more than this: will and 
belief. As Dinan says the word "common" is not the exact world for these fields: 
CFSP and CSDP." Co-operation" is a better one.
European Convention, Draft Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe, Luxembourg; Office 
for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2003, Title V Article 43, p.54
Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999, p.508
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6.2 BARRIERS AGAINST BEING A MORE INFLUENTIAL ACTOR
European Union is one of the most significant international organizations, as an
actor in the international system, especially in economic terms. EU member
states achieved their goal of creation of a single market, a single currency and
formation of a monetary union. Besides these achievements, the goal of forming
a political union has gained momentum after September 11 both due to the
internal and external factors, which were explained in Chapter V. Owing to
these factors, there has been a consensus in the Union to make their voice heard
in the international system. They agreed on the idea and the need of " more
Europe"^®’; however, they have not agreed on how they can achieve this and
turn them into effective action unanimously is not clear and great disagreements
have been taking place among members regarding this issue. This situation is
well expressed by Solange Villes in her article "The path to Unity". She says:
"European leaders face" both the greatest challenge and the greatest 
opportunity of their lives: to achieve in the earliest stages of the twenty- 
first century the political unification of Europe. These leaders are closer 
than ever to fashioning a political Europe that would fulfill its 
responsibilities in defense and security, that would be able to translate its 
economic clout into a real political power on the world stage."
Needless to add anything to these worlds. It is impossible to agree with except
this. Big projects sometimes bring good results but in order to get the optimum
and the best results, challenges have to be tackled down. Great risks have to be
taken. In this part, the challenges of this desire will be analyzed by grouping
them under three headings: Economic, Political, and Geopolitical Difficulties.
httD://www.eiiropa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/index en.htm.
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6.2.1 ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
It is always said that European Union is an economic giant and a political 
dwarf. '^^  ^ It is really an economic super power when the universal rates of 21% 
in imports, and 20% in exports are taken into account.^’® Its economic power is 
highly appreciated by the outside world owing to the programs it prepares 
towards the third world countries and to the ones who are in real need. As 
Lennon points out, the Union is the biggest donor by the percentage of 56% to 
developing countries. This increases its power in terms of legitimacy.
The Union manages to do this due to its economic power, but the recent 
enlargements, which took place in May 2004 and which will take place in 2007, 
have composed a great challenge to the Union not only economically but also 
politically. The other factor, which makes the EU economically more powerful 
and integrated, is the balance within the Union. Through many policies, the 
Union tries to balance the economic parameters of all members to a certain 
degree, which is above the level of many non- member states. Owing to 
economic power of EU, EU is that much powerful. However, these enlargement 
decisions might change the situation by worsening the economic situation of EU 
as a whole and situation of each member state.
Being powerful enough in politics require economic power but under these 
circumstances it will be difficult for the Union to spend on the development of
^®*Solange Villes, "The Path To Unity" in Robert J. Guttman (edk Europe In the New Century, 
London; Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 16
Gabriela Thornton, " The Future o f European Union External Relations: From a " Pass-the- Buck" 
Strategy to a Common V o i c e Jean Monnet/ Robert Schuman Paper Series, V ol.l, No.7, September 
2002
http://www.euroDa.eu.int/extemal trade.htm
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its defense forces and spend it’s energy on this issue. If the statistics of new 
members are interpreted, which are under the average of EU, it will be certain 
that EU will have to solve the probable economic difficulties it will have 
internally. Its internal balance will be deteriorated at the initial phases. What a 
coincidence nearly at the same time Union wants to increase its role in the world 
politically. The Union will have to fight in two fronts: one is economic and the 
other is political. It is such a difficult task to handle. With recent enlargement 
EU will increase its common market area and will try to balance the economic 
parameters between the new members and old ones. The difficulties will be 
explained by figures.
Firstly, inclusion of new members means an increase in overall population of 
EU.Approximately; 115 million new people became EU citizen. And this will 
increase the gross product per capita only by 3%. The average GDP/ capita of 
new members is 5,600 $. Whereas, the average of the Union is 24,000 $. With 
another data, 39 million Poles had a per capita of 1/3 of this amount.^*  ^Another 
fact, which worsens the situation, is the distribution of funds. The more amoimt 
of money EU has to allocate for funds within it, the lesser the GNP of EU will 
be. Therefore with new members, the GNDP of the Union will decrease by 13 % 
with the enlargements. According to some calculations, it is expected that
David Lennon, ’The European Union: A Leader in Humanitarian and Development Assistance" in 
Robert J, Guttman (ed.), Europe In the New Century, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.l27
Martin Walker, " Enlargement of the Union: How New EU Members Will Change the Shape of the 
Europe" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), Europe In the New Century, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 62 
"More Funds Needed for regions in enlarged Europe", Euobserver: 
http://www.euob$.com/mdex.phtml?aid=6165. 07.05.2002
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only the membership of the 10 last members will cost Europe approximately E-3 
trillion Euro.^’"^
Secondly, the inclusion of 110 million people to the Union, who are mainly 
dealing with agriculture, will change the way EU financed its budget and bring 
about the reformation of some policies especially the Common Agriculture 
Policy. This is one of the biggest challenges the EU faces; because it has been 
the first time that the Union has accepted new members, whose population’s 25 
% farmers. That is something that the Union is unfamiliar with. This will 
damage the general budget system. Moreover, this will put too much burden to 
the contributing coimtries like Germany and France. For instance, Germany 
contributes to the budget with a percentage of 30 but only receive 15 of it in 
return. The major contributors want to correct this system since they perceive 
themselves only as contributors. Furthermore, the recipients, mainly Greece and 
Portugal, have begun to complain because their share and also the amount of 
money they have got from the structural fimds will decrease.
To sum up, as an organization whose power has came from its economic power: 
on one hand decided to take a risk but on the other too much economic burden 
in Copenhagen 2002, on the other hand decided to combine its economic power 
with political power by ensuring the political integration. I think this is 
paradoxical because while trying to do these things, its economical power will
Christian Keushning and Wilhelm Kohler, " Eastern Enlargement to the EU: Economic Costs 
and Benefits for the EU Present Member States?," Final Report on Study XIX/ B2/9801, 
September 1999
EU Agriculture commissioner Franz Fischlet, EUROPE Magazine, April 1998
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diminish at a certain degree. Therefore, whether it will be that much influential 
is unclear. It will be seen in the future.
6.2.2 POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES
Since the Union has gained a degree of supra-nationality in economic fields by 
establishing a monetary union and accepting Euro as a single currency, finding 
solutions to the economic difficulties is easier than finding solutions to the other 
problems especially than the political difficulties. Finding the optimum solutions 
to the economic ones is easy task since all the members make their calculations 
in terms of absolute gains and due to the high level of interaction and 
interdependence. However, political ones are more delicate and controversial 
because they are closely related with the concept of "sovereignty". Moreover, 
these problems are more difficult to tackle down if this problem has an ability 
and capacity to change the political balance and structure of the system.
In below these difficulties will be explained. The divergence of members on the 
question of " What kind of a union they want to be?” The problem of 
"capability- expectation gap" will be analyzed under this one. The latter one is 
again the Trans- Atlantic Relationship. These two maim ones will be accepted as 
two main difficulties in this research paper.
6.2.2.1 VIEWS OF SOME MEMBERS
The idea of "more Europe" with establishing powerful political identity is an 
accepted idea between the members. However, their actions on the way of this 
road are full of ambiguities and dilemmas. In my opinion, with the
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Constitutional Draft, the Union has indicated its will of being powerful in 
politics by forming CFSP and CDSP. On the other hand, the members left the 
kind of political identity they want to foresee open to interpretations. It is neither 
a federation nor a confederation of states is not clear. In order to enhance 
consensus and conclude a text, this point has been missing. They prefer to use a 
mixture of both, which will slow down the momentum of these policies as 
explained above while analyzing the draft constitution.
It is obvious that members still have different perceptions and attitudes towards 
forming a political union in order to have just a single voice. The main reason of 
this is, as Dale argues, historical and cultural differences.^*^ For example, 
Scandinavian countries prefer much more transparent institutions, they are 
against the formation of " mutual defense clause", more inclined to use 
diplomacy and peaceful means^'^. As another example, due to historical rivalries 
between France and Germany, the smaller countries in between these two 
countries prefer central institutions and having common political policies to 
preserve the balance and stability in the continent. As constructivists claim, 
countries own unique histories have led to the emergence of different political 
perceptions, which have determined their attitudes towards integration and 
policy making m the union.
Simon Hix, The Political System Of the European Union, London: Macmillan Press, 1999,p.346 
Reginald Dale, ” Differing Views On a United Europe ” in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), Europe In the 
New Centujy, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 31
’’Neutrals Protest Against Mutual Defense Clause”, Euobserver: 
httD://www.euobsxom/index.phtml?aid= 13815. 08.12.2003
Reginald Dale, ” Differing Views On a United Europe ” in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), Europe In the 
New Centwy^ London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 32
Martin Smith and Grahm Smiths, Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in 
Comparative Perspective, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000, p. 154
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Moreover, as briefly mentioned above, there is a difference between the ideas of 
founding member states and other members concerning the level of 
integration.^^^ It can be said that the Union is the child of six founding states; 
therefore they want to bring up their child by enlargement and deepening. The 
Union is the product of their efforts and even sometimes the outcome of big 
concessions. Due to their long- lasting experiences, these six states are more 
likely to accept further integration. This is what has been called in those days: 
the concept of "core Europe", "two- speed Europe". This implies the 
complementation of integration by these core European states earlier than the 
other members. This idea is supported by France, Germany, and Belgium.^^^ 
Besides their experiences in integration, these countries have the opportunity, 
capability and the will for further integration. Since twenty-five members 
became members at different time series, their economic and political level of 
integration varies from each other. By making references to these, these six 
states have expressed their will to give the momentum for further integration 
firstly among themselves. According to their thesis, the others especially the 
new thirteen members^^^ are practically not ready to these developments. This 
sudden, radical change might create some internal problems both within the 
member states and within the Union as well. This idea gained momentum 
among these six, specifically, after the collapse of Constitution talks on 
December 13 2003. The logical explanation of this idea was made hy the French 
President Jacques Chirac. He said " I continue to think that it is a good solution
Reginald Dale, op. cit., p.36
"Prospect o f a Multi- Speed Europe Grows", Euobserver: 
http://www.euobs.conV index.phtml? aid=13892. 13.12.2003
These are the new 10 members and 3 candidates. New members are: Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithunia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Candidates are: Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Turkey
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because that will provide a motor, that will set an example. I think that it will 
allow Europe to better go faster and further." However, this is not a wholly 
accepted offer especially for Poland, Luxembourg and Italy.^^  ^ If all the 
members do not prepare a final draft for ratification during the Irish Presidency 
too, France and Germany might push EU integration forward by eliminating the 
other less likely and capable states. At the end, all members will be forced to 
make a choice between accepting the EU constitution and living in a European 
Union ruled by a core- club of countries. To create such a powerful 
organization, I think that on papers, and in theory, this idea might work well. 
However, in practice it will not work because this does not mean to have just a 
single voice. This means to impose these policies to non-core European states by 
isolating them in decision-making structure, which will decrease the legitimacy 
of action.
The roots of these divergent views go back to the initial stages of integration. 
From the beginning of the establishment of this institution, main argument has 
taken place between inter-govemmentalist countries and community method, 
which is another barrier behind integration. Since in political issues priorities are 
given to national interests, most of the states prefer inter-govemmentalism. The 
recent voting system, which was proposed by the Constitutional Draft, has 
created disagreements in the EU as a reflection of this disagreement. Mainly, 
Spain and Poland have opposed the double majority system.^^’ Under this
Constitution Talks Collapse", Euobserver: 
http://www.euobs.com/index.phtnil?aid=l 3 891.13.12.2003 
"Luxembourg and Italy Opposed To Core Europe", Euobserver: 
bttD://www.euobs.com/index.pbtml?aid= 13945.22.12.2003 
Lisbetb Kirk, 15.12.2003
" Constitution Success Hangs on Vote Weighting issue", Euobserver: 
bttp://www.euobs.com/index.pbtml?aid= 13811. 09.12.2003
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system, decisions can be taken by at least half of the EU states, representing at 
least 60% of the EU population. Therefore, the impact of these counties will 
decrease in decision-making. They have insisted on the continuation of the Nice 
Summit decisions, in which they have 27 votes in Council. They have not 
agreed on the creation of balance of power in the Union. This implies that still 
national interests have priority and the EU has a long way of producing a " 
European Political Identity". If EU were able to create a political identity, 
member states concerns about supra-nationalism would go down.
Furthermore, national interests are at stake in the political issues especially in 
CFSP and CSDP. As neo-liberal intuitionalists claim, speaking with one voice is 
easier in the soft security ones than the hard security issues. That's why the 
member states cannot reach a consensus in these matters. There is a consensus 
on having a common EU Foreign Minister and commencing a common EU 
defense.^^* However, when time comes to take the necessary steps, means to 
implement them, they have not agreed on. For instance, four neutral countries 
(Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Austria) of the vuiion have been against the ” Mutual 
Defense Clause", which is contrary to the principle of non-alignment.These 
four want to leave the option of help, and assistance to their own discretion. This 
has been hesitated especially the Britain, France, Germany and Belgium. If we 
accept the constitution as a major step of forming a political union, we confront 
with the fact that foreign policy goes right to the heart of what it means to be a
" An EU Constitution Short o f one line”, Euobserver: 
http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=l 3906. 16.12.2003 
"Neutrals Protest Against Mutual Defense Clause", Euobserver. 
http://www.euobs.com/index.phtml?aid=] 3815. 08.12.2003
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sovereign state?^® The other political difficulty is the non- existence of enough 
political will to overcome the other difficulties. Some of the members recognize 
these difficulties as excuses to postpone or/and delay the creation of a political
union.
The legal and material difficulties are not the main reason, these are all that can 
be settled by the enough and combined will, desire of the members. If all the 
members had a political will, they would pass the Constitutional Draft during 
the Italian Presidency and Irish Presidency as well under these circumstances. 
One EU diplomat underlined this fact by simply saying "There is no political 
will to conclude a draft." I do not totally agree with this statement. I believe 
that the level of will among the members do vary and enough and sufficient will 
has not been constructed yet and some members have resisted to do this at those 
days, at a time when the enlargement has taken place and Europe has been under 
economic difficulties and prepare to make institutional reforms.
6.2.2.2 AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL 
INTEGRATION
The long- lasting relationship between these two powerful actors has gone well. 
America since the beginning of the idea of European integration has given 
various supports to the members and sometimes even encouraged them. This 
attitude of America sometimes appreciated and sometimes criticized by the 
members. By Trans-Atlantic Agenda, they implicitly determine their area of
Chris Pattern quoted by Timothy Garton Ash in his article " Europe Has One Voice, And 
Another and Another," New York Times, September 22,2002)
" Ireland to put Constitution on hold until Spring", Euobserver: 
http://www.Euobserver.com/index.phtml?aid=13894. 13.12.2003
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business and the principles of this business. However, the international system 
has undergone tremendous changes in terms of the nature of threats and the 
structure. This has sometimes created implicit and explicit tension in this 
relationship. Although it has not been declared explicitly and officially by the 
USA, the existence of strong and decisive Europe with political power, 
supported by military power might hesitate America because this will create a 
barrier to America, which will prevent USA from acting imilaterally and 
arbitrarily.
From the beginning, EU has divided into two. They are the Atlanticist^^^ and the 
Europeanists . First group has overestimated the USA support in the matters, 
which not interested USA. On the other hand, the second group wants to stand 
its own but not enhance the necessary condition and support from the others to 
achieve this. They always confront with the anti-thesis of the first group. 
America should not be disturbed. It acts on behalf of EU as well. EU has 
managed to form a security community, which means the inconceivability of 
war between community members.^ '^  ^They have created this by desecuritization 
and they claim that this means the re-securitization of the Union. But the latter 
group is right in the sense that as long as the EU does not have a common voice 
without political power and will, and also the military power, the EU cannot be 
a superpower.However, the recent events, which have been taken place in the 
international environment fastens the process of politicization.
This group supported the idea o f maintaining the status quo o f USA preeminence in Europe.
This group supported the idea o f maximizing Europe’s collective security identity and capability. 
Martin Smith and Grahm Smiths, Building A Bigger Europe: EU and NATO Enlargement in 
Comparative Perspective, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2000, p. 150
Christopher Patten, " The European Union and the World" in Robert J. Guttman (ed.), Europe In 
the New Century, London: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 87
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Although USA has not showed reaction to EU in an explicit manner, the New 
National Security Strategy of W.Bush administration might prevent Europe 
from being politically strong. This new strategy underlined the fact that "the 
president has no intention of allowing any foreign power to catch up with huge 
lead the United States has opened since the fall of the Soviet Union more than a 
decade ago."^^  ^For this reason it wants to remain as the only super power in the 
international system as it has been under the current world situations and wants 
to act in its own, and imilaterally. The differences in the mentalities of the US 
and the EU and their different visions of world governance were explained 
while explaining the factors, which have lead the EU to reconsider its role so in 
these section there is no need to go in details.
EU, as an organization, which has a tendency to be more influential in the 
system, has to make a choice between preserving its power and influence at this 
level or developing its level of influence by increasing its political 
capabilities.^^^ The Draft Constitution and the recent divergence between the 
actors have given strong signals that EU chose the latter one. It has decided to 
be a political union despite the existence of barrier like USA, and strong 
advocates of collaboration with the USA.
I think although the USA and its attitudes seems as if it constructed barriers 
against the political EU, psychologically it can be evaluated as a motivating
David E.Singer, "Bush Outlines Doctrine o f Striking Foes First," New York Times, September
20,2002
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force. Needless to say, EU has and will face with strong difficulties. However, 
now EU has captured a good chance to be a political union owing to political 
barriers. These difficulties have proved that if the Union does not catch up the 
train, the number of barriers will increase. Now, the EU realized that in some 
issues it might not be in the same opinion with the USA and the conflictual 
international system does not leave any other choice. These factors encourage 
the members of the Union to compose a single voice which otherwise will be 
more difficult to compose. They should not preserve their status quo or wait 
the decline of the USA as argued by defensive realists.^^  ^They should do their 
best to cope with barriers by showing their decisiveness, which at the end 
improve the EU political identity and might counter balance USA in foreign 
affairs.
6.2.3 GEOPOLITICAL DIFFICULTIES
As Umit Ozdag said "EU is a civilization model and has a geopolitical reality 
just like all the other civilizations" With the last two waves of enlargement, its 
current geopolitics has been enlarging and as a result of these, EU has to form 
its new geopolitics.
With the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Malta and Southern Cyprus; and the following probable inclusion of 
Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 has changed the geopolitics of the Union. As a 
natural outcome of EU policies towards Central and Eastern Europe, EU has
Gabriela Thornton, " The Future o f  European Union External Relations: From a " Pass-the- Buck" 
Strategy to a Common V o ic e ", Jean Monnet/ Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 1, No.7, September 
2002
Ibid.
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gained a continental characteristic?'^°EU had an area of 3.238.062 kni2 but now 
it has 3.973.072 km2, and by June 2004 has had an area of 4.321.482 km2 in 
2007, with the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria^ "**. This increeised the EU area 
of influence and it will be more difficult to enhance governance in such a big 
area. There is no doubt that the bigger EU has the area to govern, the more 
influential EU has to be.
Moreover, these enlargements have changed the neighbors of the Union as well. 
Now, EU became neighbors with Baltic Sea neighboring states in the north, 
Mediterranean in the South, Russian Federation, and Ukraine in the East and 
with Western Trace in the southeast. The opinion of Mr. Ozdag contradicts with 
mine. I think that this enlargement cannot form a real opportunity for the EU to 
construct a political identity. He would be right if the EU had enough will and 
capability to govern these areas. However, EU under these circumstances has 
not been ready to control the problematic neighborhoods and new members. I 
agree with him in the sense that it is a necessary condition (geography) to be a 
super state but I think the EU is not ready to cope with bigger and more 
problematic areas.
To sum up, geopolitics is one of the factors, which needs to be considered 
during policy formation, and now the EU has a more difficult job. As the EU 
enlarges, it has to take more responsibility not only in economical terms but also 
in political terms. Therefore, this geography, for me, is a barrier for the Union in 
being a more powerfiil political actor, but if the EU enhances stability and
Ümit Ozdag, Türkiye- Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri: Jeopolitik inceleme, Ankara: ASAM, 2002, p. 18 
^^ '’ Ibid., p.19
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economic growth in these regions as it claims, then this barrier might turn out to 
be an opportunity to the Union.
241 http://www.eurostad.com/
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CHAPTER VII
FUTURE OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
From the beginning of this relationship, it has been said that this is "yes but 
when" relationship. Although Turkey has not yet been a member to the club, it is 
the only country, which has Customs Union with the Union. This means that 
economic integration has almost been achieved and Turkey proved that it could 
cope with the difficulties of liberal and competitive economy. However, due to 
the over emphasis placed by the EU regarding Turkey on democracy and human 
rights, especially after the Maastricht, this relationship has been mainly carried 
on political factors. As it was mentioned, the most problematic part of the AP is 
the compliance by the bases of political criteria. The EU in its annual progress 
reports has always appreciated the developments realized by Turkey but not find 
them efficiently implemented by Turkey. This is the explicitly stated barrier 
before the Turkish membership. By taking into account the realized reforms into 
consideration, the Union will presumably decide to begin negotiations with 
Turkey in December 2004.
However, I think that although the Union will give a date for commencement of 
the negotiations, the acceptance of Turkey as a member to the Union will 
possibly be realized the earliest in 2014. The EU has faced with dilemmas 
regarding the membership of Turkey to the Union. By enlarging, the EU placed 
itself vmder a great economic burden. In addition, EU will also face the 
additional problems in the short-run when it will accept Turkey as a member.
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These could be economic and demographic problems. However, on the other 
hand, in accordance with the Union decision to increase it's political weight 
through CFSP, Turkey will be a political and also a military asset for the Union?
7.1 DIFFICULTIES OF TURKISH MEMBERHIP
7.1.1 ECONOMIC
EU has been the one of the most powerful economic power in the world with the 
USA. However, with the inclusion of new members to the Union, it has come 
across with some economic difficulties as mentioned in the Chapter 3. Some of 
the economic difficulties that the EU might face in the case of Turkeys 
accession to the Union will be analyzed below. Needless to say, Turkey with its 
current economic parameters will add more burdens to the existing economic 
problems of he EU.
Firstly, the recent enlargement decreases the GDP per capita in EU with 13% 
and will cost the Union approximately 1,3 trillion Euros. '^*  ^Therefore, EU will 
need 10-12 years to solve these economic problems and back to the current 
economic parameters. This means that the EU will be ready to face with new 
economic challenges at the earliest in 2018-2020. According to statistics, the 
probable Turkish membership will cost the Union nearly 50 billion Dollar. '^^  ^
This is the greatest amount comparison to other candidates or new members. 
From these figures, it can be concluded that for the Union, Turkish membership 
will be a highly expensive one so the exclusion of Turkey from membership can 
the best solution. Because, through the Custom Union, the Union can carry out
‘^‘^ "Eastem Enlargement..., Eyiul 1999 
Umit Ozdag, op.cit., p.7
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it's trade relations with Turkey and under current situation EU is the beneficiary 
rather than the contributor in this relation.
Secondly, the Turkish inclusion to the Union will increase the burden sharing on 
the Common Agricultural Policy of the Union. The 34% of the Turkish 
population is still working in the agriculture sector, which means more structural 
funds will be needed for Turkey.^ '*'* However, this is not possible under these 
circumstances because the contributors have complained about the amounts of 
funds that they have contributed. The basic contributors, such as Germany, 
France and Italy, have been trying to close their own budget deficits. '^^  ^
Moreover, due to this reason, neither the old nor the new members will want 
Turkey’s membership to the Union since their share will inevitably decrease.
7.1.2 DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS
Within the framework of EU institutions, the population is the determinant 
factor in terms of representation and decision-making. Therefore, any change in 
the structure of population or any increase in the numbers can lead unavoidable 
institutional problems for the EU and will decrease the role of the EU in world 
affairs. Now, the European countries have been facing with big demographic 
problems.^"^  ^The probable membership of Turkey will increase the seriousness 
and also the dimension of these problems.
lim it Ozdag, op.cit., p.8 
Business Week, 3 July 2002, p.20
Sedat Murat, " Türkiye'nin Karsilastolmali Nufiis Yapısı" in Mustafa Aykac and Zeki Parlak 
(eds.). Turn Yönleriyle Türkiye- AB ilişkileri, Istanbul: Elif Kitabevi, 2002, p.45
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Under current situation, the EU has had the first place in terms of the average 
age in the world. Now, the EU population is the most qualified one. However, 
Europe has begun to loose its place. There is a widespread trend in the EU 
countries: their populations have been continuously getting older. Due to this, 
Europeans are afraid from the young Turkish population. Any decrease in young 
and qualified population will decrease the production capabilities and also the 
quality of labor. Whereas, any increase in the old population necessitates a 
dramatic increase at the level of production, which at the end decreases the 
welfare of the society. ‘^^’On the other hand, the yoimg generations population 
rates have been increasing in Turkey. According to statistics, the percentage of 
child and young population in Turkey was %57,26 and the percentage of olds is 
% 4,15. This number is three times less than EU member states. '^**This creates 
another demographic problem for EU: birth rates have been decreasing. This 
will further increase the affect of the Turkish population in the EU, if the 
increase in birthrates is taken into consideration. This means a decrease in the 
qualified young population in Europe.
Second problem is the density of population. In 2025, Turkish population will 
be 82 million, which, is the expected value of 17% of total EU population. In 
addition, it is expected that the EU population will begin to decrease: whereas, 
the Turkish population will increase. '^^  ^ EU neither psychologically nor 
economically can cope with that much population. EU has perceived Turkey 
with these demographic parameters as a strategic threat. If Turkey becomes a
Teitelbaum and Martin," Is Turkey Ready for Europe?”, Foreign Affairs, May/ June 2003, pp.97- 
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Council of Europe, Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, Belgium, 1997, p.27 
Umit Ozdag, op.cit, p. 15
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member, it will be the second country in terms of population and according to 
the draft Constitution, which restrict the number of parliamentarians to 732, will 
have right to have more than 72 parliamentarians in the parl iament.This  is 
less than Germany but more than France, Italy, and England. For example: in 
2000, Turkish population was 70 million: whereas, the total of number of other 
12 candidates was only 106 million.
To sum up, the structure and the density of Turkish population are perceived as 
a strategic threat to EU. This is due to the two main reasons. Firstly, Turkish 
membership changes the balance of power within the EU institutions. Secondly, 
Turkish membership will create social problems to the EU due to the different 
population structures by taking the first or the second place in the European 
markets due to the need to increase production.
7.2 BENEFITS OF TURKISH MEMBERSHIP
7.2.1 POLITICAL
It is obvious that the EU has been moving towards being a more powerfixl 
political actor in the globalizing world. Although it is such a hard objective to 
attain, it is not impossible by making rational decisions and by formulating them 
as effective policies. In addition, it is a necessary condition for EU at least to 
preserve its status quo. Turkey at this point can have a capacity to compensate 
the difficulties that it might create to the EU with its political advantages. 
Especially, it will be more realistic for Turkey to be a small partner with EU as
Rıdvan Karluk, op.cit, pp.155-158
The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2000
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middle sized EU counties rather than being a partner with a super power;
USA-252
The geographic location of Turkey can enhance some additional degree of 
political power to the EU, and will be able to complement with one of the 
strands of EU CFSP. Since EU realized the need for more accurate and effective 
foreign policy tools in order to be a political power in the world, it has to be 
more engaged in all areas, and has to put more emphasis on problematic areas. 
These areas are no more CEEC States. These areas are the Caucasus, the Middle 
East, and the Balkans. To reflect their decisiveness, EU has decided to include 
crises management and crisis prevention under the scope of CFSP in the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1997). Moreover, their policy tools of economic aid or 
development programs are not supposed to work in there and these are the areas, 
where control is necessary at any time.). These tasks require effective control 
mechanisms, which can be done by the existence of not only with will but also 
with capability. To achieve these by minimum costs, EU needs to be close to 
these areas. At this stage, Turkey's geographical location gains importance like 
it had during the Cold War. It will be better to have Turkey within Europe, 
contributing to its stability than a Turkey outside the EU. Turkey can serve as 
a "springboard" to the EU so that EU can have control over these regions.^ "^^  For 
instance, Turkey's geography and close historical and political relations with the 
Middle Eastern countries will attach a more political role to the EU. Therefore,
252 Danger with US, future with EU, Turks. US, 11 April 2003
Michael Evans, " EU Expansion; The Case for the Admission o f Turkey", Strategic Review, Vol 
XXVI, No 4, Fall 1998, p .l9
Ali Karaosmanoglu, ” AGSK Acısından Türkiye- AB ilişkileri", p.l58
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it will be better to contribute to the EU's efforts of being politicized. This can
r
enhance European influence in the Middle East and Caucasus.
In addition to the above to the stability, EU has not yet formulated an effective 
CFSP owing to the lack of will and capability. Turkey's membership will 
decrease the costs of formulating and implementing polices in the Middle East 
and the Caucus. Their capacity will increase as well. They can both gain time 
and simplify the implementation of policies. At this point, as it has been 
pronounced, Turkey will contribute to the EU's acting togetherness with the help 
of its geography and experiences to the Union. In any case, EU needs Turkey to 
be effective politically. It is their choice how to achieve this? It will be 
misleading to evaluate this relation on bilateral basis, by excluding the other 
parts of its periphery.
Finally, various circles in Europe and also in Turkey accept the religion of 
Turkey as the reason of Turkey's exclusion from membership. They take this as 
a case, which has some elements of Huntington's " Clash of Civilization". It will 
create problems for the EU, which tries to be more democratic, and transparent. 
Plus, this exclusion on the basis of religion can hamper the EU relations with the 
other Muslims as well. The acceptance of Turkey might prevent the clashes of 
civilization. On the other hand, the Umon will be able to demonstrate th a t" 
diversity within unity" is possible as stated in the draft Constitution.^^’ EU 
possible decision in this direction will increase the legitimacy of the Union in
Nathalie Tocci, " New Doubts and Uncertanities in Turkey- EU Relations", CEPS Commentary, 
October 2000
256 .’ Ziya Onis, op.cit., p .l06
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the other parts of the world, especially when compared with the decrease in the 
legitimacy of the USA.
7.2.2 SECURITY
EU till the formation of CFSP and acceptance of Turkey as a candidate accepted 
Tmkey as a "security consuming" c o u n t r y T h e y  were afraid that Turkey 
could carry the risks of instability due the neighbors: therefore, the EU would 
find itself in the instabilities since Turkey was its member. That was something, 
which the EU escaped. However, their attitudes have changed. Now, Turkey
should be seen as a " security producing" country. 259
To support such views we can firstly state that, within the scope of ESDP, 
Turkey has the capacity and potential of effective and modem military power. 
Europeans due to their unique strategic culture preferred not to have those much 
powerful army. Some of the EU countries like France, Britain are of course 
exceptions. Plus, Turkish army is the second biggest army within NATO and 
has lots of experiences to contribute the Petersberg type of operations. The main 
reason of the EU’s insufficiency in the crises in former Yugoslavia was the lack 
of military capability independent from NATO sources. Under any 
circumstances, EU will be dependent on NATO but to achieve a degree of 
knowledge and capability is a must for the Union. Turkey with its modernized
Sedat Aloglu, " Choices for The Future o f the European Union and Turkey.”, Turkish Time, 15. 
October/15.November 2003
Hüseyin Bağcı, " Turkey’s Relations With the EU After the Copenhagen Summit", An AICGS Issue 
Report, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2003
Hüseyin Bağcı, "Tiukey and Europe: Security Issues",in Michael Radu (ed.) Dangerous 
Neighborhood, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003, p.56
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army can give this opportunity to the Union. Turkey's contribution to Kosovo 
and Afghanistan really deserves appreciation.
Secondly, EU can be accepted as a newly emerging political power in the 
security field. Thanks to the American power and indecisiveness among its 
member, it preferred to be passive. However, now it has tried to be active. As 
France and Britain mentioned in the Saint- Malo meeting "the Union have must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, 
the means to decide to use them, and readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises."^^* In order to achieve that goal, EU has to adopt itself to 
the newly emerging threats. The most important and dangerous one is the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, especially the states, which do not legally have a 
right to acquire them and the terrorist groups, who have the money and 
capability to produce them. Moreover, the technology and the range of these 
weapons increased: therefore, the EU will be under the scope of these weapons. 
At this stage, the USA and the EU has tried to develop defense mechanisms in 
close cooperation. Turkey is the most suitable country to locate these 
mechanisms due to its geography. From the perspective of Turkey, to take 
these risks will only be possible in the case of membership, as a candidate these 
risks are more risky.
Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States, Washington 
Dc: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p.216
Hüseyin Bağcı, ’Turkey and Europe: Security Issues”,in Michael Radu (ed.) Dangerous 
Neighborhood, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2003, p.57
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION
As it can be clearly understood, EU has been trying to expand its area of 
influence in the world, but its strategies in that way has not been clear yet. 
Through the CFSP, it has tried to increase its legitimacy by attributing itself a 
political character in the international arena. EU really desires this, but it has not 
achieved this goal yet. Although The Constitutional Treaty has accepted, I think 
that still Europeans cannot speak with a single voice and probably will not be 
able to achieve this goal particularly in political issues at least in the coming 3-5 
years. Still the issues, which can make the Union politically worldwide has 
involved intergovernmental structures that each member state has to decide on 
the basis of their own national interests, rather than for the interest of the Union. 
In addition, inclusion of new members, which will experience the spirit of 
integration, needs time to absorb this mentality and will need time to understand 
the realities of the Union. Naturally, as a new member they want to be the 
beneficers and they are unfamiliar with the mentality of acting as a whole. Most 
recent examples to these will be the Poland’s reaction to the newly established 
voting system, which made the process of the adoption of the Constitution more 
difficult as explained in previous chapters. Therefore, the EU will need time to 
compose a single and harmonious voice.
262 All Karaosmanoglu, ” AGSK Acisindan Turkiye- AB Iliskileri”, p.l62
122
Moreover, European policies involve great dilemmas. The first dilemma is an 
economic one. EU has tried to increase its political power, which can be gained 
through by becoming an economic and potential power. On the other hand, by 
the recent enlargement decisions, it has decreased its economic power. All the 
parameters have been going down. Needless to say, EU in the following years 
will probably face with economic problems, which leads to the emergence of 
various voices within the Union. Besides the economical side of the dilemma, 
EU will most probably have a great political paradox. Consistent with the EU’s 
desire to be influential in political arena, the EU will have to spend some energy 
and sources to the fields of CFSP and to the CSDP. The difficulty in here is, on 
the one hand the EU increased the number of member states and on the other its 
policy areas. This involves a dilemma because having more members means 
difficulties in policy- making, decision- taking. In addition, it means an increase 
in the geopolitical area and more number of people to be satisfied with the 
limited sources, and capabilities. Furthermore, to be an influential political 
union will make the Union more open to threats and political problems, which 
are impossible to solve and handle with the existing values and mentalities, 
which the EU had in the past and now has. To remind, the EU reached its 
current desired status with its democratic values and through the peaceful 
methods it has been applying. In addition, it established the security community 
in Europe through the process of "desecuritization". Therefore, as a natural 
outcome, to protect its power and integrity the EU will begin for 
resecuritization, which might in the future create insecurity within and outside 
the Union for itself. Therefore, a new political and security approach should 
have been formulated by taking the realities into consideration
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The EU has to ask itself; who are they and what they will want to be in the 
future? It has two options. The first is to preserve its status quo and the second is 
to remain as an economic giant and try to be politically effective as one of the 
biggest aid providers, and to be an international influential political power under 
which the probability of Turkey’s membership would be more likely.
Consistent with this decision, EU will decide to include or exclude Turkey from 
membership. The destiny of Turkey depends on the destiny of the fixture of the 
EU. On the basis of bilateral relations, there is no problem. Turkey tries to do its 
best to fulfill its obligations, which are mentioned in the legal documents. 
Moreover, to increase it’s know- how capability, Turkey follows close relations 
with its European counterparts. There is no doubt that some of the Europeans 
have doubts about Turkey and Turkey mostly was excluded from the European 
definitions of history and geography. However, now they realize that the 
continuation of this exclusion will create more problems to the EU in the future. 
As the strategic importance of Turkey increases and the desire of the EU in 
order to be a political power continues, the level of realization of this goal will 
also increase. However, the question of Turkish membership cannot be 
evaluated just on the basis of bilateral relations. Preferences of the EU and the 
problems it will have should be taken into account.
To sum up, if the Union decides to preserve its status quo, this will probably 
make the process of Turkey’s membership more difficult, because the Union 
might not want to take additional economic burdens to the already existing ones.
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Moreover, EU under the current situation owing to the Customs Union, has been 
benefiting from Turkey’s capability and resources. If they accept and declare the 
commencement of Turkey’s accession negotiations for membership, Turkey will 
give much more than the EU will contribute to it. However, if the EU will 
decide to be an international political power, they will need Turkey within their 
system. Under these circumstances, the benefits they will receive from Turkey’s 
membership will compensate the economic burdens that they will face. This 
does not mean that Turkey will become a member to the Union within three or 
five year’s time. According to the existing data and events, under the best and 
optimistic conditions, Turkey can be a member to the EU in the years 2012- 
2015, because without making the necessary and required reforms in all the 
political and economic fields, laid by the acquis of the EU, membership will be 
impossible for Turkey.
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Appendix A
LATEST EUROPEAN COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS RELATED TO
TURKEY
LUXEMBOURG EUROPEAN COUNCIL (12-13 DECEMBER 1997) 
EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT
1. The Luxembourg European Council has taken the decisions necessary to launch 
the overall enlargement process.
2. The task in the years ahead will be to prepare the applicant States for accession to 
the Union and to see that the Union is properly prepared for enlargement. This 
enlargement is a comprehensive, inclusive and ongoing process, which will take 
place in stages; each of the applicant States will proceed at its own rate, depending 
on its degree of preparedness.
3. As a prerequisite for enlargement of the Union, the operation of the institutions 
must be strengthened and improved in keeping with the institutional provisions of the 
Amsterdam Treaty.
The European Conference
4. The European Council decided to set up a European Conference which will bring 
together the Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring 
to accede to it and sharing its values and internal and external objectives.
5. The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to peace, 
security and good neighbourliness, respect for other countries' sovereignty, the 
principles upon which the European Union is foxmded, the integrity and inviolability 
of external borders and the principles of international law and a commitment to the 
settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Countries which 
endorse these principles and respect the right of any European country fulfilling the 
required criteria to accede to the European Union and sharing the Union's 
commitment to building a Europe free of the divisions and difficulties of the past will 
be invited to take part in the Conference.
6. The States which accept these criteria and subscribe to the above principles will be 
invited to take part in the Conference. Initially, the EU offer will be addressed to 
Cyprus, the applicant States of Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey.
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7. The European Conference will be a multilateral forum for political consultation, 
intended to address questions of general concern to the participants and to broaden 
and deepen their cooperation on foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs, 
and other areas of common concern, particularly economic matters and regional 
cooperation.
8. The Conference will be chaired by the State holding the Presidency of the Council 
of the European Union. At the Presidency's invitation. Heads of State and 
Government and the President of the Commission will meet at the Conference once a 
year, as will the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.
9. The first meeting of the Conference will be in London in March 1998.
The process of accession and negotiation
10. The European Council has considered the current situation in each of the eleven 
applicant States on the basis of the Commission's opinions and the Presidency's 
report to the Council. In the light of its discussions, it has decided to launch an 
accession process comprising the ten Central and East European applicant States and 
Cyprus. This accession process will form part of the implementation of Article 0 of 
the Treaty on European Union. The European Council points out that all these States 
are destined to join the European Union on the basis of the same criteria and that 
they are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. This process, 
which will be evolutive and inclusive, will comprise the following elements.
a. The framework
11. The accession process will be launched on 30 March 1998 by a meeting of the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the fifteen Member States of the European Union, 
the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus. A single framework 
for these applicant countries will be established.
12. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the fifteen members of the European Union 
will meet their opposite numbers from the ten Central and East European applicant 
States and Cyprus as the need arises. Technical ministerial meetings could also be 
envisaged, bearing in mind experience with the structured dialogue.
b. The enhanced pre-accession strategy
13. The enhanced pre-accession strategy is intended to enable all the applicant States 
of Central and Eastern Europe eventually to become members of the European Union 
and, to that end, to align themselves as far as possible on the Union acquis prior to 
accession. With the Europe Agreements, which remain the basis of the Union's 
relations with these States, the strategy centres on accession partnerships and 
increased pre-accession aid. It will be accompanied by an analytical study of the 
Union acquis for each applicant State taken individually.
fi) Accession partnerships
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14. Accession partnership is a new instrument, the key feature of the enhanced pre­
accession strategy; it will mobilize all forms of assistance to the applicant countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe within a single framework.
15. This single framework will cover in detail for each applicant the priorities to be 
observed in adopting the Union acquis and also the financial resources available for 
that purpose, in particular the PHARE programme. In that context financial 
assistance would be linked to the applicants' progress and, more specifically, to 
compliance with the programme for adoption of the acquis.
16. The Council will decide unanimously on the establishment of the partnerships as 
the key element in the pre-accession strategy. On that basis it will then decide, by a 
qualified majority and by 15 March 1998 at the latest, on the principles, priorities, 
intermediate objectives, significant adjustments and conditions applicable to each 
individual partnership. When an element essential to the continuation of pre­
accession assistance is missing in an applicant State, the Council will take 
appropriate measures by the same procedure.
(ii) Increased pre-accession aid
17. Pre-accession aid will be increased substantially; alongside the PHARE 
programme, which will already have been refocused on accession priorities, it will, 
as from the year 2000, comprise aid for agriculture and a structural instrument which 
will give priority to measures similar to those of the Cohesion Fund.
Financial support to the countries involved in the enlargement process will be based 
on the principle of equal treatment, independently of time of accession, with 
particular attention being paid to coratries with the greatest need. The European 
Council welcomes in this connection the catch-up facility envisaged by the 
Commission.
18. Without prejudice to decisions on the financial perspective for 2000-2006, the 
PHARE programme will focus on accession by setting two priority aims: the 
reinforcement of administrative and judicial capacity (about 30% of the overall 
amount) and investments related to the adoption and application of the acquis (about 
70%).
19. Some Community programmes (e.g. education, training and research) will be 
open to applicant States and this will enable them to familiarize themselves with the 
Union's policies and working methods. Such participation will have to be determined 
case-by-case, with each applicant State making a steadily increasing financial 
contribution of its own. PHARE will, if necessary, be able to continue part-financing 
the applicant States' national contributions. Such financing should remain at around 
10% of the PHARE appropriation, not including participation in the research and 
development framework programme.
20. The applicant States should be allowed to take part, as observers and for the 
points which concern them, in the management committees responsible for 
monitoring the programmes to which they contribute financially, under specific 
arrangements adapted to the case in question.
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21. The Community agencies in which applicant countries will be able to participate 
will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
22. A specific pre-accession strategy for Cyprus will be based on:
-  participation in certain targeted projects, in particular to boost judicial and 
administrative capacity and projects in the field of justice and home affairs;
-  participation in certain Community programmes and agencies (as in the approach 
followed for the other applicant States);
-  use of technical assistance provided by TAIEX (Technical Assistance Information 
Exchange Office).
c. Commission opinions and accession negotiations
23. The Commission's opinions on the applicant States constitute a sound overall 
analysis of each applicant State's situation in the light of the membership criteria set 
by the Copenhagen European Council. The prospect of membership is a unique 
incentive to the applicants to speed up the implementation of policies which comply 
with the Union acquis. Incorporation of the acquis into legislation is necessary, but is 
not in itself sufficient; it will also be necessary to ensure that it is actually applied.
24. The European Council noted the link between the applicant States' ongoing 
efforts in that direction in sectoral policies, in particular the internal market and 
related policies, and the harmonious operation of Community policies after 
accession.
25. Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the 
opening of any accession negotiations. Economic criteria and the ability to fulfil the 
obligations arising from membership have been and must be assessed in a forward- 
looking, dynamic way.
26. The decision to enter into negotiations does not imply that they will be 
successfully concluded at the same time. Their conclusion and the subsequent 
accession of the different applicant States will depend on the extent to which each 
complies with the Copenhagen criteria and on the Union's ability to assimilate new 
members.
27. The European Council has decided to convene bilateral intergovernmental 
conferences in the spring of 1998 to begin negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia on the conditions for their entry 
into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments. These negotiations will be based 
on the general negotiating framework acknowledged by the Council on 
8 December 1997.
At the same time as the above, the preparation of negotiations with Romania, 
Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria will be speeded up in particular through an 
analytical examination of the Union acquis. This preparation may also be discussed 
at ministerial-level bilateral meetings with the Member States of the Union.
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28. The accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about 
civil peace and reconciliation. The accession negotiations will contribute positively 
to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through the talks under 
the aegis of the United Nations which must continue with a view to creating a bi­
community, bi-zonal federation. In this context, the European Council requests that 
the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to include representatives of the 
Turkish Cypriot community in the accession negotiating delegation be acted upon. In 
order for this request to be acted upon, the necessary contacts will be undertaken by 
the Presidency and the Commission.
d. Review procedure
29. From the end of 1998, the Commission will make regular reports to the Council, 
together with any necessary recommendations for opening bilateral 
intergovernmental conferences, reviewing the progress of each Central and East 
European applicant State towards accession in the light of the Copenhagen criteria, in 
particular the rate at which it is adopting the Union acquis. Prior to those reports, 
implementation of the accession partnerships and progress in adopting the acquis will 
be examined with each applicant State in the Europe Agreement bodies. The 
Commission's reports will serve as a basis for taking, in the Council context, the 
necessary decisions on the conduct of the accession negotiations or their extension to 
other applicants. In that context, the Commission will continue to follow the method 
adopted by Agenda 2000 in evaluating applicant States' ability to meet the economic 
criteria and fulfil the obligations deriving from accession.
30. A dynamic approach should be maintained in assessing the progress made by 
applicant States in the regular reports which the Commission will submit to the 
Council.
A  European stra te sv  fo r Tu rke y
31. Th e  C ouncil c o n firm s Tu rke y  e lig ib ility  fo r  accession to the European  
U n io n . Tu rke y  w ill be judged on the basis o f the same c rite ria  as the other 
applicant States. W h ile  the p o litic a l and economic conditions a llow ing  accession 
negotiations to be envisaged are no t sa tisfied , the European C ounc il considers tha t 
i t  is  nevertheless im p orta nt fo r  a strategy to  be drawn up to prepare Tu rke y  fo r  
accession by b rin g in g  it  closer to the European U n io n  in  every fie ld .
32. T h is  strategy sho u ld  consist in :
-  development o f  the p o ssib ilitie s afforded by the A nka ra  Agreem ent;
-  in te nsific a tio n  o f the Custom s U n io n ;
-  im plem entation o f fin a n c ia l cooperation;
-  approxim ation o f laws and adoption o f the U n io n  acquis.
-  partic ipa tion, to be decided case by case, in  certain program m es and in  certain 
agencies provided fo r  in  paragraphs 19 and 21.
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33. Th e  strategy m il be reviewed by the A ssociation C ounc il in  p a rtic u la r on the  
basis o f  A rtic le  2 8  o f  the Association Agreem ent in  the lig h t o f  the Copenhagen 
c rite ria  and the C o unc il's p osition  o f 29 A p ril 1997.
34. In  addition, partic ip a tion in  the European Conference w ill enable the Mem ber 
Sta tes o f  the European U n io n  and Tu rke y  to step up th e ir dialogue and 
cooperation in  areas o f common interest.
35. Th e  European C ouncil recalls tha t strengthening  Tu rk e y 's lin k s  w ith the 
European U n io n  also depends on tha t country 's p u rs u it o f  the p o litic a l and  
economic re fo rm s on which i t  has embarked, inc lud ing  the a lignm ent o f hum an 
rig h ts  standards and practices on those in  fo rc e  in  the European U n io n ; respect 
fo r  and protection o f m in o ritie s; the establishm ent o f  sa tisfactory and stable 
re la tio ns between Greece and Tu rk e y ; the settlem ent o f disputes, in  p a rtic u la r by 
legal process, inc lud ing  the In te rn a tio n a l C o u rt o f Justic e ; and support fo r  
negotiations under the aegis o f the U N  on a p o litic a l settlem ent in  C yprus on the  
basis o f the re levant U N  Se c urity  C ouncil Re so lu tio ns.
36. Th e  European C ouncil endorses the guidelines th a t emerged fro m  the General 
A ffa irs  C ouncil o f  24  November 1997  on fu tu re  re la tio ns between the U n io n  and 
Tu rk e y  and asks the Com m ission to sub m it suitab le proposals.
CARDIFF EUROPEAN COUNCIL (15-16 JUNE 1998)
ENLARGEMENT
62. Noting that the Luxembourg European Council assessed the candidatures 
addressed in Agenda 2000 and took the decisions necessary to launch the overall 
enlargement process, the European Council welcomes the substantial progress made 
since Luxembourg in preparing for enlargement.
63. The Union’s priority is to maintain the enlargement process for the countries 
covered in the Luxembourg European Council conclusions, within which they can 
actively pursue their candidatures and make progress towards taking on the 
obligations of membership, including the Copenhagen criteria. Each of these 
candidate countries will be judged on the basis of the same criteria and will proceed 
in its candidature at its own rate, depending on its degree of preparedness. Much will 
depend on the efforts made by the candidate countries themselves to meet the 
criteria. All will benefit from strengthened relations with the EU including through 
political dialogue and tailored strategies to help them prepare for accession.
64. Th e  European C ouncil welcomes the C om m ission’s  confirm ation tha t i t  w ill 
sub m it at the end o f 1998 its  f i r s t  re g u la r reports on each candidate’s  p rogress 
tow ards accession. In  the case o f  Tu rke y , reports w ill be based on A rtic le  28 o f the  
A ssociation Agreem ent and the conclusions o f the Luxem bourg  European  
C o unc il
65. The European Council welcomes the launch of the Accession Process in Brussels 
on 30 March. It is an evolutionary and inclusive process. A productive further 
meeting of the Ministers for Justice and Home Affairs of the 15 Members of the
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European Union with their opposite numbers from the 10 Central and East European 
applicant states and Cyprus was held on 28-29 May. Further Ministerial meetings 
will take place as the need arises.
66. The European Council encourages the Commission to pursue rapidly the delivery 
of assistance within the Accession Partnership framework. Pre-accession aid will be 
increased substantially. In this context it endorses in general terms the legislative 
framework proposed by the Commission, and invites the Council to continue its 
work. The priorities for projects financed by these instruments should reflect the 
priorities for agriculture and the environment and transport established in the 
Accession Partnerships. Effective coordination between these instruments and Phare, 
as well as with operations funded by the EIB, EBRD and other international financial 
institutions will be essential. The European Council notes that the basis of funding 
for the countries included in the enlargement process was set out at Luxembourg.
67. Following the opening of accession negotiations on 31 March 1998 with Cyprus, 
Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the European Council 
notes that the screening exercises for seven chapters of the acquis have been 
completed. It also welcomes the opening of the anal5q:ical examination of the acquis 
with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia.
68. The European Council also welcomes the Commission’s communication o f 
4 March 1998 on taking forward the European Strategy to prepare Turkey fo r  
membership. It agrees that, taken as a package, this provides the platform fo r  
developing our relationship on a sound and evolutionary basis. The European 
Council invites the Commission to carry forward this strategy, including the 
tabling o f any proposals necessary fo r its effective implementation. The Strategy 
can be enriched over time, taking into account Turkey’s own ideas. The European 
CouncU further invites the Presidency and the Commission and the appropriate 
Turkish authorities to pursue the objective o f harmonising Turkey’s legislation 
and practice with the acquis, and asks the Commission to report to an early 
Association Council on progress made. Recalling the need fo r  financial support 
fo r  the European Strategy, the European Council notes the Commission’s 
intention to reflect on ways and means o f underpinning the implementation o f the 
European strategy, and to table appropriate proposals to this effect.
69. The European Council welcomes the first meeting of the European Conference 
held in London on 12 March 1998, and its conclusions. The principles of 
participation in the Conference and its initial membership were agreed at the meeting 
of the European Council in Luxembourg.
VIENNA EUROPEAN COUNCIL (11-12 DECEMBER 1998) 
ENLARGEMENT
58. The European Council had a thorough discussion on all aspects of the 
enlargement process. It welcomes the fact that the overall enlargement process 
launched in Luxembourg is now well under way. The European Council welcomes 
the Commission's first Regular Progress Reports on the basis of its conclusions in 
Luxembourg and Cardiff and endorses the annexed Council conclusions of
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7 December 1998 on European Union enlargement. The European Coimcil stresses 
that each country will continue to be judged on its own merits. The European 
Council invites the Commission to present its further progress reports in view of the 
Helsinki European Council.
59. The European Council notes with satisfaction that the six Accession Conferences 
with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have 
entered into substantive negotiations and reached the first concrete results. It urges 
the Council, the Commission and the candidate countries to maintain the momentum 
in order to permit intensive negotiations in the first half of 1999.
60. The European Council also welcomes progress in preparation for accession 
negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria as described in 
the Commission's reports. It notes that the transition from the multilateral to the 
bilateral phase of the analytical examination of the acquis as from the beginning of 
the next year will confer new dynamism to the process and thus foster preparation for 
negotiations.
61. The European Council welcomes Malta's decision to reactivate its application for 
European Union membership and takes note of the intention of the Commission to 
present at the beginning of next year an updating of its favourable opinion of 1993.
62. The European Council reiterates the Union's willingness to continue to provide 
pre-accession aid throughout the process. It welcomes the broad political agreement, 
in the terms of the Council's report on Agenda 2000, on the pre-accession 
instruments which remains however subject to overall agreement on Agenda 2000.
6J. Th e  European C ouncil underlines the great importance i t  attaches to the  
fu r th e r development o f re la tio ns between the E U  and Tu rk e y  taking fo rw a rd  the 
European Stra tegy to prepare Tu rke y  fo r  m em bership. In  th is  context i t  recognises 
the centra l ro le  o f the fu rth e r im plem entation o f  the European strategy in  lin e  w ith  
its  conclusions in  Luxem bourg  and C a rd iff.
64. The European Council took note of the work of the European Conference as a 
forum for political consultation on questions of general concern to the participants. 
One meeting at Foreign Ministers level will take place in 1999.
65. The European Council will consider the future role and membership of the 
European Conference at Helsinki in the light of a report by the Council on the work 
in the Conference and other fora engaged on similar work. Meanwhile it confirmed 
the invitation of Switzerland as a "member elect".
COLOGNE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (3-4 JUNE 1999)
ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
57. The European Council notes with satisfaction that the accession negotiations 
have further gathered momentum and are on the right track. It welcomes the positive 
results of the second round of substantive negotiations in the first half of 1999 with 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia on a number of
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important and complex areas. The European Council emphasizes its resolve to 
continue to maintain the momentum of negotiations. To that end the European Union 
will open negotiations in all areas covered as early as possible next year.
58. The European Council welcomes the fact that the analytical examination of the 
"acquis" -with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia has now moved on 
from the multilateral phase to the crucial bilateral phase, which will allow those 
countries to speed up their preparations for membership. The Helsinki Council will 
examine the progress made by the accession candidates and draw the necessary 
conclusions.
59. It emphasises once again the conclusions reached by the European Covmcil in 
Luxembourg that decisions on the opening of further negotiations can only be taken 
on the basis of the criteria established by the Copenhagen European Council. At the 
same time it highlights the importance also attaching to the prospect of accession for 
applicant countries with which negotiations are not yet under way. For this reason it 
invites the Commission, in its next progress reports, to consider measures, which can 
help, crystallise that prospect for all applicant countries. The European Council 
welcomes the constant progress in the candidate countries and encourages them to 
continue their reforms and adjustment efforts.
60. The European Council emphasizes the importance of high standards of nuclear 
safety in Central and Eastern Europe. It stresses the importance of this issue in the 
context of the Union's enlargement and calls on the Commission to examine this 
issue thoroughly in its next regular progress reports on the applicant countries, due in 
autumn 1999.
61. The European Council welcomes the fact that, on the basis of the Commission's 
updated opinion on Malta's accession application, it has now been possible to make a 
start on analytical examination of the Union "acquis" with Malta. The Commission 
will also submit a report, in good time for the Helsinki European Council meeting, 
on Malta's progress in preparation for accession, to form the basis, together with the 
corresponding reports on the other applicant countries, for any decisions to be taken 
by the Helsinki European Council.
HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL (10-11 DECEMBER 1999) 
ENLARGEMENT PROCESS
3. The European Council confirms the importance of the enlargement process 
launched in Luxembourg in December 1997 for the stability and prosperity of the 
entire European continent. An efficient and credible enlargement process must be 
sustained.
4. The European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, 
which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate 
States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share 
the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this 
respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes 
in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make
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every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. 
Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the 
International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation 
relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the 
accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International 
Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council 
recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen 
European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that 
compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.
5. The Union has made a firm political commitment to make every effort to complete 
the Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform by December 2000, to be 
followed by ratification. After ratification of the results of that Conference the Union 
should be in a position to welcome new Member States from the end of 2002 as soon 
as they have demonstrated their ability to assume the obligations of membership and 
once the negotiating process has been successfully completed.
6. The Commission has made a new detailed assessment of progress in the candidate 
States. This assessment shows progress towards fulfilling the accession criteria. At 
the same time, given that difficulties remain in certain sectors, candidate States are 
encouraged to continue and step up their efforts to comply with the accession 
criteria. It emerges that some candidates will not be in a position to meet all the 
Copenhagen criteria in the medium term. The Commission's intention is to report in 
early 2000 to the Council on progress by certain candidate States on fulfilling the 
Copenhagen economic criteria. The next regular progress reports will be presented in 
good time before the European Council in December 2000.
7. The European Council recalls the importance of high standards of nuclear safety in 
Central and Eastern Europe. It calls on the Council to consider how to address the 
issue of nuclear safety in the framework of the enlargement process in accordance 
with the relevant Coimcil conclusions.
8. The European Council notes with satisfaction the substantive work undertaken and 
progress which has been achieved in accession negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.
9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and 
expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the 
process to a successful conclusion.
(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the 
accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the 
completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be 
made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of 
all relevant factors.
10. Determined to lend a positive contribution to security and stability on the 
European continent and in the light of recent developments as well as the 
Commission's reports, the European Council has decided to convene bilateral 
intergovernmental conferences in February 2000 to begin negotiations with
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Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta on the conditions for their 
entry into the Union and the ensuing Treaty adjustments.
11. In the negotiations, each Candidate State will be judged on its own merits. This 
principle will apply both to the opening of the various negotiating chapters and to the 
conduct of the negotiations. In order to maintain momentum in the negotiations, 
cumbersome procedures should be avoided. Candidate States, which have now been 
brought into the negotiating process, will have the possibility to catch up within a 
reasonable period of time with those already in negotiations if they have made 
sufficient progress in their preparations. Progress in negotiations must go hand in 
hand with progress in incorporating the acquis into legislation and actually 
implementing and enforcing it.
12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as 
noted in the Commission *s progress report, as well as its intention to continue its 
reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate 
State destined to join the Union on the basis o f the same criteria as applied to the 
other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like 
other candidate States, will benefit from  a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and 
support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis 
on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria fo r accession with particular 
reference to the issue o f human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in 
paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in 
Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States 
and the Union in the context o f the accession process. An accession partnership 
will be drawn up on the basis o f previous European Council conclusions while 
containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light 
o f the political and economic criteria and the obligations o f a Member State, 
combined with a national programme fo r the adoption o f the acquis. Appropriate 
monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the 
harmonisation o f Turkey's legislation and practice with the acquis, the 
Commission is invited to prepare a process o f analytical examination o f the acquis. 
The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework fo r  
coordinating all sources o f European Union financial assistance fo r pre-accession.
13. The future of the European Conference will be reviewed in the light of the 
evolving situation and the decisions on the accession process taken at Helsinki. The 
forthcoming French Presidency has announced its intention to convene a meeting of 
the conference in the second half of 2000.
SANTA MARIA DA FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNCIL (19-20 JUNE 2000) 
ENLARGEMENT
13. The European Council reaffirms the priority for the Union of the enlargement 
process and notes with satisfaction the substantive progress in the negotiations since 
the Helsinki European Council (see Annex II). In particular, it welcomes the 
launching of accession negotiations with Malta, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Bulgaria, and the first concrete results already achieved. The European 
Council considers that it should be feasible to open negotiations in all areas of the 
acquis with the most advanced of these candidates as early as possible in 2001.
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14. The European Council furthermore welcomes the fact that all areas of the acquis, 
except "Institutions", have now been opened for negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. It also notes that considerable 
progress has been made in several areas already under negotiation.
15. The European Council reiterates the commitment of the Union to maintain the 
momentum of the accession process. All candidates will continue to be judged on the 
basis of own merits. In line with the principle of differentiation, it is possible for 
candidates to catch up with those which started their negotiations earlier.
16. The European Council recalls that, in addition to finding solutions to the 
negotiating issues, progress in the negotiations depends on the incorporation by the 
candidate States of the acquis in their national legislation and especially on their 
capacity to effectively implement and enforce it. While progress has already been 
made, this calls for important efforts by the candidates to continue their domestic 
reforms, in particular strengthening their administrative and judicial structures. The 
Union will closely monitor the performance of the candidates. To this end, the 
Commission is invited to report to the Council on its findings. The European Council 
at Nice will review progress on enlargement and consider how to take forward the 
accession process.
17. W ith  respect to Tu rke y, the European C ounc il notes th is  candidate's in itia tive s  
to meet the accession c rite ria . In  accordance w ith the H e ls in k i conclusions, the  
European C ouncil looks fo rw a rd  to concrete progress, in  p a rtic u la r on hum an 
rig h ts, the ru le  o f law  and the jud ic ia ry . Th e  Com m ission sho u ld  rep ort to the  
C ounc il on p rog ress in  p rep a ring  the process o f analytical exam ination o f the 
acquis w ith  Tu rke y. The  Com m ission is  also invited, in  the lig h t o f the above, to 
present as soon as possib le p roposals fo r  the sing le  fin a n c ia l fra m e w o rk  fo r  
assistance to Tu rke y  as w e ll as fo r  the Accession Pa rtn e rsh ip .
18. The European Council stresses the importance of securing continuing support for 
enlargement and, to that effect, the need to provide appropriate information for the 
general public in Member States and candidate countries alike.
NICE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (7-9 DECEMBER 2000) 
ENLARGEMENT
6. The European Council reaffirms the historic significance of the European Union 
enlargement process and the political priority which it attaches to the success of that 
process. It welcomes the stepping up of accession negotiations with the candidate 
countries, which has brought very considerable progress, particularly in recent 
months.
7. The European Council believes that the time has now come to lend fresh impetus 
to the process. It endorses the General Affairs Council conclusions of
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4 December 2000 concerning the strategy proposed by the Commission. It is pleased 
to see that the principle of differentiation, based on each candidate country's own 
merits, and allowance of scope for catching up are reaffirmed in those Council 
conclusions. The road map for the next 18 months will ease the way for further 
negotiations, bearing in mind that those countries which are the best prepared will 
continue to be able to progress more quickly.
8. In the European Council's view, that strategy, together with the completion of the 
Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reform, will place the Union, in 
accordance with the objective set by the European Council in Helsinki, in a position 
to welcome those new Member States which are ready as from the end of 2002, in 
the hope that they will be able to take part in the next European Parliament elections. 
In Göteborg, in June 2001, the European Council will assess progress in 
implementing that new strategy, in order to give the necessary guidance for the 
successfixl completion of the process.
9. The European Council appreciates the efforts made by the candidate countries to 
establish the conditions for adoption, implementation and practical application of the 
acquis. The candidate countries are requested to continue and speed up the necessary 
reforms to prepare themselves for accession, particularly as regards strengthening 
their administrative capacity, so as to be able to join the Union as soon as possible. 
The European Council calls upon the Commission to propose a programme for the 
frontier regions in order to strengthen their economic competitiveness.
10. The European Council takes note of the Council report on candidate countries' 
exchange-rate strategies, which identifies an exchange-rate strategy compatible with 
accession to the Union, followed by participation in the exchange-rate mechanism 
and finally adoption of the euro. It welcomes the establishment of economic and 
financial dialogue with the candidate countries.
11. Th e  European C ouncil welcomes the p rog ress made in  im plem enting the p re­
accession strategy fo r  Tu rk e y  and is  very pleased at the agreement reached on the 
fra m e w o rk  Reg ula tion and on the Accession P a rtn e rsh ip  at the C ounc il meeting 
on 4  December 2000. I t  h ig h lig h ts the importance o f tha t document fo r  
estab lish ing  closer re la tio ns between the U n io n  and Tu rke y  along the lin e s  
mapped out by the H e ls in k i European C o unc il conclusions. Tu rke y  is  requested 
sw iftly  to sub m it its  na tiona l program m e fo r  adoption o f the acquis, basing i t  on 
the Accession Pa rtne rsh ip .
12. The meeting of the European Conference at the level of Heads of State or 
Government on 7 December 2000 provided an opportunity for discussion in depth of 
institutional reform and the operation of the European Union in the longer term. The 
European Council regards the European Conference as a useful framework for 
dialogue between the Union's Member States and the countries in line for 
membership. It proposes that the countries covered by the stabilization and 
association process and the EFTA countries be invited to attend as prospective 
members.
GOTEBERG EUROPEAN COUNCIL (15-16 JUNE 2001)
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ENLARGEMENT
5. Significant breakthroughs have been achieved in the accession negotiations under 
the Swedish Presidency. Determined efforts by all parties have made it possible to 
meet and surpass the objectives set out at Nice for the first half of 2001.
6. The Council conclusions of 11 June detail the substantial results achieved in a 
number of key areas. Candidate countries have made impressive progress in meeting 
the accession criteria. More than two thirds of the negotiating chapters have been 
provisionally closed with some candidate countries. All negotiating chapters will be 
opened before the end of June with some of the candidate countries that started 
negotiations only last year. The road map has proved to be an ambitious and realistic 
framework for the negotiations. During the incoming Belgian and Spanish 
Presidencies the European Union will pursue the road map with undiminished 
vigour.
7. This new momentum must be matched by continued progress in the candidate 
countries in transposing, implementing and enforcing the acquis. They will have to 
pay particular attention to putting in place adequate administrative structures, to 
reforming judicial systems and the civil service, as well as to the situation of 
minorities. Special efforts will be devoted to assisting Bulgaria and Romania.
8. Candidate countries will continue to be judged solely on their own merits. The 
principle of differentiation applies. This allows the best prepared countries to 
progress more quickly in the negotiations, and other candidates to catch up. 
Agreements -  even partial -  reached during the course of the negotiations may not be 
considered final until an overall agreement has been established.
9. The enlargement process is irreversible. Based on the progress achieved so far, the 
European Council reaffirms the road map as the framework for the successful 
completion of the enlargement negotiations. Provided that progress towards meeting 
the accession criteria continues at an unabated pace, the road map should make it 
possible to complete negotiations by the end of 2002 for those candidate countries 
that are ready. The objective is that they should participate in the European 
Parliament elections of 2004 as members.
10. Th e  decisions in  H e ls in k i have b rought Tu rke y  closer to the E U  and opened up 
new prospects fo r  he r European asp ira tions. Good progress has been made in  
im plem enting the pre-accession strategy fo r  Tu rke y, inc lud ing  an enhanced 
p o litic a l dialogue. Th e  presentation by Tu rk e y  o f its  N a tio na l Program m e fo r  
adopting the acquis is  a welcome development However, in  a num ber o f areas 
such as hum an rig h ts, fu rth e r p rogress is  needed. Tu rke y  is  urged to take concrete 
m easures to im plem ent the p rio ritie s  o f  the Accession Pa rtn e rsh ip , which is  the 
cornerstone o f the pre-accession strategy. Th e  C ouncil is  invited  to adopt the sing le  
fin a n c ia l fra m e w o rk  fo r  pre-accession assistance to Tu rke y  by the end o f the year 
a t the la te st Th e  economic program m e agreed w ith the I M F  m ust be vigorously  
implemented to create the conditions fo r  economic recovery.
11. Taking account of their particular situations, candidate countries are invited to 
translate the Union's economic, social and environmental objectives into their
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national policies. The intention of candidate countries to adopt the eEurope+ 
initiative is a successful example. Starting from Spring 2003, the Commission will 
begin covering the candidate countries and their national policies in its annual 
synthesis report.
12. The European Council notes that the Commission, in line with the Nice 
conclusions, will shortly present a communication on the question of the frontier 
regions in order to strengthen their economic competitiveness.
LAEKEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL (14-15 DECEMBER 2001)
ENLARGEMENT
7. The Commission document entitled "Making a success of enlargement", the 
regular reports and the revised partnerships for accession are a solid framework for 
the success of the accession process, which is now irreversible. The Berlin European 
Council established the financial framework permitting enlargement.
8. In recent months considerable progress has been made in the negotiations and
certain delays have been made good. The European Union is determined to bring the 
accession negotiations with the candidate countries that are ready to a successful 
conclusion by the end of 2002, so that those countries can take part in the European 
Parliament elections in 2004 as members. Candidacies will continue to be assessed 
on their own merits, in accordance with the principle of differentiation. The 
European Council agrees with the report of the Commission, which considers that, if 
the present rate of progress of the negotiations and reforms in the candidate States is 
maintained, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, the Czech Republic and Slovenia could be ready. It appreciates the efforts 
made by Bulgaria and Romania and would encourage them to continue on that 
course. If those countries are to receive specific support, there must be a precise 
framework with a timetable and an appropriate roadmap, the objective being to open 
negotiations with those countries on all chapters in 2002.
9. The candidate countries must continue their efforts energetically, in particular to 
bring their administrative and judicial capabilities up to the required level. The 
Commission will submit a report on the implementation of the plan of action for 
strengthening institutions to the Seville European Council in June 2002.
10. The roadmap drawn up by the Nice European Council remains frilly applicable.
At the beginning of 2002 the Commission will propose common positions on the 
agriculture, regional policy and budgetary chapters on the basis of the present acquis 
and of the principles decided on in Berlin. Proceedings on the drafting of the 
accession treaties will begin in the first half of 2002.
11. The European Covmcil welcomes the recent meetings between the leaders of the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and would encourage them to continue their 
discussions with a view to an overall solution under the auspices of the United 
Nations consistent with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security 
Coimcil.
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/2. Tu rke y  has made p rogress towards complying w ith  the p o litic a l c rite ria  
established fo r  accession, in  p a rtic u la r th roug h the recent amendment o f its  
constitu tion . T h is  has b rought fo rw a rd  the prospect o f  the opening o f  accession 
negotiations w ith Turkey. Tu rke y  is  encouraged to continue its  p rogress towards 
com plying w ith  both economic and p o litic a l c rite ria , notably w ith regard to hum an 
rig h ts. Th e  pre-accession strategy f o r  Tu rk e y  sh o u ld  m ark a new stage in  
analysing its  preparedness fo r  a lignm ent on the acquis.
SEVILLE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (21-22 JUNE 2002) 
ENLARGEMENT
18. Decisive progress has been made in the accession negotiations during the first six 
months of the year. The negotiations are now entering their final phase.
19. The road map adopted in Nice has been followed with the adoption of common 
positions concerning the chapters on "Agriculture", "Regional policy and 
coordination of structural instruments", "Financial and budgetary provisions" and 
"Institutions". Financial and other questions which were not dealt with when 
common positions were finalised on these chapters will need to be settled as soon as 
possible, while taking account of the conclusions of the General Affairs Council on 
17 June 2002.
20. As regards compliance with the accession criteria, the European Council stresses 
that it is important that the candidate countries should continue to make progress in 
the implementation and effective application of the acquis. The candidate countries 
must take all necessary measures to bring their administrative and judicial capacity 
up to the required level. In this connection, the European Council welcomes the 
Commission report on the specific action plans in this area and on the follow-up of 
commitments undertaken during negotiations, singling out in particular the 
conclusions of the Council on 10 June 2002 in the fields of justice and home affairs 
and of the veterinary and plant health acquis.
21. Taking account of all these factors and in order to enable the European Council 
to be held in the coming autumn to decide which will be the candidate countries with 
which negotiations can be concluded at the end of 2002;
the Council will have to take the appropriate decisions in order to communicate all 
the items lacking in the financial package to the candidate countries in early 
November, and
the Commission will have to draft appropriate recommendations in the light of the 
regular reports.
22. The European Council reaffirms that, if the present rate of progress in 
negotiations and reforms is maintained, the European Union is determined to 
conclude the negotiations with Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak 
Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia by the end of 
2002, if those countries are ready. The principle of differentiation must be fully 
complied with until the end of the negotiations. Drafting of the Treaty of Accession 
should continue so that it can be completed as soon as possible after the conclusion
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of the accession negotiations. It would seem reasonable to expect that the Treaty of 
Accession could be signed in spring 2003. The objective remains that these coimtries 
should participate in the elections for the European Parliament in 2004 as full 
members. However, this common aim can be realised within the time frame 
envisaged only if each candidate country adopts a realistic and constructive 
approach.
23. Bulgaria and Romania have achieved considerable progress over the last few 
months. The European Council encourages them to pursue their efforts and reiterates 
its commitment to give them full support in their preparation for accession. An 
updated road map and a revised and enhanced pre-accession strategy should be 
adopted in Copenhagen for the candidate countries still engaged in negotiations. An 
increase in pre-accession financial aid could also be contemplated. Furthermore, if 
the current pace is maintained, a more precise timetable could be set for these 
countries' accession process by the end of the year.
24. In respect of the accession of Cyprus, the Helsinki conclusions are the basis of 
the European Union's position. The European Union's preference continues to be for 
the accession of a reunited island. The European Council fully supports the efforts of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and calls upon the leaders of the Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to intensify and expedite their talks in 
order to seize this unique window of opportunity for a comprehensive settlement, 
consistent with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, hopefully before 
conclusion of the negotiations. The European Union would accommodate the terms 
of such a comprehensive settlement in the Treaty of Accession in line with the 
principles on which the European Union is founded: as a Member State, Cyprus will 
need to speak with a single voice and ensure proper application of European Union 
law. The European Union would make a substantial financial contribution in support 
of the development of the northern part of a reunited island.
25. The European Council welcomes the reforms recently adopted in Turkey. It 
encourages and fully supports the efforts made by Turkey to fulfil the priorities 
defined in its Accession Partnership. The implementation o f the required political 
and economic reforms will bring forward Turkey's prospects o f accession in 
accordance with the same principles and criteria as are applied to the other 
candidate countries. New decisions could be taken in Copenhagen on the next stage 
o f Turkey's candidature in the light o f developments in the situation between the 
Seville and Copenhagen European Councils, on the basis o f the regular report to be 
submitted by the Commission in October 2002 and in accordance with the Helsinki 
and Laeken conclusions.
BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL (24-25 OCTOBER 2002)
6. The Union welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the 
Copenhagen political criteria and the fact that Turkey has moved forward on the 
economic criteria and alignment with the acquis, as registered in the Commission’s 
Regular Report. This has brought forward the opening of accession negotiations with 
Turkey. The Union encourages Turkey to pursue its reform process and to take 
further concrete steps in the direction of implementation, which will advance 
Turkey’s accession in accordance with the same principles and criteria as are applied
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to the other candidate States. The Council is invited to prepare in time for the 
Copenhagen European Council the elements for deciding on the next stage of 
Turkey’s candidature, on the basis of the Commission’s Strategy Paper and in 
accordance with the conclusions of the European Councils in Helsinki, Laeken, and 
Seville.
COPENHAGEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL (12-13 DECEMBER 2002) 
Turkey
18. The European Council recalls its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that Turkey is a 
candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied 
to the other candidate states. It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by 
Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent 
legislative packages and the subsequent implementation measures, which cover a 
large number of key priorities specified in the Accession Partnership. The Union 
acknowledges the determination of the new Turkish government to take further steps 
on the path of reform and urges in particular the government to address swiftly all 
remaining shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, not only with regard to 
legislation but also in particular with regard to implementation. The Union recalls 
that, according to the political criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993, membership 
requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities.
19. The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the 
European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation 
from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, 
the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.
20. In order to assist Turkey towards EU membership, the accession strategy for 
Turkey shall be strengthened. The Commission is invited to submit a proposal for a 
revised Accession Partnership and to intensify the process of legislative scrutiny. In 
parallel, the EC-Turkey Customs Union should be extended and deepened. The 
Union will significantly increase its pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey. 
This assistance will from 2004 be financed under the budget heading "pre-accession 
expenditure".
THESSALONIKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL (19-20 JUNE 2003) 
ENLARGEMENT
Following the signature in Athens on 16 April 2003 of the Accession Treaty, where 
we proclaimed that "accession is a new contract between our peoples and not merely 
a treaty between our states", the results of referendums in Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic lend additional momentum to
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the ratification process. This process must be completed in time for the ten new 
Member States to join the Union on 1 May 2004. In the coming months, the ten 
acceding States are encouraged to keep up their efforts so that they are fully prepared 
to assume the obligations of membership by accession. This also includes the 
necessaiy translation of the Community acquis. With a view to making a success of 
enlargement, the monitoring of these preparations has been intensified on the basis of 
reports submitted regularly by the Commission.
Bulgaria and Romania are part of the same inclusive and irreversible enlargement 
process. Following the conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen and 
depending on fiarther progress in complying with the membership criteria, the 
objective is to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members in 2007. To this end, the 
pace of negotiations will be maintained, and these will continue on the same basis 
and principles that applied to the ten acceding states with each candidate judged on 
its own merits. Building on significant progress achieved, the Union supports 
Bulgaria and Romania in their efforts to achieve the objective of concluding 
negotiations in 2004, and invites them to step up their preparations on the ground. 
Discussions or agreement on future policy reforms, or the new financial perspective, 
shall neither impede the pursuit and conclusion of accession negotiations nor be 
prejudged by the outcome of these negotiations. The European Council in December 
2003, based on the regular reports from the Commission and the strategy paper, will 
assess progress achieved with a view to setting out the framework for the conclusion 
of accession negotiations.
The European Council welcomes the commitment of the Turkish government to 
carry forward the reform process, in particular the remaining legislative work by the 
end of 2003, and supports its on-going efforts made in order to fixlfill the 
Copenhagen political criteria for opening accession negotiations with the Union. 
Taking into account progress achieved, significant further efforts to this end are still 
required. With a view to helping Turkey achieve this objective, the Council adopted 
recently a revised Accession Partnership, which sets out the priorities that Turkey 
should pursue, supported by substantially increased pre-accession financial 
assistance. In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, fulfilment of these priorities 
will assist Turkey towards EU membership. The Accession Partnership constitutes 
the cornerstone of EU-Turkey relations, in particular in view of the decision to be 
taken by the European Council in December 2004.
BRUSSELS EUROPEAN COUNCIL (12 DECEMBER 2003) 
ENLARGEMENT 
Turkey
The European Council welcomes the considerable and determined efforts by the 
Turkish government to accelerate the pace of reforms, many of which are significant 
in political and legal terms. The legislative packages so far adopted, the first 
important steps taken to ensure effective implementation, as well as the progress in 
addressing many priorities under the Copenhagen political criteria and in the revised 
Accession Partnership have brought Turkey closer to the Union. Turkey has also 
made significant progress in meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria. However,
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further sustained efforts are needed, in particular as regards strengthening the 
independence and functioning of the judiciary, the overall framework for the exercise 
of fundamental freedoms (association, expression and religion), the further alignment 
of civil-military relations with European practice, the situation in the Southeast of the 
country and cultural rights. Turkey also has to overcome macro-economic 
imbalances and structural shortcomings.
The European Council underlines the importance of Turkey's expression of political 
will to settle the Cyprus problem. In this respect a settlement of the Cyprus problem, 
based on the principles set out in section IV. below, would greatly facilitate Turkey's 
membership aspirations.
The European Council encourages Turkey to build on the substantial progress 
achieved so far in its preparations for launching accession negotiations and 
underlines its commitment to working towards full implementation of the pre­
accession strategy with Turkey, including the revised Accession Partnership, in view 
of the decision to be taken by the European Council in December 2004 on the basis 
of the report and recommendations of the Commission.
Cyprus
In line with its relevant conclusions, the European Council reiterates its preference for a 
reunited Cyprus to join the Union on 1 May 2004, in order to allow all Cypriots to enjoy a 
secure and prosperous future and the benefits of EU accession. It considers that there is a 
good prospect of reaching a just, viable and functional settlement by 1 May 2004, 
consistent with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The European Council 
therefore again urges all parties concerned, and in particular Turkey and the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership, to strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts and, in this 
context, calls for an immediate resumption of the talks on the basis of his proposals. The 
Union reiterates its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in line with the 
principles on which the EU is founded. In this context, the European Council welcomes the 
Commission's willingness to offer assistance for a speedy solution within the framework of 
the acquis. Following a settlement, the Union is ready to provide financial assistance for 
the development of the northern part of Cyprus and the Commission would be called upon 
to prepare all necessary steps for lifting the suspension of the acquis, in accordance with 
Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession.
1 5 2
COPENHAGEN EUROPEAN COUNCIL 12 AND 13 DECEMBER 2002 
PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS
The European Council met in Copenhagen on 12 and 13 December 2002. The 
meeting was preceded by an exposé by the President of the European 
Parliament, Mr Pat Cox, followed by an exchange of views concerning the 
main items on the agenda.
The European Council heard a report by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing 
on the progress of the Convention's proceedings. In the light of that report the 
European Council held an exchange of views on the development of the 
discussions. The Convention will present the result of its work in time for the 
European Council in June 2003.
ENLARGEMENT
The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 launched an ambitious process 
to overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe. Today marks an 
unprecedented and historic milestone in completing this process with the 
conclusion of accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. The Union now looks forward to welcoming these States as 
members from 1 May 2004. This achievement testifies to the common 
determination of the peoples of Europe to come together in a Union that has 
become the driving force for peace, democracy, stability and prosperity on 
our continent. As fully fledged members of a Union based on solidarity, these 
States will play a full role in shaping the further development of the European 
project.
The Union endorses the result of these negotiations as set out in document 
21000/02. The financial consequences of enlargement are set out in Annex I. 
The comprehensive and balanced outcome provides a solid basis for the 
smooth integration of ten new Member States, while safeguarding the 
effective functioning of the enlarged Union. The agreement reached will 
provide the acceding states with the necessary transitional arrangements to 
cope successfidly with all obligations of membership. The result achieved in 
the accession negotiations ensures the continued functioning of the internal 
market as well as the various EU policies, without prejudging future reform.
Monitoring up to accession of the commitments undertaken will give further 
guidance to the acceding states in their efforts to assume responsibilities of 
membership and will give the necessary assurance to current Member States. 
The Commission will make the necessary proposals on the basis of the 
monitoring reports. Safeguard clauses provide for measures to deal with 
unforeseen developments that may arise during the first three years after 
accession. The European Council welcomes furthermore the commitment to
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continue the surveillance of progress with regard to economic, budgetary and 
structural policies in the candidate States within the existing economic policy 
coordination processes.
All efforts should now be directed at completing the drafting of the Accession 
Treaty so that it can be submitted to the Commission for its opinion and then 
to the European Parliament for its assent, and to the Council with a view to 
signing the Treaty in Athens on 16 April 2003.
By successfully concluding the accession negotiations the Union has 
honoured its commitment that the ten acceding States will be able to 
participate in the 2004 European Parliament elections as members. The 
Accession Treaty will stipulate that Commissioners from the new Member 
States will join the current Commission as from the day of accession on 1 
May 2004. After the nomination of a new President of the Commission by the 
European Council, the newly elected European Parliament would approve a 
new Commission that should take office on 1 November 2004. On the same 
date, the provisions contained in the Nice Treaty concerning the Commission 
and voting in the Council will enter into force. The necessary consultations 
with the European Parliament on these matters will be concluded by the end 
of January 2003. The above arrangements will guarantee the full participation 
of the new Member States in the institutional framework of the Union.
Finally, the new Member States will participate fully in the next 
Intergovernmental Conference. Without reform the Union will not fully reap 
the benefits of enlargement. The new Treaty will be signed after accession. 
This calendar shall be without prejudice to the timing of the conclusion of the 
IGC.
The current enlargement provides the basis for a Union with strong prospects 
for sustainable growth and an important role to play in consolidating stability, 
peace and democracy in Europe and beyond. In accordance with their 
national ratification procedures, the current and the acceding States are 
invited to ratify the Treaty in due time for it to enter into force on 1 May 
2004.
Cyprus
In accordance with the above paragraph 3, as the accession negotiations have 
been completed with Cyprus, Cyprus will be admitted as a new Member State 
to the European Union. Nevertheless the European Council confirms its 
strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus. In 
this context it welcomes the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and the 
Turkish Cypriots to continue to negotiate with the objective of concluding a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem by 28 February 2003 on the 
basis of the UNSG's proposals. The European Council believes that those 
proposals offer a unique opportunity to reach a settlement in the coming 
weeks and urges the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
commimities to seize this opportunity.
The Union recalls its willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in 
the Treaty of Accession in line with the principles on which the EU is
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founded. In case of a settlement, the Council, acting by unanimity on the 
basis of proposals by the Commission, shall decide upon adaptations of the 
terms concerning the accession of Cyprus to the EU with regard to the 
Turkish Cypriot community.
The European Council has decided that, in the absence of a settlement, the 
application of the acquis to the northern part of the island shall be suspended, 
until the Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal 
by the Commission. Meanwhile, the Council invites the Commission, in 
consultation with the government of Cyprus, to consider ways of promoting 
economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer 
to the Union.
Bulgaria and Romania
The successful conclusion of accession negotiations with ten candidates lends 
new dynamism to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania as part of the same 
inclusive and irreversible enlargement process. The Union welcomes the 
important progress achieved by these countries, which is duly reflected in the 
advanced state of their accession negotiations.
The Union looks forward to consolidating the results achieved so far. 
Following the conclusions of the European Council in Brussels and 
depending on fiirther progress in complying with the membership criteria, the 
objective is to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as members of the European 
Union in 2007. The Union confirms that accession negotiations with these 
countries will continue on the basis of the same principles that have guided 
the accession negotiations so far, and that each candidate country will be 
judged on its own merits.
The roadmaps put forward by the Commission provide Bulgaria and Romania 
with clearly identified objectives and give each country the possibility of 
setting the pace of its accession process. It is essential that Bulgaria and 
Romania seize this opportunity by stepping up their preparation, including 
fulfilling and implementing the commitments undertaken in the accession 
negotiations. In this context, the Union underlines the importance of judicial 
and administrative reform that will help bring forward Bulgaria's and 
Romania's overall preparation for membership. This will ensure that the 
process will be successfully brought forward on the basis of the results 
reached so far. Future Presidencies and the Commission will make sure that 
the pace of accession negotiations on all remaining chapters, including 
chapters with financial implications, is maintained and matches the efforts of 
Bulgaria and Romania.
The Union underlines its resolve to assist Bulgaria and Romania in these 
efforts. The Union endorses the Commission's communication on roadmaps 
for Bulgaria and Romania, including the proposals for a significant increase 
in pre-accession assistance. The high level of funding to be made available 
should be used in a flexible way, targeting the priorities identified, including 
in key areas such as Justice and Home Affairs. Further guidance in their pre­
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accession work will be provided by the revised Accession Partnerships to be 
presented to them next year.
Furthermore, Bulgaria and Romania will participate in the next 
Intergovernmental Conference as observers.
Turkey
The European Council recalls its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that 
Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis 
of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states. It 
strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent 
legislative packages and the subsequent implementation measures, 
which cover a large number of key priorities specified in the 
Accession Partnership. The Union acknowledges the 
determination of the new Turkish government to take further steps 
on the path of reform and urges in particular the government to 
address swiftly all remaining shortcomings in the field of the 
political criteria, not only with regard to legislation but also in 
particular with regard to implementation. The Union recalls that, 
according to the political criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993, 
membership requires that a candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform 
process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis 
of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides 
that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European 
Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without 
delay.
In order to assist Turkey towards EU membership, the accession 
strategy for Turkey shall be strengthened. The Commission is 
invited to submit a proposal for a revised Accession Partnership 
and to intensify the process of legislative scrutiny. In parallel, the 
EC-Turkey Customs Union should be extended and deepened. The 
Union will significantly increase its pre-accession financial 
assistance for Turkey. This assistance will from 2004 be financed 
under the budget heading "pre-accession expenditure".
The European Union and the acceding States agreed on a joint 
declaration "One Europe" on the continuous, inclusive and 
irreversible nature of the enlargement process (see doc. SN
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369/02), which will be annexed to the final act of the Accession 
Treaty.
The enlarged Union and its neighbours
The enlargement will bring about new dynamics in the European integration. 
This presents an important opportunity to take forward relations with 
neighbouring countries based on shared political and economic values. The 
Union remains determined to avoid new dividing lines in Europe and to 
promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the 
Union.
The European Coimcil recalls the criteria defined at the Copenhagen 
European Coimcil in June 1993 and reaffirms the European perspective of the 
countries of the Western Balkans in the Stabilisation and Association Process 
as stipulated by the European Council in Feira. The Council underlines its 
determination to support their efforts to move closer to the EU. The European 
Council welcomes the decision by the incoming Greek Presidency to organise 
a Summit on 21 June in Thessaloniki between EU Member States and 
countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
The enlargement will strengthen relations with Russia. The European Union 
also wishes to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the 
southern Mediterranean countries based on a long-term approach promoting 
democratic and economic reforms, sustainable developments and trade and is 
developing new initiatives for this purpose. The European Cotmcil welcomes 
the intention of the Commission and the Secretary General/High 
Representative to bring forward proposals to that end.
The European Covmcil encourages and supports the further development of 
cross-border and regional cooperation inter alia through enhancing transport 
infrastructure, including appropriate instruments, with and among 
neighbouring countries in order to develop the regions' potential to the full.
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iGREMENTS, WHICH HAS ESTABLISHED EU COMMUNITIES AND MEMBER STATEi
A. Aggrements ( With the dates put into force)
23 July 1952 Treaty of Paris/ ECSC 
1 January 1958 Treaty of Rome/ EEC 
1 January 1958 Treaty of Rome/EURATOM
1 Janaury 1973 Accession Agreements of Denmark, Ireland, and England 
1 January 1981 Accession Aggrement of Greece 
1 January 1986 Accession Aggremeiits of Spain, and Portugal 
1 July 1987 Single European Act 
29 October 1993 Treaty of Maastricht
1 January 1995 Accession Aggrements of Austria, Sweden,and Portugal 
1 May 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam 
2001 Treaty of Nice
B. Founding Members
Federal Gennany, Belgium, Holland, France, Italy, Luxembourg
C. Enlargements
1973: England, Denmark, Ireland 
1981: Greece 
1986: Spain, Portugal 
1995: Austria, Sweden, and Finland 
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TABLE 4
CHANGES REGARDING THE NUMBER OF SEATS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AFTER RECENT ENLARGEMENT
Appendix C.4
MEMBER STATE ACCORDING TO NICE TREATY*
GefTnany 99
England 72
France 72
72
Spain 50
Poland 50
Romania 33
Holland 25
Greece 22
Czech Republic 20
Belgium 22
Hungary 20
Portugal 22
Sweden 18
Bulgaria 17
Austria 17
Slovakia 13
Denmark 13
Finland 13
Ireland 12
Litvania 12
Letonia 8
S/ovenra 7
Estonia 6
Southern Cyprus 6
Luxembourg 6
Malta 5
TOTAL 732
(*): Came into force till June 2004
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